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“Each of the professions means a prejudice.  
The necessity for a career forces every one to take sides.  
We live in the age of the overworked, and the under-educated;  
the age in which people are so industrious that they become absolutely stupid” 
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ABSTRACT 
Lifeline is an earthquake engineering term denoting those systems that are necessary 
for human life and urban contest. Those systems are commonly used to transport water, 
oil, natural gas and other material. Their disruption due to earthquakes can have a 
devastating impact on urban context both for human losses both economic stability. 
Therefore, due to their vulnerabilities, it is important to assess and mitigate seismic risk 
of lifelines since they are intricately linked with industries, communities and security 
they serve. The earthquake safety of lifeline systems has attracted great attention in 
recent years since significant amount of damage was observed during several past 
earthquakes.  
This thesis focuses on the seismic performance evaluation of gas distribution 
networks. The basic function of a gas system is to deliver gas from sources to 
costumers. A gas distribution system is essentially composed by pipelines, reduction 
stations, valves and demand nodes. Those systems are essentially located underground. 
As consequences gas networks are subjected to both transient ground deformation due 
to seismic waves, which is felt over a wide geographical area,  and ground failure due 
to geotechnical hazards such as liquefaction and landslide, which determine localized 
ground failure. Moreover since buried pipelines systems generally cover large areas, a 
sophisticated hazard analysis is required. In particular the quantification of regional 
hazard is based on a large vector of spatially correlated ground motion intensities and 
requires the modeling of the joint distribution of intensity measures at all sites of 
interest. Dependencies among ground motion parameters at different sites imply the 
estimation of spatial correlation models to be used for the hazard assessment but since 
each component that characterizes the system may be sensitive to different ground 
motion parameters, the possibility of the existence of a cross-correlation between these 
parameters has also to be taken into account. Fragility analysis of gas systems is 
generally based on empirical data collected throughout past earthquakes. In the case of 
pipeline components, the usual practice is to evaluate the repair rate as a unit length of 
pipe, with respect to a parameter representative of ground shaking or ground failure. 
For processing facilities, that include many subcomponents, a quantitative vulnerability 
assessment is quite difficult. A possible approach is to consider these facilities as 
systems and to aggregate the fragility of each component into a global systemic 
vulnerability through the use of fault tree analysis. Further in order to evaluate the 
interaction between component response to earthquake and lifeline performance, 
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system performance indicators  provide a measure of the impact of the earthquake on 
the system functionality.    
Building on the results from past international research projects, existing tools for 
the vulnerability assessment, and seismic risk analysis of lifelines systems, the 
SYNER-G project (“Systemic Seismic Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for Buildings, 
Lifeline Networks and Infrastructures Safety Gain”), has been funded by the European 
Commission (2009-2012) with the aim to address criticalities.  In relation of the 
objectives of this project, this thesis had the aim to determine methodologies for 
the probabilistic seismic risk analysis of gas distribution networks and to apply these 
methods to a real gas system. In literature, there are very few studies on seismic risk 
analysis of networks that take into account all the aspects of the component of risk 
(hazard, vulnerability and loss). Moreover there are fewer studies that try to calibrate 
the analysis on a real system, making the study interesting for network operators. The  
thesis, in fact, has achieved this goal with special emphasis to the medium and low 
pressure network of a real system, namely the L’Aquila gas distribution system 
managed by ENEL Rete Gas s.p.a., for which not only detailed information on the 
network were retrieved, but also data related to damages occurred on the network 
followed the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake. A geographic information system (GIS) 
database was developed containing data on system physical and operational 
characteristics provided by the network operator to chracterize the seismic behavior of 
all components. L’Aquila region has been characterized both in terms of transient 
ground deformation hazard and permanent ground deformation hazard. In particular 
European and Italian spatial correlation models have been estimated and used for the 
simulation of probabilistic scenarios earthquakes and the ground failure hazard has 
been characterized in terms of landslide potential. Probabilistic simulations have been 
performed to evaluate the system response in terms of performance indicators for 
different combinations.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: lifelines, spatial correlation, permanent ground deformation, 
connectivity
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Chapter 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Lifeline is an earthquake engineering term denoting those systems that are necessary 
for human life and urban contest. Those systems basically convey food, water, fuel, 
energy, information, and other materials necessary for human existence. Disruption of 
lifelines caused by earthquakes can therefore have a considerable impact both in the 
short term for life security and in the long term for the effects on the economy and 
social stability of a region. Therefore, due to their vulnerabilities, it is important to 
assess and mitigate seismic risk of lifelines since they are intricately linked with 
industries, communities and security they serve.  
The critical importance and earthquake vulnerability of lifelines were first 
strongly emphasized in the in San Francisco earthquake and ensuing fires in 1906 
(ATC-25, 1991). The earthquake disaster, which continues today to be the worst one in 
U.S. history, was in large part attributable to the failure of several lifelines, including: 
breakage of gas distribution and service lines, damage to fire stations, hundreds of 
breaks to the water distribution system resulting in total loss of water for fire-fighting 
purposes. Following 1906, several earthquakes continued to illustrate the importance of 
lifelines in earthquakes. The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, for example, illustrated 
more than any other event  the effects that earthquake can be have on lifelines; there 
were damage to electrical substations, hundreds of breaks in the water distribution 
system, loss of telephone service due to this damage, near-collapse of a major dam, 
numerous breaks in the gas distribution system, collapse of major freeway 
overcrossings, damage to emergency facilities, including collapse and major loss of life 
at a hospital, and major damage or partial collapse at several other hospitals.  
Lifeline earthquake engineering is a relatively new field one. Its formal 
recognition came in the 1970's with the establishment in the United States of ASCE's 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (Duke and Matthiesen, 1973). 
In September 1988 Applied Technology Council (ATC) was awarded a contract by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency to assess the seismic vulnerability and 
impact of disruption of lifeline systems nationwide with the purpose to better 
understand the impact of disruption of lifelines from earthquakes and to assist in the 
identification and prioritization of hazard mitigation measures. A concerted research 
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effort since then has made up but many challenges remain. Recent disastrous seismic 
events have widely documented the crucial role of the lifelines networks in supporting 
the emergency management and in facilitating the response and recovery phases 
following an earthquake, thus raising the interest of both the scientific community and 
the stakeholders in identifying proper risk mitigation and risk management strategies 
for lifelines systems. Management of lifeline seismic risk is useful for several decision 
makers (e.g. emergency management, insurance modelers, industrial company) for the 
prediction (pre earthquake) and the estimation (post earthquake) of economical (e.g. 
monetary losses) and social impacts (e.g. casualties) observing in future events or in 
the aftermath of an earthquake.  
  
Figure 1.1 Damages on roads (left) and rails (right) due to surface faulting following the 4 
September 2010 Mw 7.1 Canterbury, New Zealand Earthquake (Eidinger, 2011) 
In general, each lifeline is a network within there are sources, transmission lines, 
storages and distribution systems and share four common characteristics (Wang and 
O’Rourke, 2008): geographical distribution, interconnectivity, diversity and 
interdependencies. In fact they are spatially distributed, i.e. they are usually 
constructed over a wide geographical area where communities they serve are dispersed, 
and because of this characteristic it is not practical to characterize all sites that lifeline 
systems cover with the same degree of detail. Moreover they are interconnected since 
customers and networks are interconnected through components as pipelines, roads, 
bridges etc. In fact damage to lifelines not only results in the physical impact and cost 
of repair at specific location, but also in the losses of connectivity and functionality 
throughout the network. All interconnected systems are characterized by critical links 
and their performance is influenced by the degree of physical and operational 
redundancy: systems with more redundant connectivity will perform better than less 
redundant systems. Another important aspect is represented by the degree of diversity 
of components that characterize each system.  
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Consider, for example a gas system. Many gas systems are composed by pipelines 
manufactured by steel, polyethylene, which have significantly different mechanical 
properties and perform differently under seismic load. Therefore properties as material, 
joint type, design procedures, degree of deterioration may influence performance of 
lifeline systems. Lifeline systems have also interdependencies, both by physical 
proximity and operational interactions. Damage to one lifeline system may affect other 
systems. For example loss of electricity can affect the flow pressure in the gas system 
or water system, a break in a water trunk line along a main street can block the traffic.  
This thesis focuses on the seismic performance evaluation of gas distribution 
networks. The basic function of a gas system is to deliver gas from sources to 
costumers. A gas distribution system is essentially composed by pipelines, reduction 
stations, valves and demand nodes. Those systems are essentially located underground. 
As consequences, ground movements triggered by earthquakes in the form of transient 
ground deformation (TGD), caused by the passage of seismic waves (ground shaking) 
which is felt over a wide geographical area, and permanent ground deformation (PGD), 
caused by surface faulting, liquefaction, landslides which determine localized ground 
failure, have direct effects on the integrity of systems components and system 
performance. The earthquake safety of buried pipeline systems has attracted great 
attention in recent years since significant amount of damage was observed in pipelines 
after severe past earthquakes. In Table (1.1) information about four of the most severe 
earthquakes which have occurred in southern California are summarized; it provides 
data on earthquake characteristics (magnitude, intensity, epicentral location), portion of 
pipeline systems subjected to strongest shaking and general observations about gas 
transmission and distribution line response.  
Building on the results from past international research projects, existing tools for 
the vulnerability assessment, and seismic risk analysis of lifelines systems, the 
SYNER-G project (“Systemic Seismic Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for Buildings, 
Lifeline Networks and Infrastructures Safety Gain”), has been funded by the European 
Commission (2009-2012) with the aim to address criticalities. In relation of the 
objectives of this project, this thesis had the aim to determine methodologies for 
the probabilistic seismic risk analysis of gas distribution networks and to apply these 
methods to a real gas network. In literature, there are very few studies on seismic risk 
analysis of networks that take into account all the aspects of the component of risk 
(hazard, vulnerability and loss). Moreover there are fewer studies that try to calibrate 
the analysis on a real system, making the study interesting for network operators.  
Therefore to understand gas network performance during earthquakes, this thesis 
has been conducted in collaboration with Enel Rete Gas S.p.A. (http://www.enel.it/it-
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IT/reti/enel_rete_gas/), which manages about 31.000 kilometers of local gas 
distribution networks in 1.200 Italian municipalities. In particular the gas distribution 
network operating in L’Aquila (central Italy) has been chosen as case study.  
Table 1.1 Summary of major earthquakes in the area of the Southern California gas 
system (O’Rourke and Palmer, 1996) 
 
1.2. Objectives of this study 
This thesis focuses on the seismic performance assessment of gas distribution systems. 
The overall objective is to develop a methodology for evaluating the seismic 
performance of gas distribution systems, investigating the different aspects that are 
involved. The process make use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, empirical 
relations to estimate pipeline response, fragility curves for the evaluation of reduction 
cabins vulnerability, performance indicators to characterize the functionality of the gas 
network. The thesis, in fact, has achieved this goal with special emphasis to the 
medium and low pressure network of a real system, namely the L’Aquila gas 
distribution system managed by ENEL Rete Gas s.p.a., for which not only detailed 
information on the network were retrieved , but also data related to damages occurred 
on the network followed the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake. A geographic information 
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system (GIS) database was developed containing most of relevant data on system 
component provided by the network operator, pipeline damage and strong motion data 
after 2009 L’Aquila earthquake. Moreover, the thesis rigorously includes the analysis 
of seismic hazard for gas systems (including geotechnical hazards), the analysis of 
vulnerability of system components, the analysis of systemic vulnerability in terms of 
performance measures, and probabilistic simulations for risk assessment. 
1.2.1. Framework for seismic risk assessment of lifelines 
A general framework for evaluating lifelines performance under seismic events is 
presented and described below with a particular focus on peculiarities characterizing 
gas distribution systems. For the quantification of seismic risk of spatially-distributed 
systems, there are several aspects that differ from the risk analysis of single structures.  
As shown in Fig. (1.1), where the most important differences (in green) respect to 
single structure seismic analysis are also reported, the evaluation of seismic risk for 
lifelines is not straightforward.  
The first complication is in the hazard evaluation: it is based on large vector of 
ground motion-intensities (for all sites that describe the region where the system is 
located). Moreover earthquake characteristics at separate sites are neither perfectly 
dependent nor perfectly independent. Given an expected characteristic at each site 
(ground motion values conditional upon the earthquake), derivations from the expected 
values are correlated from site to site because of common source parameters and 
depending on the sites, perhaps a common propagation path and site conditions (Mc 
Guire, 2004). Dependencies among ground motion parameters at different sites imply 
the estimation of correlation models to use for the hazard assessment but since each 
component that characterizes the system may be sensitive to different ground motion 
parameters, the possibility of the existence of a cross-correlation between these 
parameters has also to take into account. Further, most of lifeline systems are located 
underground (e.g. water, gas and oil systems) and, as consequences, they are subjected 
to earthquake-induced effects such as liquefaction and landslides which potential for 
damage is very high due to the large deformations they impose on unburied systems.  
Then, starting from the evaluation of seismic demand for each component, 
fragility analysis has to be computed. The most used and straightforward approach is 
based on empirical data collected throughout past earthquakes. In the case of pipeline 
components, the usual practice is to evaluate the repair rate as a unit length of pipe, 
with respect to a parameter representative of ground shaking or ground failure. For 
processing facilities, that include many subcomponents, a quantitative vulnerability 
assessment is quite difficult. A possible approach is to consider these facilities as 
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systems and to aggregate the fragility of each component into a global systemic 
vulnerability through the use of fault tree analysis. 
Seismic demand
Fragility analysis of each component
Above ground
facilities
Underground
facilities
Consequences
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System
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Figure 1.2 Framework for lifeline seismic risk assessment 
Further system performance measures are used in order to evaluate the interaction 
between component response to earthquake and lifeline performance. Performance 
indicators provide a measure of the impact of the earthquake on the system 
functionality.  
For the specific case of the gas network, the performance may be related to the 
capacity of the system to deliver gas with sufficient pressure to costumers; in this case 
hydraulic analysis is used to assess the overall system performance given the 
estimation of earthquake-induced damage at the component level. Since the link 
between the system component damage measures and the systemic vulnerability is 
usually not available in closed form, optimization procedures based on Monte Carlo 
simulations (MCS) based approaches, instead of analytical approaches are used: 
repeated simulations of network performance, each of which is based on randomly 
samples of hazard intensities and corresponding component status are performed in 
order to estimate in a probabilistic framework the systemic response of the lifeline 
system. Moreover an extra vulnerability could be considered when the failure of one 
element is dependent on the failure of elements in other networks: the damage 
disruption to the system may affect other networks (interdependencies) and vice versa 
because of physical proximity or operational interaction. For example gas network 
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depends on electricity because of compressor station backup system. At the same time 
power network depends on gas system for fuel production.  
Finally, since lifeline systems are interwoven with the communities they serve, the 
engineering output of system response evaluation may be utilized in the social and 
economical impact evaluation by economist and social scientists in order to quantify 
earthquake effects in terms of business interruption and social consequences.  
1.2.2. Seismic hazard characterization of L’Aquila gas network 
An important objective of this work is to describe the characterization of seismic 
hazards of the L’Aquila region in order to evaluate the effects of earthquakes on the 
L’Aquila gas distribution network. To this aim probabilistic scenarios earthquakes 
have been generated in a regular grid covering the gas network using as source the 
Paganica fault on which L’Aquila (central Italy) 2009 earthquake  was originated, 
computed for a characteristic earthquake of moment magnitude Mw 6.3 and occurrence 
rate of ν = 1/ 750 (Pace et al., 2006). Strong ground motions, in terms of peak 
acceleration and velocity, are evaluated though a European ground motion prediction 
equation, and in order to model the spatial variability of these parameters,  ad hoc 
spatial correlation models have been estimated and used for the simulation of 
probabilistic scenarios earthquakes. Site condition effects are followed according to the 
ground motion prediction equation based amplification factors. Moreover the PGD 
hazard has been integrated, in particular focusing on the effects induced by landslide, 
in order to estimate the seismic demand due to geotechnical hazard. In fact a process 
jointly developed by Department of Hydraulic Engineering, Geotechnical and 
Environmental  and Department of Structural Engineering of University of Naples, 
“Federico II”, the landslide potential of the region of interest, in terms of critical 
acceleration map, has been performed according to the HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) 
procedure. 
1.2.3. System characterization of L’Aquila gas network  
L’Aquila gas distribution network, operated by ENEL Rete Gas s.p.a., has been 
utilized as a test bed in this work. A process jointly developed with the network 
operator has allowed the characterization of the system, necessary for the evaluation of 
gas system seismic performance. A geographic information system (GIS) database was 
developed containing data on system physical and operational characteristics provided 
by the network operator. The system is connected to the high-pressure transmission 
lines (operated at a national level by SNAM, http://www.snamretegas.it) via three 
Metering/Pressure Reduction Stations, M/R Stations (Re.Mi. “Regolazione e Misura” 
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stations, in Italian) providing gas to about 42300 customers in five municipalities 
(L’Aquila, Lucoli, Tornimparte, Ocre, Rocca di Cambio e Rocca di Mezzo). The 
distribution system is made of 621 km of pipes: 234 km of pipes operating at medium 
pressure (2.5 – 3 bar), and the remaining 387 km with gas flowing at low pressure 
(0.025 – 0.035 bar) and it also consists of Metering/Pressure reduction stations (M/R 
stations), Reduction Groups and demand nodes. The knowledge of physical and 
operational characteristics of the system has allowed the evaluation of the seismic 
behavior of all components that has been also compare with data resulting from the 
analysis of the damages occurred on the gas network following the 6th April L’Aquila 
earthquake.  
1.2.4. System performance evaluation of L’Aquila gas network 
The methodology presented has been tested via the implementation of the case study in 
the OOFIM software developed in a Matlab environmental (Mathwork, 2010) by the 
University of Rome “La Sapienza”. The software, created in relation of the objectives 
of the Syner-G project, adheres to the OBJECT-ORIENTED Paradigm (OOP) where 
the problem is described as a set of objects, “software containers” grouping together 
related procedures and data. Data elements are called attributes of an object. 
Procedures which operate on data specific for an object are called methods. Objects are 
instances (concrete realizations) of classes (abstract models) that are used to model the 
system. In the context of modeling the gas distribution network, the system is 
represented as a graph with nodes and links as elementary components. For the purpose 
of the thesis the programme has been equipped with the GAS class including attributes 
and methods, in order to evaluate seismic performance of the L’Aquila network.  
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is divided in five chapters, the first of which presents introductory 
comments on lifeline seismic risk assessment.  
Chapter 2 describes the general process to characterize seismic hazard of gas 
networks and how to determine seismic demand for each system component. In 
particular, detailed information on characterization of wave propagation and PGD 
hazards are presented. Wave propagation hazard is characterized by random fields of 
intensity measures that can be estimated though ground motion prediction equations 
(GMPEs) that provide the mean value conditional on a set of explanatory variables 
describing the earthquake source, wave propagation path and local geological 
conditions, and spatial correlation models that characterize the spatial variability of 
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these parameters. Since correlation models available in literature have been estimated 
starting from dense observations of different earthquakes outside Europe, in order to 
characterize spatial correlation fields for the case study, spatial models have been 
estimated for different intensity measures (peak ground acceleration, peak ground 
velocity, spectral acceleration) using the European Strong-Motion Database (ESD) and 
the Italian Accelerometric Archive (ITACA) through the use of geostatistical tools. 
Moreover since the performance of spatially distribute systems may be conditional 
upon the failure of many components within the system, each of which is sensitive to 
different intensity measures (IMs), the possibility of the existence of a cross-correlation 
between IMs has been taken into account through the use of the conditional hazard. 
This technique starts from the assumption that two IMs considered are jointly 
distributed according to a bivariate Gaussian distribution, and it has the advantage to 
avoid making assumptions about the structure of the cross correlation between the two 
IMs.   
Geotechnical hazards induced from earthquakes have been the subject of a 
considerable amount of researches in the last decades. Their potential for damage is 
very high since they impose large deformation on pipeline systems. The principal 
forms of permanent ground deformation are surface faulting, landsliding, seismic 
settlement and lateral spreading due to soil liquefaction. There are many models 
available in literature that have the intent to relate the degree of deformation (PGD) 
and the probability of occurrence of each geotechnical hazard to the strength of ground 
motion but the main limiting factor of many models is the requirement of very detailed 
geotechnical data that could make difficult the implementation of these models for 
many lifeline systems. Therefore the use of simpler models that may be implemented 
in the widest variety of applications has been taken into account to characterize the 
geotechnical hazard potential of L’Aquila region. 
Chapter 3 focus on the system characterization and fragility analysis of gas 
distribution system components. In particular, fragility curves provide the probability 
of failure of a component as a function of an intensity measure. Unfortunately, for gas 
systems, there are no exhaustive studies in the literature on seismic behavior of all 
components. Therefore to this aim, seismic vulnerability of some components 
characterizing the L’Aquila gas network has been investigated through the use of fault 
tree analysis. Moreover fragility curves available in literature have been validated 
through an analysis of the damages occurred on the gas network following the 6th April 
L’Aquila earthquake by processing technical reports from Enel Rete Gas describing the 
repairs and replacements activities following the seismic event. 
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After evaluating the interaction between seismic demand and the component 
response, system performance assessment proceeds to system integration, in which 
performance is evaluated according the functionality and the serviceability of the entire 
network. More specifically, in Chapter 4 different performance indicators (PIs) are 
introduced in order to provide a measure of the impact of the earthquake on the system 
functionality.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the process for seismic performance evaluation of 
L’Aquila gas system and presents the probabilistic results. For the case study, a GIS 
database was developed; it containing most of relevant data on system component 
provided by the network operator, pipeline damages and strong motion data during 
2009 L’Aquila earthquake developed during this research. L’Aquila region has been 
characterized both in terms of TGD hazard and PGD hazard and system response 
simulations have been performed utilizing a specific software developed in a Matlab 
environmental (Mathwork, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 2 – GAS NETWORKS HAZARD 
CHARACTERIZATION 
2.1. Introduction 
Seismic performance evaluation of gas networks requires as first step the seismic 
hazard characterization affecting the system. The traditional approaches for seismic 
hazard evaluation at a particular site are essentially two: the probabilistic approach and 
the deterministic approach. In deterministic seismic hazard analysis, DSHA, (Reiter, 
1991), a particular earthquake scenario is assumed and the hazard is computed respect 
to the single selected earthquake. Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, PSHA, 
(Cornell, 1968) instead, considers explicitly the uncertainties (e.g. in earthquake size, 
location, time of occurrence) evaluating the effects of all possible earthquakes that can 
affect the site of interest. 
The hazard analysis, regardless of deterministic or probabilistic, starts with 
identification and evaluation of earthquake sources. Then a recurrence relationship, 
which specifies the average rate at which an earthquake of some size will be exceeded 
during a specified period of time, is used to characterize seismicity of each source 
zone. Earthquake effects are then estimated computing the level reached by one or 
more parameters used to characterize the ground motion. Generally, this goal is 
pursued using ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs) that express the selected 
ground motion parameter as function of all the effects that can modify its value (e.g. 
the seismic source, the magnitude and site effects). Finally, PSHA combines the 
uncertainties evaluating the effects of all selected earthquakes of different size, 
occurring at different locations inside the sources with different probabilities of 
occurrence to obtain  the “hazard curve” (Fig. 2.1) that shows the probability that the 
ground motion level will be exceeded during a particular time period at the site of 
interest. Therefore for each earthquake source, the hazard integral λ represents the 
mean frequency of exceedance of a specific value of a ground motion intensity 
measure denoted IM (e.g. peak ground acceleration, PGA) in a specific site calculated 
as in Eq. (2.1):  
( )* ,| , ,M R
M R
P IM im M R f m r dm drλ ν ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ > ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎣ ⎦∫ ∫   (2.1)
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where , ( , )M Rf m r  
is the joint distribution of magnitude and distances referred to a 
particular seismic source , ν is the rate of occurrence of earthquakes on it and 
* | ,P IM im M R⎡ ⎤>⎣ ⎦ is a conditional probability that, for a given magnitude-distance 
couple, gives the probability of exceeding the level of the selected intensity measure 
and it is generally calculated via a GMPE. Under the basic assumption of a Poissonian 
model for the characterization of the temporal occurrence of the earthquakes, the 
exceeding probability P of the selected range of values of an IM for a time period t can 
be expressed by Eq. (2.2): 
( )1 expP tλ= − − ⋅   (2.2) 
On the other side, for a given time period, the hazard map shows the values of the 
selected IMs that have the same exceeding frequency evaluated though PSHA for all 
points in the map. 
 
Figure 2.1 Hazard curve: frequency of exceeding the level of the selected intensity 
measure (i.e. PGA expressed in g) in a specific site 
For a single structure, numerical integration is sufficient to evaluate λ. For a 
group of sites or for a facility that extends over a large area (such as a gas network) a 
more sophisticated hazard analysis is required since it is based on a large vector of 
ground motion intensities. The scalar value IM in Eq. (2.1) is replaced by a vector of 
IMs which adds complexity to the integral. Moreover ground motion intensities also 
shown spatial statistical correlation (i.e. dependencies between IMs as function on 
inter-separation distance), which needs to be modeled and incorporated into the hazard 
integral (Crowley and Bommer, 2006; Park et al., 2007). Considering for example a 
region discretized in n sites in which there is a seismic source (characterized by the 
rate of occurrence ν); the hazard integral of Eq. (2.3) provides such annual rate of joint 
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exceedance in a region, if the same assumptions of site-specific hazard analysis are 
retained (McGuire, 2004).  
( )* *1 ,,........, | , ,⎡ ⎤= ⋅ > > ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ n M R
M R
P IM im IM im M R f m r dm drλ ν   (2.3) 
where , ( , )M Rf m r  is the joint distribution of magnitude and distances referred to the 
seismic source, and * *1 ,........, | ,⎡ ⎤> >⎣ ⎦nP IM im IM im M R , the term affected by spatial 
correlation, is the conditional probability that the same1 im* threshold is exceeded at 
the n sites in which the region is discretized and whose distances from the source are 
represented by the vector { }1 ,...,= nR R R  (the integral is conventionally written as if it 
was a scalar). The complexity of the integral, growing with the number of sites of 
interest, makes difficult to evaluate seismic hazard though numerical integration.  
Hence, many past research works use Monte Carlo simulation (MCS)-based 
approaches instead of analytical approaches (Bazzurro and Luco, 2005; Crowley and 
Bommer, 2006) where possible future earthquakes are probabilistically simulated in 
the region of interest, considering all possible scenarios that could occur, and use them 
for the loss assessment. This approach has the advantages of including in a simple way 
spatial correlation among sites to evaluate lifeline loss exceedance curves (Jayaram 
and Baker, 2009b). 
In the case of gas networks, another important aspect to consider in seismic 
hazard analysis is that the presence of buried components (i.e. pipelines) implies the 
consideration of two types of hazard: wave propagation hazard and permanent ground 
deformation hazard (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999) as shown in Fig. (2.2). The earthquake-
induced ground motion deforms the ground and affects the system by transient and 
permanent ground deformation. Wave propagation hazard is characterized by the 
transient strain and curvature in the ground due to travelling wave effects. Permanent 
ground deformation (PGD) hazards (such as landslide, liquefaction induced lateral 
spread and seismic settlement) are characterized by the amount, geometry and spatial 
extent of the PGD zone. The fault-crossing PGD hazard is characterized by the 
permanent horizontal and vertical offset at the fault and the pipe-fault intersectional 
angle. Damage on the network may be caused by TGD or PGD or a combination of 
two. The relative impact of different effects on buried pipelines varies from 
earthquake to earthquake. Transient effects are common to all earthquakes and are felt 
over a wide geographical area and associate pipeline damage rate (in terms of breaks 
                                                 
1 This is only a possible criterion and others are possible. 
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per unit length of pipe) are low but the number of pipe breaks may be relatively high. 
PGD damage typically occurs in isolated and localized areas with high damage rates.  
 
Figure 2.2 Framework for gas networks hazard characterization 
This chapter describes the general process to characterize seismic hazard of gas 
networks and how to determine seismic demand for each system component. In 
particular, detailed information on characterization of wave propagation and PGD 
hazards are presented.  
2.2. Wave propagation hazard 
When an earthquake occur, seismic waves radiate away from the source to the ground 
surface and travel rapidly though the earth’s crust. Reaching the surface, seismic 
waves produce shaking which strength and duration depends on the size and location 
of the earthquake and on the characteristics of the site. In fact although seismic waves 
travel through the rock for the majority of their trip from the source to the ground 
surface, the final part of the trip is through soil, which characteristics may influence 
the nature of shaking at the ground surface. The soil tends to act as a “filter” to seismic 
waves attenuating or amplifying the motion. Since soil conditions over short distances, 
levels of ground shakings may vary dramatically also within a small area.  
The ground shaking felt at a given location will be made up of a combination of 
body waves and surface waves. Body waves propagate through earth and they are 
generating by seismic faulting while surface waves travel along the ground surface 
and in most of cases are generated by the reflection and refraction of body waves. 
Body waves (Fig. 2.3) include compressional waves (P-waves) where the ground 
moves parallel to the direction of propagation, and shear waves (S-waves) where the 
ground moves perpendicular to the direction of propagation; moreover depending on 
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the direction of particle movement, S-waves can be divided in SV (vertical plane 
movement) and SH (horizontal plane movement). Surface waves (Rayleigh and Love 
waves, Fig. 2.4), instead, are more complex: for Rayleigh waves the particle motion 
traces a retrograde ellipse in a vertical plane with the horizontal component of motion 
being parallel to the direction of propagation; for the Love waves, the particle motion 
is along a horizontal line perpendicular to the direction of propagation.  
 
Figure 2.3 Deformations produced by body waves: a) P- waves b) S-V waves (Kramer, 
1996) 
 
Figure 2.4  Deformations produced by surface waves: a) Rayleigh waves b) Love waves 
(Kramer, 1996) 
The amplitude of ground motion reduces with distance from the source of seismic 
energy release. This is due to a combination of geometric attenuation, which accounts 
for the spread of the wavefront as it moves away from the source, and anelastic 
attenuation, which is caused by material damping. In the immediate locality of the 
fault rupture, body waves will dominate the motion while ground motion at large 
distances to the source is generally dominated by surface waves because of the 
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geometric attenuation is different for the two types of waves (Tromans, 2004): 
assuming that the earthquake rupture zone may be represented as a point source and R 
is the distance from the rupture zone, the amplitude of body waves decreases in 
proportion to 1/R, while the amplitude of surface waves decreases in proportion to 
1/√R.  
Both types of waves are of interest when considering the response of buried 
pipelines to seismic ground shaking. S-waves are normally considered more hazardous 
to buried pipelines as they carry more energy than P-waves while, in the case of 
surface waves, R-waves are the most important, inducing axial strains in buried 
pipelines of much more significance than the bending strains induced by L-waves 
(O'Rourke and Liu, 1999). 
In order to describe the most important characteristics of strong motion in 
quantitative form different ground motion parameters may be used. The motion 
parameter may be acceleration, velocity or displacement. Typically, one of those 
quantities is measured directly and the others computed from it by integration and/or 
differentiation. The most commonly used amplitude parameter is the horizontal 
component of PGA. Horizontal accelerations have been commonly used to describe 
ground motion because of their relationship with inertial forces; indeed, the largest 
dynamical forces induced in some types of structures (i.e. stiff structures) are closely 
related to PGA. The horizontal component of peak ground velocity (PGV) is another 
useful parameter for characterization of ground motion amplitude. Since the velocity 
is less sensitive to the higher frequency component of ground motion (Kramer, 1996), 
PGV is more likely than PGA to characterize ground motion amplitude accurately at 
intermediate frequencies. Therefore for structures or facilities that are sensitive to 
loading in this intermediate frequencies ranges (e.g. bridges), PGV may provide an 
accurate indication of the potential of damage than the PGA. Horizontal component of 
peak ground displacements (PGDi) are related more to the low-frequency content of 
strong ground motion. Due to the signal processing errors in the filtering and in the 
integration of accelerograms and by the presence of long-period noise, the reliability 
of displacements in characterizing aspects of the ground motion is significantly 
limited. For earthquake engineering applications, duration and frequency content are 
other important strong motion characteristics. Duration of strong ground motion often 
influences the level of earthquake damage. In the presence of certain ground 
conditions (e.g. liquefiable deposits), repeated stress or load cycles of moderate 
amplitude, over an extended period, can cause more damage than higher amplitude 
motion over a shorter period. Moreover frequency content of input motion highly 
influences response of structures to earthquakes. The Fourier amplitude spectrum of 
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strong ground-motion shows how the amplitude of the motion is distributed with 
frequency (or natural period) while the response spectrum describes the maximum 
response of a single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) system to a given input motion as a 
function of the natural frequency (or natural period) and damping ratio of the SDOF 
system. Response and Fourier spectra can be expressed in terms of displacement, 
velocity and acceleration. More details on those parameters can be found in Kramer 
(1996). 
Usually, in the area of lifeline earthquake engineering, the wave propagation 
hazard is characterized by the peak amplitude of ground motion parameters as well as 
the ground strain (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999). In particular, ground strain, which is 
closely related to PGV, controls the behavior of buried pipelines, while facilities are 
more sensitive to PGA. Different ground motion parameters are therefore appropriate 
for different types of structure. 
As it will be explained in the following sections, those parameters can be estimated 
through GMPEs that describe, in a very simplified way, how the ground motion 
decreases from the seismic source to the surface.  
2.2.1. Seismic zone characterization 
The first step in performing seismic hazard analysis is the identification and the 
characterization of seismic sources that can affect the site of interest. There are two 
general types (McGuire, 2004): 
•Area sources:  areas within for which future seismicity is assumed to have 
distributions of source properties and locations of energy release that do not 
vary in time and space. 
•Fault sources: are faults or zones for which the tectonic features causing 
earthquakes have been identified. These are usually individual faults, but 
they may be zones comprising multiple faults or regions of faulting if 
surface evidence is lacking but the faults are suspected from evidence (e.g. 
seismicity patterns). 
In the probabilistic approach to the seismic hazard, each zone is considered as a 
configuration within it is assumed that earthquakes occur at the same rate with respect 
to size or magnitude regardless of the location (i.e. uniform seismicity rates).  
Once the geometrical configuration is assigned, for each zone, a recurrence 
relationship is required. This relation indicates the chance of an earthquake of a given 
size occurring anywhere inside the source during a specified period of time. Most 
applications of seismic hazard analysis use the exponential probability distribution to 
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represent the relative frequency of different earthquake magnitudes since his function 
allows considerable analytical convenience in the hazard calculations (Mc Guire, 
2004); the most used recurrence law is the one proposed by Gutenberg and Richter 
(1954) which expresses the cumulative number of earthquakes with a magnitude 
greater than a fixed one as in Eq. (2.4): 
( )10log n m a b m= − ⋅     (2.4) 
where n is the number of earthquakes of magnitude m or grater per unit of time, and a 
and b are constants. 
For seismic hazard analysis, this is usually expressed in the equivalent form: 
( ) ( )expn m mν β= ⋅ − ⋅   (2.5) 
where 10aν = is the number of earthquakes per unit of time with 0m ≥  (seismicity 
rate), and ( )ln 10bβ = ⋅ . Those parameters are usually estimated though historical 
seismicity. The general formulation of the Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law covers an 
infinite range of magnitudes, but often a lower and un upper-bound, mmin and mmax 
respectively, are used resulting in a truncated exponential distribution for magnitude 
frequency. The minimum magnitude is generally linked to the fact that not all the 
earthquakes can produce damages to the structures and a threshold on the magnitude is 
thus fixed. The selection of the maximum magnitude is more complicate because it is 
generally estimated by using geologic evidence, geophysical data, analogies to similar 
tectonic regimes, or other methods (Mc Guire, 2004). 
Alternative magnitude distributions other that the truncated exponential 
distribution are available for modeling earthquake magnitudes as Characteristic 
Magnitude Distribution. This distribution is used when continuous distributions 
encompassing all magnitudes are not appropriate. Large earthquakes may occur with a 
characteristic magnitude whose frequency of occurrence is higher than obtained 
extrapolating from the smaller magnitude earthquakes. In any case, the best 
distribution to adopt depends on which magnitudes are most critical for the seismic 
hazard analysis and which ones therefore influence the seismic risk mitigation 
decision. 
2.2.2. Ground motion estimation 
Traditionally, ground motion is modeled, for engineering purposes, via GMPEs, which 
provide probabilistic distribution of the chosen IM (the predicted variable 
characterizing the level of shaking) conditional on a set of explanatory variables 
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describing the earthquake source, wave propagation path and local geological 
conditions. GMPEs are obtained by regression of recorded data from historical events 
and they are the oldest estimates in seismic hazard analysis, dating from the 1960s. 
Explanatory variables usually include the earthquake magnitude, factors describing 
style of faulting, a measure of source to site distance, and parameters describing site 
classes; other factors that are known to influence the motion are not included in the 
equation because of lack of information in advance. For the factors considered in the 
equations, the general formulation of a GMPE generally have a simple mathematical 
expression compared to the complexity of the physical process involved in ground 
motion generation and propagation. They typically have the following type form as in 
Eq. (2.6): 
( )log log , ,Y Y M R θ ε= +                                      (2.6)  
where Y  denotes the IM of interest; ( )log , ,Y M R θ  is the mean of the logs 
conditional on parameters such as magnitude (M), source-to-site distance (R), and 
others ( )θ ;  the difference between the observed and the predicted ground motion is 
the ground motion residual ε  that represents the unexplained part of the model. 
Coefficients of GMPEs are usually estimated though nonlinear least-square regression 
analysis but the implicit nature of earthquake data violates many assumptions of this 
approach (Mc Guire, 2004). In fact observations of Y are not independent: multiple 
records are used from the same earthquake and these are correlated by common source 
and path, while multiple records from the same site but different events are correlated 
by common soil conditions.  
The inclusion of correlation among observations from common earthquake can be 
handled more efficiently using the random effects model (Brillinger and Priesler, 
1985; Abrahamson and Youngs, 1992): this is an iterative procedure that requires the 
numerical solution of a likelihood function within the iteration, but it gives ground 
motion estimates that include the variance attributable to the random effect caused by 
earthquake-to earthquake variability.  In particular the residual is expressed as the sum 
of two components: an interevent term, which is constant for each earthquake 
(common for all sites) and represents average source effects not explicitly appearing in 
the model covariates, and an intraevent term representing the site-to-site variability of 
the IM (Strasser et al., 2009). 
Therefore for a particular site p and earthquake j the logs of ground-motion 
intensities and related heterogeneity may be expressed as in Eq. (2.7). 
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( )log log , ,pj pj j pjY Y M R θ η ε= + +  (2.7) 
where jη denotes the interevent residual, which is a constant term for all sites in a 
given earthquake and represents a systematic deviation from the mean of the specific 
seismic event (i.e. average source effects not explicitly appearing in the model 
covariates); and pjε  is the intraevent variability of ground motion. Residuals pjε and 
jη are usually assumed to be independent random variables, normally distributed with 
zero mean and standard deviation 2intraσ and 2interσ , respectively. Then, log pjY is 
modeled as a normal random variable with mean ( )log , ,pjY M R θ  and standard 
deviation, Tσ , where 2 2 2T intra interσ σ σ= + . Appropriately plugging this distribution into 
the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis leads to the distribution of the IM at the site 
of interest (McGuire, 2004).  
2.2.3. Spatial correlation models for peak ground motion parameters 
In recent research, it was demonstrated that another form of correlation may exists 
among residuals beyond the correlation due to the source effects not explicitly 
appearing in GMPEs.  Boore et al. (2003) demonstrated that intraevent residuals, for 
example those referring to peak ground acceleration (PGA), are spatially correlated2. 
In fact the ground-motion intensities at two sites generated from the same earthquake 
are expected to be correlated for a variety of reasons, such as a common source 
earthquake, similar locations to fault asperities, similar seismic travel path from the 
source; moreover similar site conditions and very simple schemes used in GMPE for 
example to characterize site classes may cause a correlation among intraevent 
residuals. Therefore, IMs at different sites result correlated both because of inter- and 
intraevent residuals, and it is important to account for these dependencies in seismic 
risk assessment when a region is of concern (Crowley and Bommer, 2006; Park et al., 
2007; Goda and Hong, 2008b, Crowley et al., 2008). 
Several correlation models are available in the literature, which depend uniquely 
on inter-site separation distance. Most of the studies are based on dense observations 
of single events (e.g., Boore et al., 2003; Wang and Takada, 2005; Jayaram and Baker, 
                                                 
2 This kind of spatial correlation of ground motion consists of similarity between IMs (e.g., peak values of 
time-history) observed at different sites within the same event. It is also worth to mention here coherency 
of ground motion signals, which represents the similarity of ground motion in frequency domain, and 
describes the degree of positive or negative correlation between amplitudes and phases angles of two time 
histories at each of their component frequencies (e.g., Zerva and Zervas, 2002). 
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2009a) from different major earthquakes outside Europe, such as Northridge (1994) or 
Chi-Chi (1999). A few works have, instead, combined data from multiple events to 
obtain a unique estimate of correlation (e.g., Goda and Hong; 2008a, Goda and 
Atkinson, 2009; Goda and Atkinson, 2010; Sokolov et al., 2010).Different authors, for 
a given IM, provide different distance limits for correlation to disappear (i.e., distance 
beyond which IMs may be considered uncorrelated), and this is supposed to depend on 
the dataset considered, the GMPE chosen to compute residuals, and the working 
assumptions of the estimation. For example, Goda and Atkinson (2009) investigated 
the effects of earthquake types (i.e., shallow and deep events) on correlation using 
datasets from K-NET and KiK-net Japanese strong motion networks without finding 
any significant dependency. On the other hand, Sokolov et al. (2010), starting from 
the strong-motion database of Taiwan Strong Motion Instrumentation Program 
(TSMIP) network in Taiwan, estimated correlation for various areas, site classes and 
geological structures, asserting that a single generalized spatial model may not be 
adequate for all of Taiwan territory. In some cases (e.g., Wang and Takada, 2005; 
Jayaram and Baker, 2009a) existing GMPEs are used, while, in others (e.g., Goda and 
Hong, 2008a; Goda and Atkinson, 2009; Sokolov et al., 2010), ad hoc fit on the 
chosen dataset is adopted. Generally, regressions analysis used to develop prediction 
equations does not incorporate the correlation structure of residuals as an hypothesis. 
Hong et al. (2009) and Jayaram and Baker (2010a), evaluated the influence of 
considering the correlation in fitting a GMPE, finding a minor influence on regression 
coefficients and a more significant effect on the variance components. Goda and 
Atkinson (2010) investigated the influence of the estimation approach, emphasizing its 
importance when residuals are strongly correlated.  
In Fig. (2.5), several models for PGA and PGV, as mentioned above, are shown; 
the correlation coefficient is expressed by Eq. (2.8), where a, b and c are the model 
parameters (to follow) and h is the inter-site separation distance (in km). 
( ) ( ){ }- hmax 1- + e ,0bah c cρ ⋅= ⋅
 
 (2.8)
 
If the hazard assessment at two or more sites is of concern, the joint probability 
density function (PDF) for the IMs at all locations is required. A simple way to model 
for the joint PDF of the IM, conditional on the GMPE covariates, is the multivariate 
normal (e.g., Jayaram and Baker, 2008). It is assumed that the logs of IM form a 
Gaussian random field (GRF), defined as a set of  random variables IM⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ulog ሺ ሻ , one 
for each site u in the study area S∈R2,{ }IM S⎡ ⎤ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦u ulog ሺ ሻ , . To any set of n sites 
Chapter 2  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Gas networks hazard characterization 
 
 
38 
pu , 1p n= …, , , corresponds to a vector of n random variables that is characterized by 
the covariance matrix,Σ ,as in Eq. (2.9) where the first term produces perfectly 
correlated inter-event residuals (Malhotra, 2008), while the second term (symmetrical) 
produces partially correlated intraevent residuals. 
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Figure 2.5  Some correlation models available in literature for PGA (up) and PGV (down) 
the black dotted line intersects the curves at the distance at which the correlation is 
conventionally considered as almost, lost being the correlation coefficient equal to 0.05 
In Eq. (2.9), the correlation is heterogeneous as it depends on the pairs of sites 
considered, and the intra-event variance is homoscedastic as it is constant for all sites 
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(this assumed in most of GMPEs, although some studies have found dependence of 
intraevent variability on distance, magnitude and non-linear site effects; Strasser et al., 
2009). If the spatial correlation for intraevent residuals is a function of the relative 
location of sites, it becomes as in Eq. (2.10), where p and q are two locations at the 
ends of hpq (the separation vector between the two sites).  
( )pqρ ρ= pqh  (2.10) 
To briefly review the features of a GRF, let up∈R2 be the generic site in a two-
dimensional Euclidian space and suppose that the intra-event residuals in a specific 
earthquake, ( )j p pjε ε=u , is a GRF in a domain S∈R2 (the region of interest). The 
GRF is fully described by the mean jE ε⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦uሺ ሻ  and the covariance, Cj, between two 
generic locations up and uq defined in Eq. (2.11). 
j p q j p j q j p j qC E E Eε ε ε ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ − ⋅⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦u u u u u uሺ , ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ    (2.11) 
Under the hypothesis of second-order stationarity of the GRF (Cressie, 1993), the 
mean is constant and the covariance is location-independent as defined in Eq. (2.12). 
j j j j jC E E Eε ε ε ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + − ⋅ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦h u u h u u hሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ   (2.12)               
In this case, the two points’ statistics depend only on the separation vector h and the 
reference to a particular location u can be dropped. Herein it is assumed intra-event 
residuals may be modeled as a stationary GRF, and all data available from different 
earthquakes and regions, therefore deemed homogeneous, are used to fit a unique 
model. If the GRF is isotropic correlation depends only on the separation distance h = 
||h||. An anisotropic random field implies, instead, the possibility of having a spatial 
variability that depends on the direction considered. Past research has shown that the 
hypothesis of isotropic random field, which is also retained herein, is reasonable 
(Wang and Takada, 2005; Jayaram and Baker, 2009a). 
2.2.3.1.  Geostatistical analysis  
A common tool to quantify spatial variability of random fields is the 
semivariogram, j hγ ሺ ሻ . It measures the average dissimilarity between georeferenced 
data, and it is used to model the covariance structure of GRF through suitable 
functions. Under the hypothesis of second-order stationarity and isotropy it is defined 
as in Eq. (2.13).  
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1
2j j j j j
h Var h Var C hγ ε ε ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − = −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦u u uሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ  (2.13)                
Therefore, for an isotropic and homogenous random field, considering that for 
0h → , j jC h Var ε=ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ  the semivariogram results as in Eq. (2.14),  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1j j j j jh C C h Var hγ ε ρ⎡ ⎤= − = ⋅ −⎣ ⎦   (2.14)                
where ρj(h) denotes the spatial correlation coefficient between εj (u+h) and εj (u); see 
Cressie (1993) for more details. 
 In fact, estimation of correlation usually develops in three steps: (1) computing 
the empirical semivariogram (assuming a common semivariogram for different events, 
that is, invariant through earthquakes, allows to neglect the subscript j in the following 
equations); (2) choosing a functional form; (3) estimating the correlation parameters 
by fitting the empirical data with the functional model.  
Empirical semivariograms are computed as a function of site-to-site separation 
distance, with different possible estimators. The classical estimator is the method-of-
moments (Matheron, 1962) which is defined for an isotropic random field in Eq. 
(2.15),  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
21ˆ
2 N h
h h
N h
γ ε ε⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + −⎣ ⎦⋅ ∑ u u
 
(2.15) 
where N(h) is the set of pairs of sites separated by the same distance h, and |N(h)| is 
the cardinal of N(h). 
To compute the semivariogram, it may be useful, when dealing with earthquake 
records, to define tolerance bins around each possible h value. The selection of 
distance bins has important effects: if its size is too large, correlation at short distances 
may be masked; conversely if it is too small, empty bins, or bins with samples small in 
size, may impair the estimate. A rule of thumb is to choose the maximum bin size as a 
half of the maximum distance between sites in the dataset, and to set the number of 
bins so that there are at least 30 pairs per bin (Journel and Huijbregts, 1978).  
The method-of-moments estimator is unbiased; however it can be badly affected 
by atypical observations (Cressie, 1993). Therefore, Cressie and Hawkins (1980) 
proposed a more robust estimator (less sensitive to outliers), as in Eq. (2.16). 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
4
0.51 1 0.494ˆ 0.457
2 N h
h h
N h N h
γ ε ε
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= + − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
∑ u u   (2.16) 
The fitting analytical model, under stationary and isotropic hypotheses, may be of 
different kinds, for example, exponential, Gaussian, or spherical (Goovartes, 1997). In 
particular, the exponential model, which is the most common one, is described in Eq. 
(2.17) where c0 is defined as the nugget, and represents the limit value of the 
semivariogram when h is zero because of variations at distances smaller than the 
sampling interval and measurement errors, which causes a discontinuity at the origin 
(Matheron, 1962); ce is the sill, or the population variance of the random field (Barnes, 
1991); and b is the range defined as the intersite distance at which ( )hγ  equals the 
sill. For the exponential model, the sill is asymptotic and it is possible to define a 
practical range as the separation distance at which ( )hγ  equals 95% of the sill.  
( ) ( )3 /0 1 h beh c c eγ − ⋅= + ⋅ −   (2.17) 
The goodness of fit of a model can be determined via several criteria that have been 
proposed in the geostatistical literature. Studies dealing with earthquake data 
sometimes use visual or trial and error approaches in order to appropriately model the 
semivariogram structure at short site-to-site distances (Jayaram and Baker, 2009a). In 
this thesis experimental semivariograms are fitted visually, although using the least 
squares estimation as a starting point (to follow). 
2.2.3.2. Semi-empirical models based on multi-event European datasets 
The estimation of the correlation starts from the characterization of residuals of 
empirical data with respect to a GMPE. To this aim, subsets of the European Strong-
motion Database and the Italian Accelerometric Archive datasets were considered. 
The ground motions and related information were provided by authors of Akkar and 
Bommer (2010) and Bindi et al. (2010) GMPEs for ESD and ITACA datasets, 
respectively. In particular, subsets of data used to fit these GMPEs; i.e., only free field 
records from earthquakes for which more than one record was available have been 
considered. 
ESD subset is comprised of 480 records from 87 events recorded between 1973 
and 2003, and characterized by moment magnitude from 5 to 7.6, and the closest 
horizontal distance to the vertical projection of the rupture (i.e., Joyner-Boore 
distance, Rjb) from 0 to 100 km. The number of considered recordings for the ITACA 
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subset is 1112 from 162 events over the 4-6.9 magnitude range (moment or local), and 
Rjb up to 196 km. Characteristics of the datasets, with respect to explanatory variables 
of the considered prediction equations (magnitude, distance and local site conditions) 
are shown in Fig. (2.6). ESD is a smaller database of stronger and closer to the source 
records from European events, while ITACA is a denser dataset of Italian earthquakes 
within a lower magnitude range and a broader distance range. A limited number of 
records (150 from 19 events) are in common between the two sets of data. In Fig. (2.7) 
the distributions of data pairs as a function of separation distance bins (4 km width for 
ESD and 1 km for ITACA) are also shown. 
To compute the empirical semivariogram, normalized intra-event residuals are 
obtained for a single earthquake j and a generic site p as εpj∗=εpj/σp where σp is the 
standard deviation of the intra-event residual at the site p (in the study the intra-event 
standard deviation is common for all sites consistent with GMPEs used to compute 
residuals). In this case Eq. (2.14) becomes Eq. (2.18), where the superscript represents 
an empirical estimate. 
( ) ( )1h hγ ρ= −ˆ ˆ   (2.18) 
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Figure 2.6 ESD subsets with respect M, Rjb, and local site conditions: rock (3), stiff soil 
(2), soft soil (1), and very soft soil (0) (up); and ITACA strong-motion subsets with respect 
M, Rjb and local site conditions (down) according to Eurocode 8 (2004) 
 
Eq. (2.18) shows that standardization enables to not estimate the sill, as it should be 
equal to one. This applies if standardization is carried out using the true population’s 
variance. With earthquake data, the sample variance or the standard deviation 
provided by the GMPE can be used to obtain standardized residuals3. Another option 
is to use the sample variance as an estimate of the true variance (e.g., Jayaram and 
Baker, 2010a). Goda and Atkinson (2010) used the intraevent standard deviation 
inferred from the large-separation-distance plateau of the semivariogram, assuming 
that at those distances residuals are not correlated. In this work, the variance provided 
by the GMPEs was preferred. In fact, evaluation of possible alternatives for 
standardization leads to results which seem to be not significantly affected by a choice 
with respect to another (as discussed later on). 
Because geostatistical estimation needs a relatively large number of data to model 
the semivariogram (i.e., many records to have more than 30 pairs in each h bin), which 
are not available for individual events in the chosen datasets, all data available from 
multiple events (and regions) are used herein to fit a unique correlation model. The 
same isotropic semivariogram with the same parameters for all earthquakes is 
assumed.  
                                                 
3 It is usual to use the sample variance as an estimator of the sill for the experimental semivariogram, but 
this may be improper in some circumstances; see Barnes (1991) for a discussion. 
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Figure 2.7 Histograms of the number of data pairs as a function of site-to-site separation 
distance 
The experimental semivariogram becomes that of Eq. (2.19), where nj is the number of 
records for the jth event and ( )N h  is the number of pairs in the specific h bin. Eq. 
(2.20) shows how individual events are kept separated in computing the empirical 
semivariogram. In fact, the differences of residuals of Eq. (2.19) are computed only 
between pairs of residuals (standardized with the common standard deviation from the 
GMPE) from the same earthquake, then differences from different earthquakes are 
pooled. This process is visually sketched in Fig. (2.8) from which it is possible to note 
that the empirical semivariogram point at h1 is not the average of experimental 
semivariograms from different earthquakes, as ( )N h is the number of pairs in the 
specific h bin from all earthquakes. 
( ) ( ) ( )
21
2 pj qjN h
h
N h
γ ε ε⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦⋅ ∑ * *ˆ   (2.19)  
( ) ( ){ }* * * *, , : ; , 1, ; 1,pj qj pj qj jN h j h p q n j kε ε ε ε= − = = =… …   (2.20) 
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2.2.3.3. Proposed model  
For the European subset, each bin has 4-km width, as it also allows having at least 30 
pairs per bin and no empty bins until the half of the maximum distance between pairs 
in the dataset. Both estimators (classical and robust) were used; no significant 
difference was found in the shape of the fitted semivariogram. Of the three basic 
models (Gaussian, spherical and exponential), the exponential model provided the best 
fit at the small separation distances (where the correlation is expected to be strong). 
Least square method (LSM) was used as a starting point to fit the semivariogram. 
Because LSM minimizes the fitting error over the whole distance interval data, and in 
order to give more importance to the small separation distances, LSM has been 
applied until a limit separation distance (of the same order of magnitude of the range 
where correlation is expected to disappear). LSM results are then used as a reference 
to manually fit a model in the empirical semivariogram.  
This approach was used to estimate correlation of both PGA and PGV. Because 
the chosen GMPE refers to geometric mean of horizontal components, the correlation 
was estimated for this IM. Assuming that there is no nugget effect (as this study does 
not investigate variations at a smaller scale with respect to that of the tolerance), the 
only parameter to estimate is the range b whose results equal to 13.5 km for PGA and 
21.5 km for PGV, as shown in Fig. (2.9).  
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Figure 2.8 Pooling standardized intra-event residuals of multiple events (up) to compute 
experimental semivariogram (down) 
It should be noted that in Esposito et al. (2010) the proposed methodology was 
used to estimate the correlation of the  PGA (horizontal and vertical components) 
intraevent residuals starting from a less recent GMPE, the Ambraseys et al. (2005a,b), 
and also the dataset was not exactly the same. However, the resulting range was quite 
similar, 12 km and 18 km horizontal and vertical components, respectively. 
For the Italian dataset, the spatial correlation ranges of residuals obtained from 
the Bindi et al. (2010) GMPE were 11.5 km and 14.5 km for PGA and PGV, 
respectively (Fig. 2.10). In this case, because of the denser dataset, it was possible to 
consider 1-km bin width; however, it seems that estimates are not significantly 
dependent on such size. In fact, exponential model for PGA obtained with a bin width 
of 4-km is characterized by a range of 13.5 km. 
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Figure 2.9 ESD empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for PGA (up) and 
PGV (down) considering a bin width of 4 km 
In both cases of ESD and ITACA correlation ranges are higher for PGV than for PGA. 
In fact, the acceleration time history shows a significant proportion of relatively high 
frequency, while velocity records shows substantially less high-frequency motion and 
are likely to yield higher correlations (e.g., Kramer, 1996). This seems to be consistent 
with past studies of ground motion coherency (Zerva and Zervas, 2002). In fact, the 
coherency describes the degree of correlation between amplitudes and phases angles 
of two time histories at each of their component frequencies. Considering that 
coherency decreases with increasing distance between measuring points and with 
increasing frequency, it may be reasonable to expect more coherent ground motion, as 
velocity that corresponds to low frequency exhibits more correlated peak amplitudes.  
In principle, residuals model what is not explained by the covariates of the GMPE, 
therefore, because datasets are different, differences in the results between ESD and 
ITACA may be legitimate4. However, for a given IM, practical ranges are definitely 
                                                 
4 One may argue that the larger ranges found for ESD with respect to ITACA are an effect of different 
distribution of magnitude in the two datasets. However, the proposed correlation models does not 
incorporate dependency on magnitude also based on the findings of Jayaram and Baker (2009). 
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comparable and probably the differences are not significant, although the latter is 
difficult to assess because the estimation methodology does not provide the statistics 
of the range, which would allow quantitatively to assess differences by means, for 
example, of hypothesis tests. 
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Figure 2.10 ITACA empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for PGA (up) 
and PGV (down) considering a bin width of 1 km  
Another important point regards the different possibilities to obtain standardized 
residuals. As suggested in Goda and Atkinson (2010), positive correlations among 
intra-event residuals may lead to underestimated intra-event sample variance in 
GMPEs. Hence, intraevent standard deviations inferred from the large separation 
distance plateau of the semivariograms were used to estimate practical ranges of 
correlation in the two subsets. In particular, intra-event residuals without any 
standardization were used to estimate the sill (population variance) under the 
assumptions that at large-separation distance those residuals are not correlated. The 
resulting estimates are practically the same (less than 10% differences) with respect to 
those of the GMPEs. This is also because there are relatively few data at short 
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separation distances in the datasets. As a result, it was possible to infer that, at least in 
the considered case studies, the GMPEs variance can be used for the standardization. 
The same approach has been used to estimate spatial correlation for spectral 
acceleration (Sa) in order to evaluate a possible dependency of the correlation length 
on the period Sa refers to. Preliminary results obtained from ITACA dataset are shown 
in Appendix A. 
2.2.3.4. Regional hazard 
Developed correlation models can be used, for example, to obtain the exceedance 
probability of the IM in a region and in a time interval of interest. The hazard integral 
of Eq. (2.3) provides such annual rate of joint exceedance in a region, if the same 
assumptions of site-specific hazard analysis are retained (McGuire, 2004).  
As an example, regional hazard was developed considering as a source the 
Paganica fault on which the 2009 L’Aquila (central Italy) earthquake originated, and 
the Bindi et al. (2010) GMPE under the assumption that all the sites have the same 
stiff soil local site conditions. PGA and PGV hazards, considering ranges of 11.5 km 
and 14.5 km respectively, were computed for a characteristic earthquake of moment 
magnitude 6.3, and occurrence rate on the source 1/ 750ν =  (Pace et al., 2006).  
In Fig. (2.11), surfaces are a function of IMs (as in traditional hazard curves) and 
exceedance areas (A*), which are fractions, between 2.5% to 25%, of a region of 2500 
km2 around the fault. Referring for example to PGA, entering the plot with a set of 
two A* and PGA values, the surface returns the mean annual rate of exceedance of 
that PGA value over an area at least equal to A*. 
 For comparison, hazard considering uncorrelated intra-event residuals was also 
computed. For both PGA and PGV, correlation does not always provide higher rates 
with respect to the independent case. In fact this is because, in the simulated case, the 
n sites constituting the A* exceedance region are not necessarily adjoining. Given that 
im* is exceeded (not exceeded) at a given site, correlation increases the probability of 
having neighbouring sites exceeding (not exceeding) im* as well. 
If an alternate hazard criterion is considered, an example is that im* has to be 
exceeded at exactly n points constituting A* , the joint hazard for correlated residuals 
is always higher with respect to the independent case (Fig. 2.12). This seems also 
consistent with the results of Sokolov and Wenzel (2011). 
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Figure 2.11 Regional hazard surface considering: correlated residuals (a and c) and 
independent residuals (b and d) for PGA and PGV 
2.2.4. Spatial cross-correlation of  intensity measures 
The performance of spatially distribute systems may be conditional upon the failure of 
many components within the system each of which is sensitive to different IMs, id est 
each component may respond differently to the input ground motion. In particular 
some elements of a gas system, such as regulator stations, are more sensitive to PGA 
respect to pipelines whose seismic behavior is closely related to PGV. 
As shown previously each IM is spatially correlated but the hazard assessment of a 
system, since it is characterized by different IMs, has to take into account the 
possibility of the existence of a cross-correlation between IMs in order to model the 
joint distribution of different random fields. Therefore when considering the spatial 
distribution of multiple ground motion parameters, it is necessary to evaluate both 
autocorrelation and cross-correlation properties. Jayaram and Baker (2010b) 
demonstrated that spectral acceleration at different fundamental periods are spatially 
cross-correlated but until now, this represents the unique preliminary study available 
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on this topic. Further research on the characterization of the joint distribution of 
different IMs in multiple points is still needed.   
 
Figure 2.12 Regional hazard curve considering correlated and independent residuals for 
PGA (left) and for PGV (right) 
2.2.5. Site amplification 
Site conditions may influence the amplitude of  ground shaking at the ground surface: 
sites near the source of a large earthquake are characterized by high levels of ground 
shaking that may produce significant damages. Although seismic waves travel through 
the rock for the majority of their trip from the source to the ground surface, the final 
part of the trip is through soil, which characteristics may influence the nature of 
shaking at the ground surface. The soil tends to act as a “filter” to seismic waves 
attenuating or amplifying the motion.  
Since soil conditions may differ over short distances, levels of ground shakings 
may vary dramatically also within a small area. Generally site effects represent local 
ground response effects, basin effects and the influence of surface topography on 
ground motion. Local ground response refers to the influence of relatively shallow 
geologic materials on (nearly) vertically propagating body waves. The term basin 
effects refers to the influence of two- or three-dimensional sedimentary basin 
structures on ground motions, including critical body wave reflections and surface 
wave generation at basin edges. Site effects due to surface topography (i.e., 
topographic effects) can amplify the ground shaking that would otherwise be expected 
on level ground along ridges or near the tops of slopes. Details about amplification 
due to those effects can be found in Kramer (1996). 
Depending on the extend of the information that are available to define the site 
characteristics across a region, several different approaches could be considered for 
the purposes of characterizing the strong motion amplification due to local geology. 
There are essentially two general types (Kramer and Stewart, 2004): 
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•GMPE-based site amplification: each site can be characterized according to the 
site classification scheme adopted and modeled within the GMPE.  The site 
class becomes a fixed parameter of the site in question and can be used 
directly within the strong ground motion evaluation. The key advantage of 
the GMPE-based approach is that it requires a minimum amount of 
information within the site characterization. In most cases each site need 
only be categorized according to Eurocode classes, NEHRP classes or the 
30-m shear wave velocity, Vs30, (see Tables 2.1). There are several 
shortcomings to this particular approach. Actual conditions at strong motion 
recording sites are highly variable with respect to local geotechnical 
conditions, possible basin effects and surface topography may occur, and 
hence estimates from attenuation relationships necessarily represent 
averaged values across the range of possible site conditions. Moreover, it is 
possible that the set of strong motion records used for deriving the GMPE 
will not adequately sample all the site classes of interest. This is the case for 
many existing European models, which may only derive amplification 
factors for NEHRP classes B, C, D (rock, stiff soil and soft soil), which 
broadly correspond to Eurocode 8 classes A, B, and C (Akkar and Bommer, 
2010). 
•Site amplification factor: site amplification factors represent for a given ground 
motion intensity measure, the ratio of that parameter for a given site category 
to the value of the parameter for a reference category (usually rock). Site 
amplification factors are generally inferred from strong motion recordings or 
are derived from analyses using engineering models of wave propagation 
(Kramer and Stewart, 2004). However, site condition remains relatively 
crudely represented with amplification factors, quantified only by site 
conditions that affect the categorization per the classification scheme. For 
example, in the HAZUS technical manual (FEMA, 2004) soil amplification 
factors are given according to NEHRP site class (A to E) and spectral 
acceleration on class B rock. As with the GMPE-based approach, code-based 
approach has several advantages in terms of simplicity and relatively 
minimal requirements in terms of the site classification but this approach is 
limited to site categories for which the code supplies such factors. An 
additional limitation is that design codes are extremely unlikely to provide 
amplification factors for IMs other than PGA or spectral acceleration 
limiting the extension of the code-based site amplification approach to less 
common IMs. A more complex alternative to describe the site amplification 
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is the model produced by Choi and Stewart (2005). It was derived from 1828 
observed strong motion records taken from 154 active shallow crustal 
earthquakes. The amplification factor was determined from the ratio of 
observed spectral acceleration to expected acceleration calculated for the 
same event using an existing GMPE. A variation on this approach has been 
presented by Walling et al. (2008) where the amplification factors are 
calculated using a 1D equivalent linear analysis model of site amplification, 
applied to a synthetic time history generated by point source stochastic 
simulation. Both approaches may be implemented either directly as a single 
site amplification model, or indirectly via the GMPEs that adopt it as their 
site amplification function.  
It is important to note that the approach used by Walling et al. (2008) could be used to 
characterize a generic site amplification model on the basis of one-dimensional 
modeling tools based on geotechnical profiles produced by microzonation study for 
the region of interest (if it is available). In this way amplification factors, instead of 
being generic or characteristic for a particular site class, are defined in order to be 
specific to the sites for the application in question. 
2.3. Permanent ground deformation hazard  
Geotechnical hazards induced from earthquakes have been the subject of a 
considerable amount of researches in the last decades. A substantial body of literature 
on pipeline systems has been produced on this topic.  Although PGD hazards are 
usually limited to small regions within the pipeline network, their potential for damage 
is very high since they impose large deformation on pipelines. The relative impact of 
the various earthquake induced effects on a pipeline system, as a gas system, depends 
on the geological conditions in which surface faulting and the other collateral effects 
occur and the coincidence of these regions with the buried infrastructure. In fact where 
these phenomena coincide with the network, relatively high pipeline damage rates are 
observed but in localized areas. 
The principal forms of permanent ground deformation are surface faulting, 
landsliding, seismic settlement and lateral spreading due to soil liquefaction. There are 
many models available that have the intent to relate the degree of deformation (PGD) 
and the probability of occurrence of each geotechnical hazard to the strength of ground 
motion but the main limiting factor of many models is the requirement of very   
detailed geotechnical data that could make difficult the implementation of those 
models for many lifeline systems. Therefore it may be preferable to consider simpler 
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models, as the approach implemented in HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) that may be 
implemented in the widest variety of applications.  
In the following sections, the most important earthquake induced effects for gas 
systems are presented and for each geotechnical hazard, HAZUS methodology will be 
illustrated. 
Table 2.1 Site Classification According to Eurocode 8 (2004) 
Class Stratigraphy Vs30 (m/s) 
A Rock or rock-like geological formation, including at most 5m 
of weaker material at the surface. 
> 800  
B Deposits of very dense sand, gravel or very stiff clay, at least 
several tens of metres in thickness, characterised by gradual 
increase of mechanical properties with depth 
360 – 800 
 
C Deep deposits of dense or medium-dense sand, gravel or stiff 
clay with thicknesses several tens to many hundreds of 
metres 
180 – 360  
D Loose-to-medium cohesionless soil (with or without some 
soft cohesive layers), or of predominantly soft-to-firm 
cohesive soil. 
< 180 
 
E A soil profile consisting of a surface alluvium layer with Vs 
values of type C & D,  and thicknesses varying between 
about 5m and 20m, underlain by stiffer material with Vs30 > 
800 m/s 
- 
 
S1 Deposits consisting of, or containing a layer at least 10 m 
thick, of soft clays/silts with high plasticity index (PI > 40) 
and high water content 
< 100 
 
S2 Deposits of liquefiable soils, of sensitive clays, or any other 
soil profile not included in types A – E or S1 
- 
 
2.3.1. Liquefaction 
Liquefaction is a term used to describe a variety of complex phenomena involving soil 
deformations characterized by the generation of excess pore-water pressure under 
undrained loading conditions. During earthquake ground shaking, induced cyclic shear 
creates a tendency in most soils to change volume by rearrangement of the soil-
particle structure. In loose soils, this volume change tendency is to compact or densify 
the soil structure. For soils such as fine sands, silts and clays, permeability is 
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sufficiently low such that undrained conditions prevail and no or insignificant volume 
change can occur during the ground shaking. To accommodate the volume decrease 
tendency, the soil responds by increases of pore-water pressure and corresponding 
decreases of intergranular effective stress. In general, more compressible soils such as 
plastic silts or clays do not generate excess pore-water pressure as quickly or to as 
large an extent as less compressible soils such as sands. Therefore, silty and clayey 
soils tend to be less susceptible than sandy soils to liquefaction-type behaviours.  
Soil liquefaction has caused significant damage to buried lifelines in past 
earthquakes. Zonation of liquefaction hazard is therefore of particular importance to 
lifeline earthquake engineers. Therefore the first step of liquefaction hazard evaluation 
is the determination of liquefaction susceptibility. For a given soil, liquefaction 
susceptibility can be judged according to various historical, geological, compositional 
or soil state criteria. Once it has been evaluated, the next stage is to determine the 
likelihood that an earthquake will cause a disturbance strong enough to initiate the 
phenomenon (i.e. the probability of liquefaction). The criteria necessary to determine 
liquefaction susceptibility and the condition require to trigger liquefaction are complex 
and beyond the scope of this study. More details can be found in Kramer (1996). 
In HAZUS methodology, susceptibility classes are categorized on the basis of 
deposit type, age and general distribution of cohesionless sediments (see Appendix B 
for the classification scheme). Based on the analysis of Youd and Perkins (1978), at 
each susceptibility class corresponds a conditional probability of liquefaction for a 
given value of PGA and a proportion of map unit susceptible to liquefaction as 
expressed by the Eq. (2.21) 
  3 2
[ | ][ ]
= 0.0027 0.0267 0.2055M +2.9188
=0.022d 0.93 
ml
M W
M
W w
P Liq PGA aP liquefaction P
K K
K M M
K
==
− −
+  
(2.21)  
where [ | ]P Liq PGA a=  is the conditional probability for a given susceptibility 
category at a specified level of peak ground acceleration; MK is the moment 
magnitude (M) correction factor; WK  is the groundwater correction factor as a 
function of the water depth dw  (in feet); and mlP is the proportion of map unit 
susceptible to liquefaction (see Appendix B for more details). 
Alternatively, if more geotechnical information is known for the site of interest, 
as the effective overburden stresses, the probability of liquefaction may be determined 
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from the Liao et al. (1988) empirical model. If not, the simpler approach of HAZUS 
can be preferred.  
Given that liquefaction is likely at a particular location, the last step is to predict 
the amount of permanent ground deformation associated to liquefaction. The ground 
failure phenomena associated to liquefaction that may induce pipe damage are 
generally lateral spread and settlement. 
2.3.1.1. Lateral spreading 
Lateral spreads develop when a loose saturated sandy soil deposit is liquefied and 
occur near abrupt topographic features (i.e., free-faces) and on gently sloping ground 
underlain by liquefied soil. Earthquake ground-shaking affects the stability of sloping 
ground containing liquefiable materials by causing seismic inertia forces to be added 
to gravitational forces within the slope and by shaking-induced strength reductions in 
the liquefiable materials. The ground movement is primarily horizontal since vertical 
component is typically small. 
The potential for PGD to induce pipe damage is related to the amount of ground 
movement, the length and width of the PGD zone as well as the pattern of deformation 
(O’Rourke and Liu, 1999). Predicting the amount of ground displacement due to 
lateral spread is a challenging problem. Nevertheless there are a number of studies 
available, both analytical and empirical. A review of these studies may be found in 
(O’Rourke and Liu, 1999). Nevertheless the simple relation proposed by HAZUS may 
be considered as a first order estimate on the amount of displacement associated with 
lateral spreading. The amount of lateral displacement in inches is calculated via the 
Eq. (2.22): 
[ ] ( )
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W W W
E PGD K E PGD PGA PL a
K M M M
Δ
Δ
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= − + −    (2.22)  
where ( )| SCE PGD PGA PL a=⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  is the expected PGD for each susceptibility 
category under the normalised level of shaking defined by PGA/PGA(t) | SC where 
PGA(t)| SC is the threshold PGA. The factor ΔK is a displacement correction term. 
The primary advantage of the HAZUS methodology is the simplicity and the 
dependence on few site specific factors. If the ground conditions can be better 
constrained for the site in question, other empirical models, as Bardet et al. (2002), 
Youd et al. (2002), could alternatively be applied. 
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2.3.1.2. Seismic settlement 
Settlement is a result of the dissipation of excess pore pressure generated by the 
rearrangement of loosely compacted saturated soils into a denser configuration during 
shaking. Such dissipation produces volume decreases (termed consolidation or 
compaction) within the soil that is manifested at the ground surface as settlement. 
Volume changes may occur in both liquefied and non-liquefied zones with 
significantly larger contributions to settlement expected to result from liquefied soil. 
Densification may also occur in loose unsaturated materials above the ground water 
table. Spatial variations in material characteristics may cause such settlements to occur 
differentially. Differential ground settlement may also occur near sand boil 
manifestations due to liquefied materials being removed from the depths of 
liquefaction and brought to the ground surface. 
Despite being a commonly observed liquefaction phenomenon, there are fewer 
established models that are used for the estimation of ground settlement. In the 
HAZUS methodology a characteristic settlement is attributed to each susceptibility 
class, thus making the expected settlement a product of the liquefaction probability 
and the characteristic settlement. The actual values of the characteristic settlement 
were determined from the process described by Tokimatsu and Seed (1987) (see 
Appendix B) that suggest characteristic values for volumetric settlement to use for the 
characterization of seismic input of  a spatially distributed system.  
The HAZUS methodology represents the most widely applicable, in spite of the 
relative crudeness of the model. Alternative models, as Pradel (1998) and Takada and 
Tanabe (1988), can be taken into account if detailed site data are available. 
2.3.2. Landslide 
Landslides are mass movements of the ground which may be triggered by ground 
shaking. There are different schemes to classify landlslides. Based on the different 
effects on pipelines, Meyersohn (1991) established three types of landslides as shown 
in Fig. (2.13). 
The first type includes rock fall and rock topple, which can cause damage to 
above-ground pipelines by the direct impact of falling rocks. The second type includes 
flow and debris flow in which the transported material behaves as a viscous fluid. For 
loss estimation purposes, this type of landslide is part of the liquefaction potential 
assessment rather than the landslide potential. The last type includes earth slump and 
earth slide, in which the earth moves as a block. They usually develop along natural 
slopes, river channels and embankments. Because pipelines often cross such zones, the 
following will focus on this type of landslide.  
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Figure 2.13 Types of landslides (Meyersohon, 1991) 
The HAZUS approach for the characterization of slope displacement mirrors, in 
concept, that of liquefaction displacement. First landslide susceptibility has to be 
evaluated. Susceptibility is characterized by the geologic group, slope angle and 
critical acceleration. The acceleration required to initiate slope movement is a complex 
function of slope geology, steepness, groundwater conditions, type of landsliding and 
history of previous slope performance. The relationship proposed by Wilson and 
Keefer (1985) is utilized in the methodology where landslide susceptibility is selected 
from a ten point scale and assigned on the basis of geology, slope angle and the 
position of groundwater with respect to the level of sliding (essentially a wet/dry 
distinction). The description for each geologic group and its associated susceptibility 
is given in Appendix B. The groundwater condition is divided into either dry condition 
(groundwater below level of the sliding) or wet condition (groundwater level at 
ground surface). For each susceptibility class, a critical acceleration is defined; hence, 
if PGA exceeds the critical acceleration then a landslide is observed. The probability 
of a landslide occurring is modified by a term to determine the percentage of the map 
area having a landslide susceptible deposit due to the conservative nature of the 
Wilson and Keefer (1985) correlation. The calculation of expected ground 
displacement in HAZUS is relatively simple and it is given by the Eq. (2.23): 
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where [ ]isadE |  is the expected displacement factor, which is a function of the 
induced acceleration (ais) and n is the number of cycles. Note that the induced peak 
ground acceleration within the slide mass, ais, represents the average peak acceleration 
within the entire slide mass. For many applications ais may be assumed equal to the 
accelerations predicted by the peak ground acceleration attenuation relationships being 
used for the loss estimation study (FEMA, 2004). 
Alternative models exist, in particular the empirical relations suggested by Saygill 
and Rathje (2008) displacement may be the simplest extension of the slope 
displacement calculation already implemented in HAZUS. The ground displacement is 
functions of the critical acceleration Kc and PGA (in g) and it is given by the Eq. 
(2.24):  
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(2.24) 
2.3.3. Faulting 
An active fault is a discontinuity between two portions of the earth crust along which 
relative movements can occur. The extent of faulting is linked closely with earthquake 
magnitude. In most earthquakes, the fault rupture plane does not have a surface 
expression; the surface fault trace is usually only observed for large earthquakes 
occurring at shallow depth but even for earthquakes without a surface fault expression, 
coseismic strains induced in the epicentral region may still be large enough to cause 
damage to buried pipelines. Faults can be classified according to the movement of the 
two sides of the fault relative to each other, in particular the principal types of fault 
movement include strike-slip, normal-slip and reverse slip as shown in Fig. (2.14).  
In a strike-slip fault the predominant motion is horizontal, which may deform a 
continuous pipe in tension or compression depending on the pipe-fault intersectional 
angle. In normal and reverse the predominant ground displacement is vertical. When 
the overhanging side of the fault moves downwards, the fault is normal, which 
deforms a horizontal pipe primarily in tension. When the overhanging side moves 
upwards, the fault is reverse, this deforms a horizontal pipe primarily in compression. 
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Figure 2.14 Difference types of faulting (Taylor and Cluff, 1977). FW-foot wall; HW- 
hanging wall 
The large permanent ground deformation associated with faulting can present a 
very severe hazard to structures on or near to active faults. In the case of gas pipelines, 
crossing active faults is often unavoidable, since pipeline location is dictated by the 
locations of supply and demand areas. It is therefore useful to be able to estimate the 
amount of permanent ground displacement that might occur in the event of an 
earthquake of a given magnitude on a particular fault. 
Various empirical relations between fault displacement and moment magnitude 
have been proposed. Based on a worldwide data base of 421 historical earthquakes, 
Wells and Coppersmith (1994) selected 244 earthquakes, and developed empirical 
relationships among magnitude, rupture length, rupture width, rupture area and surface 
displacement. These expressions (Eq. 2.25-2.27) can be used to predict likely fault 
rupture characteristics given a specific magnitude of event. Of most interest for the 
prediction of pipeline damage are the following expressions: 
log 6.32 0.90D M= − +  for Strike-Slip Fault  (2.25) 
log 4.45 0.63D M= − +  for Normal Fault  (2.26) 
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log 0.74 0.08D M= − +  for Reverse Fault  (2.27) 
where D  is the average surface fault displacement, in meters, and M is the moment 
magnitude. According to Wells and Coppersmith, the maximum fault displacement is 
twice the average fault displacement and it is assumed that the maximum displacement 
can potentially occur at any location along the fault considering that at the end of the 
fault displacements must drop to zero. Therefore for the hazard assessment, the fault 
rupture displacement, as suggested in HAZUS (FEMA, 2004), may be sampled from 
an Uniform distribution between half the maximum and the maximum displacement. 
2.4. Seismic hazard assessment   
In the past, researchers have developed several techniques for lifeline risk assessment. 
The procedure for loss estimation of such systems involves several aspects that make 
the loss computation though traditional approaches adopted for single structures, 
theoretically possible but highly impractical (Bazzurro and Luco, 2005). In particular, 
regarding the hazard assessment, the first and most important aspect stems from the 
fact that in the same earthquake, ground motion intensities at multiple sites are 
spatially correlated. Hence the joint hazard of ground shaking at more location and 
correlation models for the intensity measure of interest should be included in the risk 
computation. In this case, the use of simulation-based methods may be the approach of 
choice: multiple scenarios of ground shaking are simulated at all sites of interest 
though stochastic models that may include spatial correlation. This procedure is 
conceptually sounder but the estimation of the performance may be high 
computationally intensive especially when the facility covers a very large area. 
Moreover lifeline hazard assessment may involve the simulation of several intensity 
measures (co-simulation) due to the presence of different components (buried and 
unburied) sensitive to different IMs. Since intensity measures may be cross-correlated, 
simple sampling methods (e.g. Matrix Decomposition , Davids 1987) applied usually 
for the simulation of one single spatially correlated IM are not feasible (Weatherill et 
al, 2011). To this aim different simulation methods have to be considered. 
In this section available earthquake hazard assessment methods are described 
with a summary of strengths and limitations when a spatially distributed system is of 
concern. The formulation adopted for the case study application of L’Aquila gas 
system is described in the Chapter 5. 
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2.4.1. Methods  
This section briefly describes available hazard assessment methods in terms of their 
potential to be used for lifeline risk evaluation.  
A first way to evaluate seismic risk for spatially distributed system is to use 
individual scenarios: a particular scenario event (defined generally in terms of 
magnitude and location) is specified where ground motion is estimated though 
GMPEs; then losses are estimated conditional on occurrence of that scenario. 
Focusing on one or few earthquake scenarios no computational effort is required but 
for many applications, as insurance portfolio planning or risk reduction policy, the 
knowledge of one or few occurrence earthquake and consequences might be 
completely ineffective. 
In order to consider the effects of all possible earthquakes with different sizes, 
occurring at different locations with different probabilities of occurrence, probabilistic 
seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) can be applied. For each site considered, the 
probability of exceeding different levels of ground motion (e.g. PGV) for a specified 
period of time is evaluated (“hazard curve”). Generally when this method is applied 
for multiple sites, individual site hazard and losses curves are combined to obtain the 
overall lifeline risk assessment and spatial correlation of ground motion among sites is 
not considered (FEMA, 1999); in this way loss estimation of multiple sites might be 
underestimated (Bazzurro and Luco, 2005). Anyway it is theoretically possible to 
extend PSHA formulation accounting for spatial correlation in lifeline seismic risk 
assessment (Rohades and McVerry, 2001) but it is difficult in practice. Moreover 
lifeline performance measures are usually not available in closed form function of 
ground-motion intensities, making the evaluation of risk assessment not possible. 
Alternative methods for charactering ground motion and computing resulting 
losses for spatially distributed systems are simulation-based (Bazzurro and Luco, 
2005; Crowley and Bommer, 2006). Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) based approaches 
involve the probabilistic simulation of many earthquakes in the region of interest, 
considering all possible scenarios that could occur, and use them for the loss 
assessment. This approach has the advantages of including in a simple way spatial 
correlation among sites to evaluate lifeline loss exceedance curves. Nevertheless, 
conventional MCS may be computationally intensive for large systems and inefficient 
(Jayaram and Baker, 2010a) considering that large magnitude events that are more 
important than small-events earthquakes for lifelines risk assessment, are infrequently 
sampled. Some simulation-based approaches that tend to reduce the number of 
earthquake scenarios are characterized by the selection of a small set of possible 
earthquakes that may dominate the hazard in the region of interest (Jayaram and 
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Baker, 2009b) or represent the total regional hazard in terms of the frequency and 
distribution of ground motion they causes, i.e. “hazard-consistent” scenarios 
(Campbell and Seligson, 2003, Lee et al., 2005). Those methods have the advantages 
of including partially spatial correlation among sites (since they are simulation-based 
methods) while reducing the computational demand. Nevertheless, the identification 
of the events that dominate the hazard is not easy and the determination of the reduced 
set of scenarios and their associated hazard-consistent occurrence probabilities is 
usually based on matching according to a single ground motion parameter, making 
difficult represents other parameters or induced hazards (e.g. liquefaction). Moreover 
those procedures do not capture the effect of the uncertainties in ground motion 
intensities. Jayaram and Baker (2010a) use instead an innovative simulation-based 
framework based on an efficient sampling method (Important Sampling, IS) and data 
reduction technique (K-Means Clustering) for developing a small but stochastically 
representative set of earthquake ground-motion intensity maps. In this framework, IS 
is used to preferentially sample “important” ground motion intensity maps, involving 
the probabilistic sampling of earthquake magnitude, rupture locations and GMPE’ 
residuals and K-means is used to identify and combine redundant maps in order to 
obtain a small set of earthquakes. 
Meanwhile non-sampling based approaches have been also developed (Chang 
and Song, 2007, Kang et al., 2008, Song and Ok, 2009, Bensi et al., 2009) but those 
are generally applicable to only specific classes of lifeline systems.  
2.4.2. Simulation of spatially cross-correlated ground motion fields 
As explained in the section 2.2.4 the computation of joint distribution of spatially 
correlated IMs needs the availability of spatial cross-correlation models. A simple way 
to tackle this issue, especially if only two IMs are of concern (for example PGA and 
PGV for gas systems) is the sequential conditional simulation (Weatherill et al, 2011). 
This technique starts from the assumption that two IMs considered are jointly 
distributed according to a bivariate Gaussian distribution. This hypothesis for several 
ground motion intensities has been verified by Jayaram and Baker (2008) and 
Iervolino et al. (2010). 
Considering two correlated IMs (e.g. PGA and PGV) which logarithms are 
distributed as normal random variables with means ( log PGAμ  and log PGVμ ) and 
standard deviations ( log PGAσ and log PGVσ ) and correlation coefficient ρ , the 
conditional PDF of  one variable ( log PGV ) given a known value of the other  
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( log PGA z= ) is normally distributed characterized by the conditional mean 
log |log , ,PGV PGA M Rμ   and standard deviation log |logPGV PGAσ   as reported in Eq. (2.28) 
 
log | ,
log |log , , log | , log
log
2
log |log log 1
PGA M R
PGV PGA M R PGV M R PGV
PGA
PGV PGA PGV
z μμ μ ρσ σ
σ σ ρ
−⎧ = +⎪⎨⎪ = −⎩
   (2.28) 
 
Moreover assuming that each IM considered in multiple sites is modelled as a GRF, 
whose at least one spatial correlation model is known, the conditional simulation of 
those IMs can be realized following those steps: 1) simulation of the unconditional 
means of the two IMs from the specified GMPEs for each site 2) evaluation of 
residual terms for the first IM (e.g. PGA) according to the own spatial correlation 
model 3) evaluation of residual terms of the second  IM (e.g. PGV) for each site 
according to the normal distribution whose parameters are described by Eq. (2.28). 
This approach has the advantage to avoid making assumptions about the structure 
of the cross correlation between the two IMs. Moreover since the spatial simulation is 
made only for one IM, it can be conditioned upon the ground motion parameter for 
which the spatial correlation model is available. The secondary IM (or IMs) is 
simulated then on the basis of his correlation to the first IM. The only requirement of 
this procedure is the availability of correlation coefficients between different IMs. 
Several studies in literature have been tackled this issue: Inoue and Cornell (1990), 
Backer and Cornell (2006) and Baker and Jayaram (2008) are only some examples. 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 3 – SYSTEM CHARACTERIZATION 
AND FRAGILITY ANALYSIS OF GAS 
NETWORKS  
3.1. Natural Gas System 
Natural gas is considered among the world’s most important resource. The process 
and systems involved are highly complex and capital-intensive. The natural gas 
system can be subdivided essentially into two major parts (as shown in Fig. (3.1)): 
•Production/Processing 
•Transmission/Distribution 
Production facilities consist of onshore facilities (production field) or offshore 
(marine-water) platforms. The former is an area encompassing a group of oil and gas 
pools and wells (oil, gas and condensate wells). The natural gas that comes from oil 
wells is typically referred to as 'associated gas'. The ‘associate gas’ can exist separate 
from oil (free gas), or dissolved in the crude oil (dissolved gas). The natural gas that 
comes from gas and condensate wells, where there is little or no crude oil, is termed 
'non-associated gas'. Gas wells typically produce raw natural gas, while condensate 
wells produce free natural gas along with a semi-liquid hydrocarbon condensate. 
In Europe gas supply essentially comes from four sources outside of domestic 
production; production within the Europe accounts for around a third, and imports 
come from the following four countries: Russia (46% of imports), Norway (27%), and 
Algeria (20%), and to a lesser extent Nigeria (less than 8%). Proportions of supply 
sources vary from member state to member state for obvious geographic reasons. The 
dominance of Algerian gas in the mix of Mediterranean states (Italy, France, and also 
Portugal) contrasts with Russia’s dominance in Central Europe, notably in the new 
member states and Germany. The rest comes from internal production, which rose to 
33% in 2005 (Nies, 2008). 
 The production facility is complemented by a gathering facility, which is a flow-
line network (surface pipeline) and by process facilities that transport and control the 
flow of oil or gas from the wells to the main storage facility, the processing plant or 
the shipping point. There are two types of gathering systems, radial and trunk line. 
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The radial type brings all the flow-lines to a central header, while the trunk-line type 
uses several remote headers to collect fluid. The latter is mainly used in large fields. 
The gathering line consists of low pressure, low diameter pipelines that transport raw 
natural gas from the wellhead to the processing plant. The natural gas must be purified 
before it can be transported. Therefore, after its extraction, the natural gas is processed 
in order to obtain pipeline quality gas, namely dry natural gas. The gas is treated to 
remove any contaminants, water, and dust or petroleum liquids. The processing can be 
done at the wellhead and at centralized processing plant.In the production and the 
processing facility, the gas is treated through a chemical and a heating process. In 
offshore development, instead, field platforms or floating vessels are used for the 
production and extraction process. 
 
Figure 3.1 Scheme of a gas system 
After the separation from water and sediments, gas is placed in storage areas. 
From there the resource can be pumped through pipelines to the loading terminals 
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where is ready to be transported. Storage facilities are usually of two types: 
underground storage facilities (depleted gas reservoirs, aquifers, salt caverns); and 
storage tanks for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) that includes pipes and electric 
components.  
The gas transmission pipelines use compressors to force the gas through the pipe; 
when the natural gas enters into the compressor station, it is compressed by a turbine, 
a motor, or an engine to ensure that the flowing of the natural gas, through any 
pipeline, remains pressurized. The turbine operates a centrifugal compressor that, 
using a fan, compresses and pumps the natural gas through the pipeline. Natural gas 
engines are also used to power some compressor stations. Compressor stations usually 
contain scrubbers and filters that capture any undesirable particles or liquids that 
might be still contained in the natural gas flowing through the pipeline.  
Before reaching a major metropolitan area, the natural gas is diverted through 
intermediate stations (metering/pressure reduction stations) where the pressure is 
reduced, measured, and sold to the local gas company. Metering/Pressure Regulator 
Stations contain metering equipments for monitoring and managing the natural gas in 
their pipes, including the reduction of the gas pressure before its distribution into the 
pipe system. The natural gas company distributes the natural gas through an 
underground network of smaller pipelines called "mains." Smaller lines called 
"services" connect the mains to the end-users. Along the distribution system there are 
other intermediate stations (regulator stations) where gas pressure is reduced as 
required for the gas to arrive to the end-user.  
Therefore there are three major types of pipelines used in three different systems: 
1) the gathering system connects the wellhead to the treatment plant and it is 
characterized by low pressure and diameter pipelines; 2) the transportation system 
transports gas from the treatment plant to the distribution systems, often across long 
distances and  it is characterized by high pressure and large diameter pipelines; 3) the 
distribution system that connects regulator stations to the city, communities and it is 
characterized by low pressure and small-diameter pipelines. Moreover pipeline 
systems may include a great number of valves along their entire distributed network. 
These valves work like gateways: they are open to allow the flow of the natural gas 
and they can be closed to stop the gas flow along a certain section of pipe. In addition 
for the safe and continuous conveyance of gas fuels, control and communication 
systems are critical and vital to guarantee an effective and timely emergency response. 
In particular, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, SCADA, which stands for 
sophisticated communications systems that take measurements and collect data along 
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the pipeline network (usually in a metering or compressor stations and valves) and 
transmit them to centralized control stations. This enables a quick reaction to 
equipment malfunctions, leaks, or any other unusual activity along the pipeline. Some 
SCADA systems incorporate the ability to remotely operate certain equipment along 
the pipeline, including compressor stations, allowing engineers in a centralized control 
center to immediately and easily adjust flow rates in the pipeline. 
Note that methodologies illustrated in this thesis focus on the systems 
components that belonging to the transmission and distribution part. As explained in 
Franchin et al. (2011), system components may be classified essentially in “point-
like” components (critical facilities) or “line-like” (network) components respect to 
the geometric point of view and the approaches used for the characterization and 
definition of the vulnerability. According to this classification production and 
treatment plants may be considered as “critically facility”, i.e. single site-facilities 
whose importance for the functionality of the system (or generally more systems if 
they are interconnected with other networks) makes them critical, justifying a detailed 
description and analysis. Therefore stations, storage facilities and pipelines are 
considered “line-like” components, and the vulnerability methodology explained 
below will be referred to these components. 
3.1.1. Past earthquake effects on system components 
According to (Eguchi, 1987), past earthquakes have caused significant damage to 
pipeline system networks.  
For above-ground components of pipeline systems, such as buildings and storage 
tanks, inertial forces resulting from ground shaking are a major concern. According to 
(EERI, 1986), damage to tanks has been quite common throughout past earthquakes as 
in the 1975 Imperial Valley earthquake and the 1985 Chile earthquake. Reports from 
past earthquakes show little information on above ground facilities (intermediate 
stations), yet the small number of incidents associated to these components tends to 
indicate a good behaviour of these support facilities during an earthquake. The 
anchorage of subcomponents is especially a crucial point, as unanchored equipment 
can lead to the rupture of electrical connections or the tipping and sliding of 
mechanical parts. 
For buried pipelines, major problems seem to be most related to faulting, 
landslides, and liquefaction induced deformation. The first sign of damages to buried 
pipelines is the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, which resulted in significant fires 
through the city, due to the rupture of water lines needed by fire-hydrants. Regarding 
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the causes of damage, according to (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999), the zones of lateral 
spreading accounted for only 5% of the built-up area affected by strong ground 
shaking, yet approximately 50% of all pipeline breaks occurred within one city block 
of these zones: this fact demonstrate the high impact of ground failure on pipelines 
damage. However significant damage to the gas pipeline system due to ground 
shaking have been also observed  in four earthquakes : the 1933 Long Beach,  1952 
and 1954 Kern County, 1971 San Fernando and 1994 Northridge earthquakes 
(O’Rourke and Palmer, 1996). According to O’Rourke and Palmer (1996) damages to 
gas transmission and supply lines followed these earthquakes occurred primarily in the 
form of ruptures of oxy-acetylene girth welds in areas which lack of significant 
permanent deformation. 
3.2. Physical characteristics and fragility analysis 
To estimate earthquake damage to a natural gas system, given knowledge of ground 
shaking (or ground failure), earthquake intensity parameters have to be correlated with 
system component damage in terms of fragility functions.  In fact these relations 
provide the probability of reaching or exceeding a particular damage state (level of 
damage) given the level of ground shaking (or ground failure). To this aim the 
typology classification of each component, damage scale definition and the intensity 
measures have to be defined. Based on these fragility curves, functionality of each 
component of the natural gas system can be assessed. 
3.2.1. Buried pipelines 
Natural gas pipelines are operating at various pressures, depending on their scale: 
• Supra-regional transmission pipelines: these pipelines operate at very high 
pressures (~100 bar) and present large diameters (up to 1.40 m). Such 
pipelines can cover large area;  
• Regional transmission/distribution pipelines: these pipes still operate at high 
pressure (from 1 to 70 bar) and are used to connect local distribution 
systems; 
• Local distribution pipelines: these smaller pipelines usually operate in the 
medium (0.1 – 4 bar) or low-pressure (< 0.1 bar) range; 
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In addition to this classification, the pipeline typologies mainly rely on the following 
parameters (Gehl et al., 2010): 
- material type (usually PVC, HDPE, Cast Iron, Ductile Iron, Steel) 
- material strength 
- diameter 
- wall thickness 
- smoothness of coating 
- type of connection 
- design flow 
Fragility curves available in literature are usually based on empirical data collected 
throughout past earthquakes. The usual practice is to evaluate the Repair Rate, RR, 
parameter of a Poisson process model, which is defined as the number of pipeline 
repairs in an area divided by the length of the pipelines in the same area, with respect 
to a parameter (i.e. an intensity measure, IM) representative of ground shaking (e.g. 
PGV or PGA) or ground failure (e.g. permanent ground deformation, PGD). Empirical 
data is collected from field crews of gas / oil companies operating the pipelines and 
consists of the following: length of pipes subjected to a given level of ground shaking, 
and the number of repairs carried out for that segment. This means that this data may 
be generic characterized for example by some inaccuracies, including omitted address 
indication, vague damage description and multiple repairs at a single site combined 
into one record. Moreover no distinction is made between the different kinds of 
repairs: complete fracture of the pipe, leak in the pipe or damage to an appurtenance of 
the pipe (ALA, 2001a).Then, based on the data points, a correlation procedure is 
performed in order to fit a predefined functional form with the empirical data, for 
example linear models (RR = a·IM) or power models (RR = b·IMc). Depending on the 
consistency of the available data, it is possible to build specific models based on 
various factor such as pipe material, pipe diameter or pipe connections; hence a 
corrective factor K is usually added to the fragility model in order to account different 
factors that affect the vulnerability of pipelines. For example, considering a linear 
model, fragility functions for a generic IM is expressed by Eq. (3.1):  
RR K a IM= ⋅ ⋅  (3.1) 
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As mentioned previously, buried pipelines are very sensitive to permanent ground 
deformation (resulting from various ground failures), in addition to transient ground 
deformation due to seismic wave propagation: the characteristics of these physical 
phenomena are summed up in Tab. (3.1). 
Table 3.1Two main types of sollicitations 
 Permanent ground 
deformation 
Transient ground 
deformation 
Hazard surface faulting, 
liquefaction, landslides 
R-waves, S-waves 
Intensity measure PGD PGV, PGA, strain 
 
Wave passage effects are transient vibratory soil deformations caused by seismic 
waves generated during an earthquake. Wave passage effects cover a wide geographic 
area and affect pipe in all types of soil. Strains are induced in buried pipe because of 
its restraint within the soil mass. Among the various seismic parameters used to 
correlate the ground motion effects to the damage suffered by buried pipeline, PGV 
has been identified as the one having a more direct physical interpretation (O’Rourke 
et al. 1998).  In theory, for vertically propagating shear waves, peak ground strain is 
directly proportional to peak ground particle velocity (PGV); therefore, PGV is a 
natural demand description (ALA, 2001a).  
Many PGV fragility relations are available in literature, as O’Rourke and Ayala 
(1993), Eidinger (1998), ALA (2001a), HAZUS (FEMA 1999, 2004). Some of them 
are expressed in Tab. (3.2)5 and compared graphically in Fig. (3.2).  
Table 3.2 Pipeline fragility curves for PGV 
Author Fragility relation Notes 
ALA (2001a) 
1 0.002416RR K PGV= ⋅ ⋅  “backbone6” curve (K1=1) 
HAZUS (FEMA, 
1999) 
2.250.00003RR PGV= ⋅  “ductile pipes” curve 
                                                 
5 Fragility relations reported in Tab. (3.2) were converted by Tromans (2004): RR was 
converted from 1/feet*103 to  1/km and PGV from inch/s to cm/s. 
6 Backbone fragility functions represent the average performance of all kinds of pipes in 
earthquakes. These functions can be used when there is no knowledge of the pipe materials, 
joint type, diameter, etc. 
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Eidinger (1998) 1.98
1 0.0001658RR K PGV= ⋅ ⋅  “best-fit” curve (K1=1) 
 
As mentioned previously, depending on the availability of data used for the 
estimation of fragility curves, a corrective factor may be added to the formulation.  
As example values of modification factor, K1 estimated in ALA (2001a) for different 
combination of pipe material, join type, soil type and pipe diameter are summarized in 
Tab. (3.3).    
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Figure 3.2 Fragility curves expressed in Tab. (3.2) 
However, the seismic response of buried pipes is mostly controlled by the amplitude 
of transient strain induced in the ground by the wave propagation. In case of body 
waves, S-waves only are considered, since they tend to generate larger ground motion 
that P-waves. Concerning surface waves, the most significant motions are caused by 
Rayleigh waves. O’Rourke and Deyoe, (2004) proposed a relation between peak 
ground strain and RR introducing also a distinction between the type of wave. 
Although using transient ground strain as an intensity measure parameter seems 
really powerful, the studies carried out so far do not develop fragility functions for the 
typology directly concerned with gas pipelines: these are usually made of ductile 
materials, whereas the results of O’Rourke and Deyoe (2004) are mainly relying on 
brittle segmented pipes, like cast-iron. Therefore PGV represents the best choice to 
characterize the transient ground deformation hazard since for this parameter a large 
number of empirical relations, based on a wide range of pipe typologies, is available. 
A concise summary of fragility curves for buried pipes due to ground shaking can be 
found in Tromans (2004) and in Gehrl et al. (2010) including the dataset used and the 
range of applicability for each relation. 
Ground failure effects are permanent soil movements caused by such phenomena 
as liquefaction, landslides and localized tectonic uplifts. These tend to be fairly 
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localized in a geographic area and potential zones can be identified a priori by the 
specific geotechnical conditions. Ground failure can be very damaging to buried pipe 
because potentially large, localized deformations can develop as soil masses deform 
and move relative to each other. Such deformations can cause pipe segments 
embedded within the soil to fracture or pull out of place. Permanent ground 
deformation (PGD) is used as the demand description. The PGD descriptor ignores 
any variation in the amount of ground displacement and the direction of ground 
displacement relative to the pipeline. If this level of detail is desired, then site-specific 
analytical methods should be used instead of area-wide vulnerability functions (ALA, 
2001a). There are different PGD fragility relations available in literature, as Eguchi 
(1983), ALA (2001a), HAZUS (FEMA, 2004). 
Table 3.3 Values of modification factor K1 for PGV fragility curves (ALA, 2001a) 
Pipe material Joint type Soil Diameter7 K1 
Cast Iron cement unknown small 1.0 
cement corrosive small 1.4 
cement non corrosive small 0.7 
rubber gasket unknown small 0.8 
Welded Steel arc welded unknown small 0.6 
arc welded corrosive small 0.9 
arc welded non corrosive small 0.3 
arc welded all large 0.15 
rubber gasket unknown small 0.7 
screwed all small 1.3 
riveted all small 1.3 
Asbestos 
Cement 
rubber gasket all small 0.5 
cement all small 1.0 
Concrete welded all large 0.7 
cement all large 1.0 
                                                 
7 For the ALA (2001a) study, the “small” category includes pipes of 30.48 cm diameter, 
whereas “large” refers to diameter greater than 30.48 cm. 
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rubber gasket all large 0.8 
PVC rubber gasket all small 0.5 
Ductile Iron rubber gasket all small 0.5 
The empirical fragility proposed by Eguchi (1983) are focused on PGD induced 
by fault ruptures while vulnerability relation of ALA (2001a), has been estimated from 
four earthquakes where the liquefaction ground failure was the predominant 
mechanism. This relation is expressed by Eq. (3.2), 
0.319
2 11.223RR K PGD= ⋅ ⋅   (3.2) 
where PGD is given in m and K2  is the modification factor for different combination 
of pipe material and join type summarized in Tab. (3.4). A concise summary of 
fragility relations for permanent ground deformation can be found in O’Rourke and 
Liu (1999) with more developments given by ALA (2001a).  
As stated before, empirical relations for the fragility of pipelines are based on the 
recorded number of repairs during past earthquakes, and no distinction is really made 
between damage states. As a result, all fragility relations for pipelines are given for a 
single “damage state”, e.g. the repair rate per unit length of pipe.  
Table 3.4 Values of modification factor K2 for PGD fragility curves (ALA, 2001a) 
Pipe material Joint type K2 
Cast Iron cement 1.0 
rubber gasket 0.8 
mechanical restrained 0.7 
Welded Steel arc-welded, lap welds 0.15 
rubber gasket 0.7 
Asbestos Cement rubber gasket 0.8 
cement 1.0 
Concrete welded 0.6 
cement 1.0 
rubber gasket 0.7 
PVC rubber gasket 0.8 
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Ductile Iron rubber gasket 0.5 
 
However, according to HAZUS (FEMA, 2004), two damage states (summarized 
in Tab. 3.5) are considered: leaks and breaks and the type of repair or damage depends 
on the type of hazard: a damaged pipe because of ground failure is likely to present a 
break (it is assumed 80% breaks and 20% leaks), whereas ground shaking may induce 
more leak related damages (e.g. 20% breaks and 80% leaks). These percentages are 
accepted in the reviewed publications that are interested in making such distinction 
even if these values do not result from a specific argumentation. Then, using a Poisson 
probability distribution and the repair rate RR, one can assess the probability of having 
n pipe breaks / leaks in a pipe segment of length L though the Eq. (3.3): 
( ) ( )
!
R
n
RR L R LP N n e
n
− ⋅ ⋅= = ⋅
 
(3.3) 
Therefore, assuming that a pipe segment fails (flow rupture) when it has a least one 
break along its length, the probability of failure is given by the Eq. (3.4): 
( )1 0 1 RR LfP P N e− ⋅= − = = −  (3.4) 
Finally, using the HAZUS assumption and considering the type of hazard, it is 
possible to assess the probability to have a pipe break or a pipe leak along the length 
of the segment 
Table 3.5 Damage states for pipeline components 
Damage state Damage description 
leakage at least one leak along the pipe length 
failure at least one break along the pipe length 
 
3.2.2. Storage facilities 
Storage facilities are usually of two types: underground storage facilities (depleted gas 
reservoirs, aquifers, salt caverns); and storage tanks for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
that includes pipes and electric components.  
Underground storage facilities are used for storing gas to balance seasonal 
variations in demand. They may be classified as: 1) seasonal supply reservoirs 
designed to be filled during the 214 day non-heating season (mostly gas/oil fields and 
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aquifers); 2) high-deliverability sites for 151-day heating season (mostly salt cavern 
reservoirs). These facilities are located hundred meters below the surface. They are 
usually natural geological reservoirs, such as depleted oil or gas fields or water-
bearing sands on the top and impermeable cap rock.  
Aside from underground storage facilities, natural gas is usually stored while in 
its liquefied state (LNG) in specific LNG tanks: these facilities are designed to insulate 
the gas from any heat ingress, using “auto-refrigeration” techniques. LNG will stay at 
near constant temperature if kept at constant pressure. As long as the steam (LNG 
vapour boil off) is allowed to leave the tank, in a safe and controlled manner, the 
temperature will remain constant. This vaporisation loss is collected from the tank and 
either reabsorbed as a liquid, sent to the gas output line connecting to the national gas 
grid, or used as fuel on the site. The LNG tanks would be of a full containment design. 
In a full containment system two tanks are employed, an inner tank which contains the 
stored liquid, and an outer tank which provides security in the event of any loss of 
containment or leak from the inner tank. Inner tanks are usually made of a nickel-steel 
alloy, whereas the outer tanks are a pre-stressed concrete construction (Gehl et al., 
2010). Storage tanks may be classified according to:  
- Shape  
- Capacity  
- Dimension  
- Material  
- Construction type 
- Style of roof system (Steel)  
- Anchored or unanchored8 
- Back up power 
Past studies on the vulnerability of storage tanks usually propose PGA as the 
earthquake descriptor used to define the fragility curves. This seems to be a sound a 
choice as this acceleration-driven parameter is appropriate to account for the inertia 
forces inherent to these large and usually tall structures and the liquid contents within. 
                                                 
8 Anchored means equipment designed with special seismic tie downs and tiebacks while 
unanchored means equipment with manufactures normal requirements.   
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Regarding fragility curves, empirical relations are also quite common, such as 
O’Rourke and So (2000), HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) and ALA (2001a). During past 
earthquakes, at each storage facility subjected to a given level of ground shaking, the 
proportion of damaged tanks has been evaluated. Observations may give some details 
about the type of failure, which is then translated into a damage state, DS , Eq. (3.5) 
defines the general form of a damage function for the storage facility:  
( )( ) jP DS j x≥ = Φ  (3.5) 
where x reprents the intensity measure (IM) considered, ( )P DS j≥  is the probability 
of DS being in damage state j or higher, ( )jΦ ⋅  is the cumulative distribution function 
of a normal random variable with mean ln( )jμ and standard deviation jβ .  
An analytical approach can be found in the study of  Iervolino et al., (2004) 
where numeric analyses on dynamic models of unanchored steel tanks have been 
performed. The results (μ and β of the fragility function) are displayed as a response 
surface according two effects: the fluid height-over-radius ratio and the friction 
coefficient between the tank and the baseplate. This method is interesting, as it allows 
for the vulnerability assessment of all structures belonging to the “tank” typology. Yet, 
this study was only applied to one specific damage state (failure by elephant’s foot 
buckling), and other sets of response surfaces should be needed for an exhaustive 
evaluation of the vulnerability of storage tanks. 
Fragility curves from the literature, whether they are empirical or analytical, 
usually propose the same number of damage states and very similar definitions 
(O’Rourke and So, 2000; ALA, 2001a; FEMA, 2004). The detailed damage states 
used by HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) are summarized in the Tab. (3.6). 
For each damage state, the HAZUS methodology proposes fragility curves 
accounting also for the fragility of the equipment needed for the tank facilities to 
function properly (i.e. electric power, tank, elevated pipes, electrical/mechanical 
component) using the logic fault-tree shown in Fig. (3.3). 
Table 3.6  Damage states for tank farms defined in HAZUS (FEMA, 2004)  
Damage state Damage definition 
None No damage to tank or I/O pipes 
Slight / minor Damage to roof, minor loss of contents, minor damage to piping, but 
no elephant’s foot buckling 
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Moderate Elephant’s foot buckling with minor loss of content 
Extensive Elephant’s foot buckling with major loss of content, severe damage 
Complete Total failure, tank collapse 
 
 
The global damage state is based on the individual damage state of  its components 
and using the fault-tree analysis and the fragility parameters of the sub-components 
(lognormal distributions which parameters are summarized in Tab. 3.7), fragility 
curves for tank farms, with anchored or unanchored components are obtained. Tab. 
(3.8) shows the parameters of the corresponding lognormal distributions.  
 
Figure 3.3 Fault-tree analysis proposed by HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) to assess the 
vulnerabiltiy of tank farms 
Note that tank farms may be vulnerable also to PGD if they are located in liquefiable 
or landlisde soils.In HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) is mentioned  that damage functions  due 
to ground failure for these components are assumed to be similar to those described 
for buildings, unless specified otherwise.  
In particular it is assumed that for lateral spreading, a lognormal damage function 
with a median of 60 inches and a dispersion of 1.2 is assumed for the damage state of 
at least extensive and 20% of this damage is assumed to be complete. For vertical 
settlement, a lognormal curve with a median of 10 inches and a dispersion of 1.2 is 
assumed for the damage state of at least extensive and 20% of this damage is assumed 
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to be complete.  For fault movement or landslide, a lognormal curve with a median of 
10 inches and a dispersion of 0.5 is assumed for complete damage state.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 Fragility curves of components (anchored or unanchored) of tank frams 
components, according to HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) 
Components Damage state Anchored Unanchored 
µ(g) β µ(g) β 
Electric Power (Backup) minor 
moderate 
0.80 
1.00 
0.60 
0.80 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
Loss of  commercial 
Power 
minor 
moderate 
0.15 
0.30 
0.40 
0.40 
0.15 
0.30 
0.40 
0.40 
Electrical/ Mechanical 
Equipment 
moderate 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Steel tank minor 
moderate 
extensive 
complete 
0.30 
0.70 
1.25 
1.60 
0.60 
0.60 
0.65 
0.60 
0.15 
0.35 
0.68 
0.95 
0.70 
0.75 
0.75 
0.70 
Elevated pipes extensive 
complete 
0.53 
1.00 
0.60 
0.60 
0.53 
1.00 
0.60 
0.60 
 
Table 3.8  Fragility parameters for tank farms, according to HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) 
Typology Damage state µ(g) β 
Tank farm with 
anchored components 
slight / minor 0.29 0.55 
moderate 
0.50 0.55 
extensive 
complete 0.87 0.50 
Tank farm with slight / minor 0.12 0.55 
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unanchored 
components 
moderate 0.23 0.55 
extensive 0.41 0.55 
complete 0.68 0.55 
 
 
3.2.3. Stations 
Four different types of stations exist in Gas System:  
• Compression Stations: the natural gas enters into the compressor station, 
where it is compressed by a turbine, a motor, or an engine to ensure that the 
flowing of the natural gas, through any pipeline, remains pressurized. The 
turbine operates a centrifugal compressor that, using a fan, compresses and 
pumps the natural gas through the pipeline. Natural gas engines are also used 
to power some compressor stations. Compressor stations usually contain 
scrubbers and filters that capture any undesirable particles or liquids that 
might be still contained in the natural gas flowing through the pipeline. 
 
•Metering /Pressure Reduction Stations: these stations contain metering 
equipments for monitoring and managing the natural gas in their pipes, 
including the reduction of the gas pressure before its distribution into the 
pipe system. 
 
•Regulator Stations: at regulator stations gas pressure is reduced as required for 
the gas to arrive to the end-user. 
 
•Metering Stations: metering stations are only measurement points. 
 
 Considering that stations mean the building and the equipments inside they may be 
classified with respect to: 
- Building typology  
- Anchored or unanchored subcomponents 
- Existence of SCADA system  
- Electrical and mechanical component  
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- Existence of back up power 
- Kiosk Solution 
- Buried equipment 
- Equipment inside or near by the buildings 
Processing facilities are mostly vulnerable to PGA, sometimes PGD, if located in 
liquefiable or landslide zones. Therefore, damage states and fragility curves for these 
components are defined and associated with either PGA or PGD (FEMA, 2004). 
3.2.3.1. Compressor stations 
This type of station is a facility which supplies gas with energy to move along the 
transmission lines. Compressor stations are also used in storage facilities to compress 
the gas when it is fed into the pipeline. Each station contains one or more centrifugal 
or reciprocating compressor units, and auxiliary equipment for purposes such as 
generating electricity or cooling discharge gas and SCADA system that controls the 
station with all the equipments. Two or more compressors in a station can be used 
either in parallel or in series (FEMA 233, 1992).  
Regarding fragility analysis, in HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) damage algorithms are 
assumed to be similar to those described for pumping plants of oil systems. In 
particular compressor stations are categorized as having either anchored or 
unanchored subcomponents and a total of five damage states are defined (as shown in 
Tab. 3.9).  As for tank farms, fragility curves for these components are based on the 
probabilistic combination of subcomponent damage functions using Boolean 
expressions of the fault tree analysis to describe the relationship of subcomponents 
with the component. Note that the Boolean logic is implicitly presented within the 
definition of a particular damage state. In general, the Boolean combinations do not 
produce a lognormal distribution, so a lognormal curve that best fits this probability 
distribution is determined numerically.  
Table 3.9 Description of damage states for gas compressor (FEMA, 2004) 
Damage state Description 
No No damage 
Slight/Minor Damage Slight damage to building or full loss of commercial power and backup power for few days (< 3 days) 
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Moderate Damage 
Considerable damage to mechanical and electrical 
equipment or considerable damage to building or 
loss of electric power and of backup for 7 days. 
Extensive Damage Building being extensively damaged, or the pumps badly damaged beyond repair.   
Complete damage Building collapsed  
Table 3.10 Fragility curves for stations components (FEMA, 2004) 
Components Damage 
state 
Anchored 
components 
Unanchored 
components 
µ(g) β µ(g) β 
Electric Power (Backup) minor 
moderate 
0.80 
1.00 
0.60 
0.80 
0.20 
0.40 
0.60 
0.80 
Loss of  commercial Power minor  
moderate  
0.15 
0.30 
0.40 
0.40 
0.15 
0.30 
0.40 
0.40 
Vertical/ Horiz. Pump extensive 1.25/1.60 0.60 1.25/1.60 0.60 
Electrical/ Mechanical Equipment moderate 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Building minor 
moderate 
extensive 
complete 
0.15 
0.40 
0.80 
1.50 
0.80 
0.80 
0.80 
0.80 
0.15 
0.40 
0.80 
1.50 
0.80 
0.80 
0.80 
0.80 
 
3.2.4. Other components 
Regarding pressure reduction stations and SCADA systems, no quantitative fragility 
curves are available in literature 
3.3. Combined Damage due to Ground Failure and Ground 
Shaking 
In order to evaluate the damage induced by the combination of ground failure and 
ground shaking hazard, this section describes the general formulation that can be 
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adopted. Regarding facilities (tank farms, stations) the combined damage state 
probability (due to occurrence of ground failure and ground shaking) is found using 
the principle of probability of a union of events. 
Considering the hypothesis of independent events according to (FEMA, 2004) 
Equation (3.6) summarizes this operation:  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]C S F S FP DS j P DS j P DS j P DS j P DS j≥ = ≥ + ≥ − ≥ ⋅ ≥  (3.6) 
 
where S an F indicate the earthquake hazard, ground shaking and ground failure 
respectively, j is the particular damage state, and C indicates the combined probability 
for the damage state due to occurrence of ground failure or ground shaking.  
Table 3.11 Fragility curves for gas compressor stations, according to HAZUS (FEMA, 
2004) 
Typology Damage state µ(g) β 
Anchored 
components 
Minor 0.15 0.75 
Moderate 0.34 0.65 
Extensive 0.77 0.65 
Complete 1.50 0.80 
Unanchored 
components 
Minor 0.12 0.60 
Moderate 0.24 0.60 
Extensive 0.77 0.65 
Complete 1.50 0.80 
 
Considering that the probability for the damage state due to occurrence of ground 
failure depends on the triggering of the ground failure phenomena, and [ ]FP DS j≥  
is explicated as: 
[ ] ( ) ( )ln ln FF jF FF
j
PGD
P DS j p
μφ β
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟≥ = ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.7) 
where pF is the probability of ground failure occurrence and it is assumed a lognormal 
damage function characterized by median Fj and standard deviation Fj.  
Moreover considering that four are the principal forms of  ground failure, i.e. 
surface faulting , landsliding , and volumetric settlement and lateral spreading due to  
liquefaction, the Eq. (3.6) may be generalized as in Eq. (3.8): 
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[ ] ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1
1 2
.......
1 , ,...,
nn
C
k kk k
n
n
P DS j P E P E P two events
P threeevents
P E E E
= =
+
⎛ ⎞≥ = ∪ = − ∩ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∩ +
+ −
∑ ∑
∑  (3.8)
where n indicates the numer of earthquake hazard and ( )kP E is the damage state 
probability due to the k-th earthquake hazard. 
One issue that may yet be unresolved when modeling geotechnical hazard for 
applications such as this, is if multiple effects are possible. In most application it is 
assumed that, for a given site, permanent displacement due to liquefaction, slope 
displacement and faulting are mutually exclusive. In this case in the Eq. (3.8) all 
products referring to ground failure phenomena are equal to zero. Depending on the 
nature of the models used to characterize the ground failure, this assumption may be 
valid for many applications. For liquefaction, however, it is possible that both lateral 
spreading and volumetric settlement may be observed at a particular site. This issue is 
not widely addressed in relevant literature on the subject, and may therefore need to be 
explored further in the case study applications. 
Regarding pipelines, the combined fragility function (in terms of repair 
ratio) for a particular damage state j is generally evaluated hypothesizing that 
the earthquake hazards are mutually exclusive, as defined by the Eq. (3.9): 
C S F
R j R j RR a R b R= ⋅ + ⋅  (3.9) 
where aj and bj are the proportion of leaks and breaks with respect to the expected 
number of pipe repairs, e.g. 0.2 and 0.8 for  j=1 (break) and 0.8 and 0.2 for j=2 (leak) 
according to values suggested by HAZUS. Moreover the combined hazard due to 
ground failure at the site is generally assumed to be the maximum of the three types of 
ground failure. This means that PGD value should refer to the maximum of all 
possible types of permanent displacement at a site. These assumptions are generally 
used in many applications due to the nature of empirical fragility curves.  
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3.4. L’Aquila gas distribution system 
In the L`Aquila Region the gas is distributed via a 621 km pipeline network, 234 Km 
of that with gas flowing at medium pressure (2.5-3 bar) and the remaining 387 Km 
with gas flowing at low pressure (0.025-0.035 bar) (Fig. 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4 L’Aquila gas network 
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The medium-pressure distribution network is connected to the high pressure 
transmission network (operated by SNAM at national level) through three M/R 
stations (referred to as Re.Mi “REgolazione e MIsura” stations in Italian) providing 
gas to about 42300 customers in five municipalities (L’Aquila, Lucoli, Tornimparte, 
Ocre, Rocca di Cambio e Rocca di Mezzo). The three M/R stations are cased in one-
story reinforced concrete structures with steel roofs (Fig. 3.5) hosting internal 
regulators and mechanical equipment (heat exchangers, boilers and bowls) where the 
gas undergoes the following processes: (1) gas preheating; (2) gas-pressure reduction 
and regulation; (3) gas odorizing; (5) gas-pressure measurement. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Metering/Pressure Reduction Stations external view (up) internal view (down) 
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The pipelines of the medium and low pressure distribution networks are either 
made of steel or HDPE (High Density Polyethylene) according to the pressure level 
(Tab. 3.12). The Maximum Service Pressure, MOP [bar], is the parameter adopted for 
classifying the pipelines accounting for the pressure of the gas flowing in the 
distribution network. The MOP is defined as the maximum allowed pressure of the 
gas inside the pipeline, expressed in bar. The MOP accounts for both the physical and 
the mechanical properties of the gas system components and is evaluated according to 
the Eq. (3.10): 
20
( 1)
MRSMOP
C SDR
⋅= −  (3.10) 
where MRS is the Minimum Required Strength, SDR is the Standard Dimension Ratio 
and C is a safety factor.   
Table 3.12 Pressure Classification and allowed material for pipelines according to the 
Italian Standards (D.M. 24/11/84 e s.m.) 
Pressure Class Maximum Service 
Pressure 
MOP [bar] 
Material  
(D.M. 24/11/84 e s.m.) 
1 MOP >24 Steel 
2 12 < MOP ≤24 Steel 
3 5 < MOP ≤ 12 Steel 
4 1.5 < MOP ≤ 5 Steel; HDPE 
5 0.5 < MOP ≤1.5 Steel; HDPE 
6 0.04 < MOP ≤ 0.5 Steel; HDPE 
7 MOP ≤ 0.04  Steel; HDPE 
 
For HDPE pipes, the Minimum Required Strength MRS is the long-term 
hydrostatic capacity [MPa] (rounded according to the standards ISO 3:1973 and ISO 
497:1973) with 97.5% probability to be exceeded in every HDPE specimen. The 
Standard Dimension Ratio, SDR, is a method of dimensionally rating gas pipelines; 
the SDR is the ratio of pipe external diameter to wall thickness (e.g. a SDR 11 means 
that the external diameter of the pipe is eleven times the wall thickness). The safety 
factor C is a coefficient that accounts for both the service conditions and the 
properties of the gas system components (usually C=1.25). HDPE pipes have nominal 
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diameters ranging from 32 to 400 mm, whereas diameter of steel pipes is usually 
between 25 and 300 mm. Moreover different types of in-line valves are found along 
the pipeline network (mainly gate valves, butterfly valves, check valves, ball valves). 
The transformation of the medium distribution pressure into the low distribution 
pressure (LP) is operated via 300 Reduction Groups (RGs). Generally along the low 
pressure network (in some cases also along medium distribution pressure network), 
there are several demand nodes (IDU, “Impianto di Derivazione Utenza” in Italian) 
consisting of buried and not buried pipes and accessory elements to supply natural gas 
to utilities. Moreover, depending on the type of final client of the network and 
whether there is an IDU system, there are three types of RG (as shown in Fig. 3.6): 
(a) GRM, Reduction Groups and Measure along medium distribution pressure (MP) 
network and direct connected to large users (e.g., industrial facilities); (b) GRU, 
Reduction Groups smaller than GRM for medium pressure users connected to a 
medium pressure IDU system; (c) GRF, Final Reduction Group connected to low 
pressure network. It is worth noting that all the components contained in both the 
L’Aquila M/R stations and reduction groups are unrestrained, and therefore especially 
seismically vulnerable. The 300 reduction groups, that in the L`Aquila gas 
distribution allow for the transformation of the medium distribution pressure into the 
low distribution pressure are either buried, sheltered in a metallic kiosk or housed 
within/close to a building (Fig. 3.7). 
Re.Mi
GRF 
MP 
Network
LP Final user
IDU
GRU
GRM
MP Final user
Large user
LP
Network
IDU
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Figure 3.6 L’Aquila Gas system flow chart 
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Figure 3.7. Reduction group in L`Aquila housed in a metallic kiosk 
3.4.1. Description of database 
The following sections provide an overview of the GIS databases available for the gas 
distribution network and a summary of the mechanical and geometric properties. 
3.4.1.1. High Density Polyethylene pipelines 
Data available for the HDPE (Italian acronyms PEAD, “Politilene ad Alta Densità”) 
pipelines and their GIS representation are described in Tab. (3.13).  
Nominal Dimensions DN (mm) for the HDPE pipelines in L`Aquila are: 32; 40; 
50; 75; 90; 110; 125; 140; 160; 180; 200; 400. The nominal external diameter, dn, the 
minimum average external diameter, dem,min, the maximum average external diameter, 
dem,max, and the maximum deviation in circularity for the HDPE pipelines are 
correlated to the nominal dimension DN according to UNI EN 1555-2 standard. The 
minimum thickness emin, for the HDPE pipelines is related to the Nominal Dimension 
DN and to the Standard Dimension Ratio SDR. In conformity with the UNI EN 1555-2 
Standard the Standard Dimension Ratio SDR is related to the MOP and MRS 
according to Eq. (3.10). 
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Table 3.13 Description of database for HDPE pipelines 
Component Topology
 
Field Name Type 
 
Field Description 
 
HDPE 
Gas 
pipelines  
Line 
 
MATERIAL  T ext  Material  
DN Double Nominal Dimension 
PRESSURE_CLASS Integer Pressure Classification 
DIAMETER_EXTmax_MM Double Max External 
Diameter [mm] 
DIAMETER_EXTmin_MM Double Min External 
Diameter [mm] 
THICK_MM  Double Thickness [mm] 
DEPTH_M Double Depth [m]  
LENGTH_M  Double Pipe length [m] 
CONNC_TYPE Text Joint Type  
YIELD_MPA  Double Yield stress (MPa)  
YIELD_ELONGATION  Double Yield Elongation (%) 
ULT_ ELONGATION Double Ultimate Elongation 
(%) 
CONS_YEAR  Double Construction year  
 
Regarding the mechanical and material properties HDPE pipelines of the L`Aquila gas 
system are PE100 types. The Design Strength, σs, for PE100 pipelines is σs=8 MPa. 
The Design Strength for a certain application is the ratio between the Minimum 
Required Strength, MRS, and the safety factor, C.  For PE100 pipelines, MRS=10 
MPa and C=1.25. Tab. (3.14) shows further mechanical properties for PE100 
pipelines. Tab. (3.15) shows material properties for PE100 pipelines. 
Table 3.14 Mechanical Properties of HDPE pipelines  
Mechanical 
Properties 
Symbol Units Value Testing condition Testing 
Protocol 
Yield strength  -  
[MPa] 
23 at 23 C° ISO 527 
Yield elongation  - % 9 at 23 C° ISO 527 
Ultimate elongation - % ≥350 e < 13 mm v=100 
mm/min 
e ≥ 13 mm v=25 
mm/min 
EN 638 
E modulus (tension)  - MPa 900 at 23 C° ISO 527 
E modulus (flexure)  - MPa 1200  DIN 54852 Z4 
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Table 3.15 Material Properties of HDPE pipelines 
Material 
Properties 
Symbol Units Value Testing 
Conditions 
Testing 
Protocol 
Density    [Kg/m3] 958 at 23 C° ISO 1183 
Viscosity  [cm3/g] ≥360  ISO 1628-3 
Fluidity 
Index  
MFR190/5 [g/10 min] 0.22 at 190 C° 
weight 5kg 
ISO 1133 
Fluidity 
Index  
MFR 
190/21.6 
[g/10 min] 6.6 at 190 C° 
weight 21.6 
kg 
ISO 1133 
Minimum 
required 
strength  
MRS  [MPa] >10  ISO TR 9080 
Slow crack 
growth 
resistance 
SGC [h] >1000 σ=4.0Mpa; 
80 °C; 
>165h 
EN 33479 
Rapid Crack 
propagation 
 
RCP [bar] >25 Specimens 
∅=110x10 
ISO DIS 
13477 
 
3.4.1.2. Steel pipelines  
Data available for the steel pipelines and their GIS representation are described in Tab. 
(3.16). 
Table 3.16 Description of database for steel pipelines. 
Component Topology
 
Field Name Type 
 
Field Description 
 
HDPE 
Gas 
pipelines  
Line 
 
MATERIAL  Text  Material  
DN Double Nominal Dimension 
PRESSURE_CLASS Integer Pressure Classification 
DIAMETER_EXT_MM Double Nominal External 
Diameter [mm] 
THICK_MM  Double Thickness [mm] 
DEPTH_M Double Depth [m]  
LENGTH_M  Double Pipe length [m] 
CONNC_TYPE Text Joint Type  
YIELD_N_MM2  Double Yield strength [N/mm2] 
ELONGATION  Double Elongation [%] 
TENSILE_N_MM2 Double Ultimate Tensile Strength 
[N/mm2] 
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CONS_YEAR  Double Construction year  
 
Nominal Dimensions DN (mm) for the steel pipelines in L`Aquila are:  25; 32; 
50; 65; 80; 100; 150; 200; 250; 300. The nominal external diameter, dn, the nominal 
wall thickness, en, and the nominal mass are correlated to the nominal Dimension DN 
according to the UNI EN 10208-1 Standard. Tab. (3.17) shows the mechanical 
properties of the steel pipelines for the L`Aquila gas system (in conformity with the 
UNI EN 10208-1 Standard). 
Table 3.17 Mechanical properties of steel pipelines 
Steel Quality Yielding strength 
[N/mm2] 
Ultimate Tensile Strength 
[N/mm2] 
Elongation 
[%] 
L235GA 235 370-510 23 
L245GA 245 415-555 22 
L290GA 290 415-555 21 
L360GA 360 460-620 20 
3.4.1.3. Stations 
Data available for Re.Mi.cabins  and RGs are described in Tab. (3.18) and Tab. (3.19). 
Table 3.18 Description of database for Re.Mi cabins 
Field Name  Type 
CODE Integer 
NAME Text 
LOCATION Text 
ADDRESS Text 
CONTRUCTION YEAR Integer 
REMOTE ALARM Text 
TELEMETRY Text 
SECOND REDUCTION Text 
ODORIZING SYSTEM  Text 
INPUT PRESSURE (PRE-HEATED)[BAR] Integer 
MEASUREMENT PRESSURE [BAR] Double 
OUTPUT PRESSURE [BAR] Double 
FLOW (QIMP)[SMC/H] Integer 
RELIEF VALVE Text 
BUILDING Text 
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GROUND Text 
FENCE Text 
3.4.2. Vulnerability assessment  
As mentioned previously for pressure reduction stations (Re.Mi. and RG) no 
quantitative fragility curves are available in literature.  
In the configuration where support equipment (e.g. regulators) is sheltered within 
a building, a solution is to treat these facilities as a common building. Thus, one can 
use fragility curves for low-rise reinforced concrete or masonry structures to assess the 
vulnerability. Another approach is to consider these facilities as systems and to 
aggregate the fragility of each component into a global systemic vulnerability based 
on a fault tree analysis. The fault tree decomposition follows a logic structure with 
AND/OR operators that indicate how to aggregate the fragilities of two connected 
components. Using the basic rules of system reliability it is possible to build up the 
global probability of failure of the processing facility and to account for the fragility of 
both the building and the components within. 
Table 3.19 Description of database for Regulator stations 
Field Name  Type Field Description 
ALLOGGIAME Text Housing 
ANNOCOSTRU Integer Construction Year 
FACTYP1020 Text Gas System Component  
INSONORIZZ Text Soundproofing 
LINEE Text Lines 
PMASSIMAIN Double Maximum Pressure 
PMINIMA Double Minimum Pressure 
PORTATANOM Double Nominal Flow  
PUSCITA Double Exit Pressure 
RECINZIONE Text Fence 
TELEALLARM Text Remote Alarm  
TELEMISURA Text Telemetry  
TERRENOPIA Text Ground Typology 
TIPOGRUPPO Text Reduction group type  
UBICAZIONE Text Location 
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To this aim, in collaboration with the network operator, a fault tree analysis of 
Re.Mi  station and RG has been performed. The fault-tree decomposition has been 
applied to Re.Mi cabins in order to identify which sub-component is critical with 
respect to seismic fragility.  All sub-components are considered to be not anchored 
and simply supported on the ground (with the exception of bowls located in a 
separated area that are ceiling-mounted). The Re.Mi. station is decomposed in the 
following sub-components: 
- Building 
- Regulators 
- Mechanical equipment (heat exchangers, boilers and bowls) 
To compute the global fragility curve of the whole plant the fault tree shown in Fig. 
(3.8) has been formulated: 
Re.
Mi
S
T
A
T
I
O
N
Regulators
First Regulator
Second Regulator
Building
Mechanical
Equipment
Boilers
Alimentation
 
Figure 3.8 Fault tree analysis of a Re.Mi station 
Since gas supply has to be maintained at all times, two installations are mounted in 
parallel where each installation is characterized by a regulator and a monitor. The 
monitor is a safety device that has to be able to prevent the outlet pressure from 
exceeding safe thresholds in the case of complete failure of the regulator, taking over 
the function of the primary, normally active regulator. During normal operation the 
monitor is fully open and if the pressure becomes equal to the setpoint of the monitor, 
the monitor will close to constrain the pressure. 
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According to experts’ experience, two damage states have been indentified: 
Complete and Extensive that corresponds to a complete loss of functionality of the 
system (no gas supply).  
Tab. (3.20) summarizes the damage states and the description. 
 
Table 3.20 Damage states for the Re.Mi cabin 
Damage state  Description 
Complete  Building collapse  
Extensive  Extensively damaged building, or both regulators 
damaged, or badly damaged boilers/heat alimentation   
 
In particular, when boilers break down the gas flow is ensured since the freezing stops 
the system.RGs are decomposed, instead, in the following sub-components: 
- Regulators 
- Masonry housing (when it is present) 
To compute the global fragility curve of the whole plant the fault tree shown in Fig. 
(3.9) has been formulated.  
R
GRegulators
First Regulator
Second Regulator
Masonry 
housing
 
Figure 3.9 Fault-tree analysis of a Reduction Group 
In the most of cases the safety device is ensured by the presence of shut-off valves that 
are able to block the gas flow. When the pressure exceeds a maximum value the valve 
closes. Also in this case two damage states have been identified that Tab. (3.21) 
summarizes.It is important to note that some RGs do not have the second regulator 
and this fact implies a higher vulnerability. 
Table 3.21 Damage states of the Reduction Group 
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Damage state  Description 
Complete  Building collapse (mansory housing) 
Extensive  
Extensively damaged housing, or both regulators 
damaged. 
These preliminary results represent the first attempt for the developing of new 
fragility curves. Further research is needed in order to propose new fragility curves. 
However, as first approximation fragility curves of compressor stations of HAZUS 
(FEMA, 2004) will be used for the seismic analysis of the case study. 
Regarding pipelines, fragility curves available in literature have been validated 
through an analysis of the damages occurred on the gas network following the 6th 
April L’Aquila earthquake by processing technical reports from Enel Rete Gas 
describing the repairs and replacements activities following the seismic event. In 
particular the ground shaking induced damage to the gas distribution network was 
analyzed to obtain the repair rate (number of repairs per km) as a function of the level 
of ground shaking experienced, expressed in terms of PGV. Results shows that the 
trend is somehow comparable with existing pipeline-fragility curves (see Appendix C 
for more details); although the fragility curves seems to be conservative on respect to 
the observed damage, it must be highlighted that the scatter associated with the 
empirical fragility relations is quite high since those fragility curves have been 
obtained combining data from different kinds of pipes (e.g. ALA 2001a).  
 
  
Chapter 4 – SYSTEMIC VULNERABILITY 
ANALYSIS  
4.1. Systemic Vulnerability analysis  
Vulnerability assessment of a gas network can be measured generally in two 
perspectives:  
 
• Connectivity reliability between node pairs where the main goal is related to 
determine the probability of the existence of a path connecting the source and 
the demand node when the links and the nodes are subjected to random failure 
events or in terms of serviceability defined by the aggregate functionality of 
facilities (nodes) composing the system, i.e. the number of distribution nodes 
which remain accessible from at least one supply node following the 
earthquake; in this case individual failures of each component do not influence 
other components vulnerability but change the topology of the network; 
• Flow-performance reliability includes consideration of the network capacity, 
e.g. maintaining minimum head pressure related to leakages from two 
particular points of the network or related to a demand node or determining 
flow discharge of the network that quantifies the undelivered flow related to i 
-th distribution demand node related to leakages.  
Moreover an extra vulnerability could be considered when the failure of one element 
is dependent on the failure of elements in the other networks. This regards inter-
dependent networks such as gas and electricity network that are interconnected 
through the gas fired power plants that need fuel from gas pipeline systems to generate 
electricity. 
Depending on the goal of the analysis, the performance of the system may be 
evaluated though the use of performance indicators that express numerically either the 
comparison of a demand with a capacity quantity, or the consequence of a mitigation 
action, or the assembled consequences of all damages. 
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4.1.1. Connectivity analysis 
4.1.1.1. Functional modeling 
Gas systems are networks that can be modeled as a graph composed by the set of 
nodes connected by edge links amongst each other. The way these connections are 
formed dictates how the vulnerability of each element influences the vulnerability of 
the network as a whole.  
A graph G = (X, A) is a collection of points or vertices (node) x1, x2 … xn 
(denoted by the set X) and a collection of lines (edge/branch) a1, a2 … an (denoted by 
the set A) joining all or some of these points. Graph can be divided into directed graph 
and undirected graph. If the lines in A have direction, which is usually shown by an 
arrow, they are called arcs and the resulting graph is called a directed graph 
(Christofides, 1975). Moreover a graph is said to be strongly connected if for any two 
vertices xi and xj, there is at least one path going to vertices xi and xj. For a strongly 
connected graph, vertex xj is reachable from vertex xi and vice versa for any xi and xj, 
the strong component containing a given vertex xi is unique and xi will appear in the 
set of vertices of one and only one strong component. Considering a gas network. This 
system is strongly connected if the gas flows in one direction between every two 
positions. The network is weakly connected if the gas flows in both directions between 
every two positions. The network is disconnected if there is no possible way for the 
gas to flow from one point to another. 
These systems can be classified in two different types namely tree or loop. The 
tree type pipeline system happens where the pipeline system is not in the loop 
condition. While for the loop type system, the pipeline system contains loops. It is 
much easier to solve the calculations for the tree type system compare to the loop type 
pipeline system. This is due to the looped nature, flow and direction of each pipe 
cannot easily be calculated. Usually the tree type is used for the distribution level of 
the network since it has the task of reaching as close as possible to the end user. 
 Different graph theory algorithms and numerical methods exists, each of them 
solve different problems. Dijkstra’s algorithm solves the shortest path problem for a 
directed graph with non negative edge weights. For example, if the vertices of the 
graph represent gas wells and edge weights represent distances between pairs of wells 
connected by a pipeline, this algorithm can be used to find the shortest route between 
two gas wells. The Depth First Search algorithm instead is used to determine which 
nodes are reachable from a given node. More details on graph theory algorithms can 
be found in Christofides (1975). 
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Graph theory is very useful to represent the network computation of any topology 
and to check the connectivity of the gas network systems. 
4.1.1.2. Connectivity evaluation 
In the seismic vulnerability assessment the general aim of a connectivity analysis is to 
determine if after the seismic event a demand node is accessible from at least on 
supply node. To this aim nodes should be distinguished considering their 
functionality. The nodes are generally treatment plant, storage tanks, stations and end 
user demand node. Moreover for the underground pipeline network construction, T-
junction, and joints represent other nodes since in that place the failure probability is 
fairly high. The deliver line between the structures is the side of graph.  
In order to compute performance indicators, that are used to provide a measure of 
the impact of the earthquake on the systemic vulnerability, it is important to designate 
which nodes in the network are sources and which are demand node. All the nodes 
that do not belong to either of these two classifications are considered transmission 
nodes. Directions of the flows are presumably from sources to demand node. In the 
case of gas transportation/distribution network the source node is represented by the 
gas treatment plant; moreover if it is possible to determine the intermediate response 
to the shortage of the gas in the system, the storage tanks must also be considered as 
source nodes in the graph representation. Nodes that are connected directly with 
customers are considered demand nodes.  
It is important to note that if only the transportation (or distribution) part of the 
gas supply network is of concern, node functionality changes. In particular 
considering only the distribution network, regulator stations becomes source nodes. 
4.1.2. Flow analysis 
In a flow-based analysis the network performance is measured evaluating the satisfied 
customer demand after the earthquake event respect to that before the earthquake. In 
the case of gas network, for the purpose of calculating pipe flows and nodal pressure, 
Newton Nodal method in steady state condition and flow equations may be used 
respect to different pressure levels. A network is in a steady state when the values of 
the quantities characterizing the flow of gas in the system are independent of time and 
the system is described by a set of nonlinear algebraic equations (Osiadacz, 1987). In 
steady state analysis, the pressure of the nodes and the flow rate in the pipes must 
satisfy the flow equations and the value of load node and source node must fulfill the 
two Kirchhoff’s laws, which are the Kirchhoff’s first law and Kirchhoff’s second law.  
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Common flow equations can be expressed in a general form (Osiadacz, 1987). For any 
pipe k, the pipe flow equation from node i to node j can be expressed as in Eq. (4.1): 
( ) ( )1mn k nk kQ K Qφ ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  (4.1) 
where ( )n kQφ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ is the flow function for the pipe k, kK is the pipe constant, ( )n kQ is 
the flow in the pipe k and m1 is the flow exponent. The low pressure version of the 
equation is: 
( ) ( )2n k n i jk kQ K Q p pφ ⎡ ⎤ = = −⎣ ⎦  (4.2)                    
where pi is the pipeline inlet pressure and pj is the pipeline outlet pressure. The 
medium and high pressure version of the equation is: 
( ) ( )1 2 2mn k n i jk kQ K Q p pφ ⎡ ⎤ = = −⎣ ⎦  (4.3) 
where m1 is equal to 1.848 for medium pressure pipes and 1.854 for high pressure 
pipes. 
Note that taking account of the fact that a change of the flow direction of the gas 
stream may take place in the network Eq. (4.2) and (4.3) should be rearranged 
respectively as: 
( ) ( )
0.5
ij i j
n ijk
k
S p p
Q S
K
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  (4.4) 
( ) ( ) 1
1 m
ij i j
n ijk
k
S p p
Q S
K
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
(4.5) 
where 1ijS =  if i jp p> and 1ijS = −  if i jp p< . 
Details on Newton Nodal method and selection of flow equations can be found in 
Osiadacz (1987). 
4.1.3. Inter-dependencies  
Interdependencies that are likely to exist in service lifelines can be classified as 
physical, geographical, logical and cyber (Rinaldi et al., 2011).  
Physical dependencies between two systems exist if the state of each is dependent 
on the material output(s) of the other. For example gas transportation network depends 
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on electricity because of compressor station backup system. At the same time power 
network depends on gas system for fuel production. Examples of possible physical 
inter-dependencies for gas systems with other networks can be found in Esposito and 
Iervolino (2011c). 
Infrastructures are geographically interdependent if a local environmental event 
can create state changes in all of them, affecting components across multiple 
infrastructures due to physical proximity (physical disaster propagation). Geospatial 
interdependency is the relationship that exists entirely because of the proximity of 
components. For example structural interaction in buried pipelines, especially in the 
case of being constructed in same ditch (water from the broken water pipe will 
degrade the transmission performance of the fiber-optics of telecommunication system 
in the proximity of the water pipe). 
Cyber interdependencies are relatively new and include the reliance on 
telecommunications for supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
and information technology for e-commerce and business systems. For example a loss 
of the SCADA system in the electrical power grid will not by itself shut down the 
grid, but the ability to remotely monitor and operate the breakers is lost. 
Two systems are logically interdependent if the state of each depends on the state 
of the other via a mechanism that is not a physical, cyber, or geographic connection. 
Logical interactions exist in infrastructures, which are linked through financial 
markets. A possible logical dependency is the impact that oil futures have on natural 
gas prices and ultimately the natural gas infrastructure via changes in infrastructure 
investment.  
Several researchers have proposed different types of interdependency simulation 
models. Dueňas-Osorio et al. (2007) proposed a very simple model for interdependent 
lifeline systems in which the interdependency was determined by geographical 
immediacy. In particular, the study focuses on the dependence of a water system on 
the power grid. Adachi and Ellingwood (2008) evaluated the probability of lost 
functionality of a component whose serviceability depends on the behavior of another 
network, though the use of a fault tree analysis. A fault tree model in fact illustrates 
how the functionality of the primary and supporting systems are integrated. More 
recently Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueňas-Osorio (2011) have introduced an 
interdependence definition that allows a clear characterization of coupling links 
between interdependent systems; in particular interdependent failure propagation and 
evolution are modeled to include cascading effects from network interactions into 
fragility assessment. 
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4.2. Performance indicators 
Within the seismic reliability analysis of a gas network it is needed to assess the 
performance of the whole system and its components when subjected to a seismic 
hazard. The quantitative measure of this performance is given by Performance 
Indicators (PIs), that express numerically either the comparison of a demand with a 
capacity quantity, or the consequence of a mitigation action, or the assembled 
consequences of all damages Therefore PIs are introduced to provide a measure of the 
impact of the earthquake on the systemic vulnerability and to quantify the degree to 
which the system is able to meet established specifications and/or customer 
requirements following an earthquake event.  
Depending on the goal of the vulnerability analysis (connectivity or flow 
reliability) different PIs may be evaluated. Moreover as explained in Franchin et al. 
(2011), PIs can be categorized according to the object they refer to. Thus one has: 
• Component level PIs  
• System level PIs 
In the following section some examples of performance indicators from the literature 
will be given. At the system level, the adaptation and use of two serviceability 
performance indicators, originally defined for the water supply system, namely the 
System Serviceability Index (Wang et al. 2010) and the Serviceability Ratio (Adachi 
and Ellingwood, 2008), is proposed. At the component level, the use of the Damage 
Consequent Index (Wang et al. 2010), originally defined for water pipes, is proposed 
to assess how the pipelines damage can impact on the system serviceability of gas 
systems.  
4.2.1. System’s performance indicators 
 
• System Serviceability Index (Wang et al, 2010) 
The System Serviceability Index (SSI), originally defined by Wang et al. (2010) for a 
water supply system, is proposed as a system performance indicator for the gas 
network.  The SSI is a relative index that compares the serviceability of the utility 
network, in terms of customer demand satisfaction, before and after the earthquake. It 
is expressed by the following equation:  
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where n and n0  are respectively the number of satisfied demand nodes after and before 
the earthquake and Qi is the demand (flow) at the i-th node. 
 
• Serviceability Ratio (Adachi and Ellingwood, 2008) 
The Serviceability Ratio (SR), originally defined by Adachi and Ellingwood (2008) 
for a water supply system, is proposed herein for a gas network. This index is directly 
related to the number of distribution nodes in the utility network, which remain 
accessible from at least one supply facility following the earthquake. It is computed 
as: 
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 (4.7) 
where SR is the serviceability ratio of the system defined on the domain [0,1], iw  is a 
weighting factor assigned to the distribution node i and Xi represents the functionality 
of facility i, which is modeled as the outcome of a Bernoulli trial (Xi = 1 if facility is 
accessible from at least one supply facility), and n is the number of distribution nodes. 
 
• Connectivity Loss (Poljanšek et al., 2011) 
Connectivity Loss (CL) measures the average reduction in the ability of sinks (gas-
fired power plants) to receive flow from sources (gas fields and LNG terminals) 
counting the number of the sources connected to the i-th sink in the original 
(undamaged) network ,
i
source origN  and then in the damaged network ,
i
source damN . It is 
expressed by the following equation:  
,
,
1
i
source dam
i
source orig i
N
CL
N
= −  (4.8) 
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4.2.2. Component performance indicators 
 
• Damage Consequence Index (Wang et al., 2010) 
The use of the Damage Consequence Index, DCI, originally defined for water system, 
is proposed herein for a gas network.  DCI measures how the damage on a single pipe 
impacts on the overall system serviceability, by identifying critical links that 
significantly affect the system seismic performance. The Damage Consequences Index 
(DCI) is expressed as: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
|
1
i
i
E SSI E SSI L
DCI
E SSI
−= −  (4.9) 
where [ ]E SSI  is the expected value of SSI defined in Eq. (4.6) and [ ]| iE SSI L  is 
the conditional value of SSI that considers only the i-th damaged pipes. DCIi measures 
the reduction of SSI given that the i-th pipe is damaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5 – PROBABILISTIC SEISMIC RISK 
ASSESSMENT OF L’AQUILA GAS 
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK  
5.1. Framework  
The proposed methodology for the evaluation of seismic performance of gas networks 
is herein applied to L’Aquila gas distribution system and it consists of five major 
steps: 
 
1. Seismic hazard assessment of L’Aquila region considering as source the 
Paganica fault on which L’Aquila (central Italy) 2009 earthquake was 
originated though the simulation of  probabilistic scenarios earthquakes of 
strong motion parametrs on a regular grid that covers the region of interest.  
2. Evaluation  of  the PGD hazard, in particular focusing on the effects induced 
by landlside, in order to estimate the seismic demand due to geotechnical 
hazard. 
3. Seismic demand evaluation at each facility and distributing elements within 
the network to obtain the failure probability though the use of appropriate 
fragility curves. 
4. Systemic vulnerability analysis though the use of a connectivity algorithm to 
integrate the damage of facilities and distributing elements into the damage of 
the system. 
5. Probabilistic risk assessment of the case study using Monte Carlo simulation 
in terms of mean functionality and annual exceedance curve. 
 
The methodology presented has been tested via the implementation of the case 
study in the OOFIM software developed in a Matlab environmental (Mathwork, 2010)  
by the University of Rome “La Sapienza” . The software, created in relation of the 
objectives of the Syner-G project, adheres to the OBJECT-ORIENTED Paradigm 
(OOP) where the problem is described as a set of objects, “software containers” 
grouping together related procedures and data. Data elements are called attributes of 
an object. Procedures which operate on data specific for an object are called methods. 
Objects are instances (concrete realizations) of classes (abstract models) that are used 
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to model the system. Fig. (5.1) shows the classes implemented in the OOFIM software 
at the time of release (April 2011) of the deliverable 2.1 (Franchin et al., 2011) of 
Syner-G project, in which the object-oriented modeling and software development are 
described.  
The first class, Analysis, contains the analysis methods required to evaluate the 
overall impact of wave propagation hazard on an infrastructure, and acts upon the 
Enviroment class. This latter class is composed of two classes, the Infrastructure and 
the Hazard. The Enviroment is the portion of physical space that needs to be 
considered in evaluating the impact of the hazard on the Infrastructure. The Hazard 
class is an abstract class, generalization of the Natural class that contains 
environmental hazards such as the seismic one. The Seismic hazard, in turn, is 
modeled as the composition of three classes: one class for seismo-generic sources, one 
for ground-motion prediction equations and one for the description of events. The 
Infrastructure class is the generalization of the Physical class made up of two classes: 
the Network class and the Inhabited Area class. The Network class is an abstract class, 
generalization of all types of networks. Note that, as shown in the figure, the classes 
interact with each other (i.e. they are associated). Association means that an object 
from a class can call the methods from another class. In physical terms this means that 
the object describing the set of buildings in a neighborhood (object from the Inhabited 
Area class) can “ask” to the object electric power network (from the corresponding 
class) whether there is still electric power fed to the neighborhood after the seismic 
event. Network class is composed of two classes: EPN (electric power network) and 
WSS (water supply system) which are the only systems implemented in the software 
at the time of release of the deliverable 2.1. These systems are made up of nodes and 
links connecting them; therefore WSS and EPN classes are the composition of the 
corresponding node and link classes. More details on the object-oriented modeling and 
specification of the classes implemented in the software can be found in Franchin et 
al. (2011).   
For the purpose of the thesis the programme has been equipped with the GAS 
class, focusing on the components of a gas distribution system, in order to evaluate 
seismic performance of the L’Aquila gas distribution network. The gas distribution 
system class, illustrated in Fig. (5.2) is the composition of node and link abstract 
classes, of which the first is the generalization of Pipe class, while the second is the 
generalization of FinalNode, GasSource and Station classes. In particular the 
FinalNode class is the generalization of IDU class that represents the node directly 
connected with customers (demand node) and Joint class that represents nodes used to 
reproduce the geometry of the system but characterized by a demand equal to zero. 
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The Station class is represented by regulator stations while the Source class is 
represented by Metering/pressure Reduction stations (M/R) that are used to connect 
the distribution medium-pressure network to the high-pressure transmission lines. 
 
Figure 5.1 Classes implemented in the OOFIM software at the time of release of the 
deliverable 2.1 (Franchin et al., 2011) 
Each class is characterized by attributes and methods. Attributes refer to properties 
that describe the whole system and each component. For example for the gas 
distribution system class, possible attributes may be related to the number of links and 
nodes presented in the system, the list of vulnerable sites and the corresponding 
intensity measures, or the connectivity and adjacency matrix used for the evaluation 
state by state of connectivity performance measures. Possible attributes for link and 
nodes instead may be related to geographical coordinates, site class, material and other 
data necessary as input to compute fragility and system component performance 
measures. Methods, instead, may be related for example to the computation of flow in 
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all pipes and nodes or accessibility of demand nodes or fragility of links and nodes if 
they are considered vulnerable. 
 
Pipe Finalnode GAS source GAS station
GAS link
GAS
GAS node
M/RJointIDU
 
Figure 5.2 Class diagram for the gas distribution network 
5.2. Case study 
Part of the L’Aquila gas system has been selected for the evaluation of seismic 
performance. In particular the area selected is characterized by one M/R station, 12 
regulator stations and pipelines at medium pressure either made of steel and HDPE as 
shown in Fig. (5.4). The function of a gas network at medium pressure is to provide 
end-users with gas where, in this case considering only the MP network,  end-users are 
represented by the regulator stations. The implementation of the selected network in 
the software imply the identification of nodes and links of the GAS class, i.e. the M/R 
station, regulators groups and joints are nodes while pipes are links. To this aim 39 
nodes (1 source, 12 RG stations and 26 joints) and 38 links have been identified and 
all data necessary for the evaluation of seismic vulnerability have been imported in the 
software. Nodes and links represent the vulnerable sites for which the seismic demand 
has to be computed. 
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Figure 5.3 Case study 
5.2.1. Seismic hazard assessment  
Probabilistic hazard scenarios have been simulated for the region covering the gas 
network. An overview of the procedure implemented in the software according to the 
proposed methodology to generate the hazard input for each scenario is shown in Fig. 
(5.4). The process is essentially divided into four separate stages:  
• generation of the seismic source 
• calculation of ground motion on rock  
• calculation of the cross-correlated ground motion  
• site and geotechnical characterization 
The seismic source needs to be defined in terms of magnitude, geographical extent and 
mechanism. The latter may refer only to a parameter describing the fault type (normal, 
strike-slip, reverse) or may be a focal mechanism (strike, dip and rake) characteristic 
to the source in question. In this case the Paganica fault (normal fault type) on which 
L’Aquila (central Italy) 2009 earthquake was originated is used as source for the 
generation of seismic event computed for a characteristic earthquake of moment 
magnitude Mw 6.3 and occurrence rate of ν = 1/ 750 (Pace et al., 2006). Data on 
geographical extent of the source are summarized in Tab. (5.1). 
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Figure 5.4 Overview of Seismic Hazard Simulation Procedure: inputs (blue), outputs 
(yellow) and process (red).  
The epicenter of the source is sampled as a point within the source model, with every 
location assumed equally probable. In this case the source is defined as a mesh of 
points prior to the simulation process and each point is sampled randomly with 
replacement from the mesh. More details on the approach used for the generation of 
rupture events can be found in Weatherill et al. (2011). 
Table 5.1 Geographical extent of the Paganica fault (Chioccarelli and Iervolino, 2010) 
 Vfault 
1 
Vfault 
2 
Vfault 
3 
Vfault 
4 
Longitude 
(°) 
13.424 13.552 13.465 13.336 
Latitude 
(°) 
42.405 42.293 42.238 42.351 
Depth 
(km) 
0.600 0.600 11.800 11.800 
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The strong ground motion is attenuated away from the source using a GMPE. In 
particular strong motion is evaluated on a regular grid covering the gas network. An 
intensity measure for which a spatial correlation model is available is selected as the 
“primary IM”, i.e. the intensity measure chosen to generate a GRF and to obtain the 
“secondary IM” though the conditional sequential simulation (following the procedure 
described in the section 2.4.2). The regular grid that cover the region of interest is 
identified based on the correlation structure of the primary IM, i.e. a grid with a 
subdivision that is adequately smaller of the IM correlation length (i.e. the range). 
For each site of the grid the means of primary IM from the specified GMPE are 
calculated and the residual sampled from a random filed of spatially correlated 
Gaussian variables according to the own spatial correlation model. Note that the grid 
depends on the extension of the study region but in general its nodes do not coincide 
with any of the sites of the gas network components. The number of its nodes is 
independent of the number of vulnerable components. In this way the evaluation of the 
number of nodes of the grid is related to the spatial correlation of the primary IM and 
it is independent of the refinement in the modeling of the network. The value of the 
primary IM at each site of the network (i.e. the vulnerable sites) is then obtained 
interpolating the grid values. The resulting ground motions correspond to a “rock” 
site, corresponding to Eurocode 8 class A. 
Then for each site conditional mean and conditional covariance of the secondary 
IM are simulated using the formulation in Eq. (2.29). The secondary IMs are then 
determined by sampling a vector of Gaussian variables described by the conditional 
mean and covariance of each IM upon the primary IM. For the case study PGA has 
been chosen as primary IM and since gas network components of the case study 
(pipelines and stations) are vulnerable to PGV and PGA (as discussed in section 3.2), 
PGV has been chosen as secondary IM. The GMPE used for the evaluation of strong 
motion is Akkar and Bommer (2010) and spatial variability has been modeled using 
correlation models provided by Esposito and Iervolino (2011a). 
The third stage of the process is to determine the hazard at the soil site, given the 
hazard for the assumed rock condition that has been calculated by the previous stage. 
To scale the hazard to the site condition an amplification factor needs to be applied. 
The amplification factor can be determined in several different ways, depending on the 
data available. As discussed in section 2.3 there are advantages and disadvantages to 
the use of code specified amplification factors and those inherent within particular 
GMPEs. For the case study site condition effects are followed according to the ground 
motion prediction equation based amplification factors. 
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Regarding geotechnical hazards, the modeling approach of HAZUS has been 
largely adopted. For the case study, thanks to a process jointly developed by 
Department of Hydraulic Engineering, Geotechnical and Environmental  and 
Department of Structural Engineering of University of Naples, “Federico II”, the 
landslide potential of L’Aquila region, according to the HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) 
procedure has been performed (more details can be found in Appendix D). 
Therefore, in order to evaluate PGD hazard though the OOFIM software, the 
program has been also equipped with the Landslide class including attributes and 
methods according to the HAZUS procedure. The process of estimating site 
amplification and landslide hazard implemented in the software is shown in Fig. (5.5). 
As discussed in section 2.3.2 the probability of landsliding is determined for each site 
using the susceptibility class and the PGA on surface. If PGA is exceeded by the value 
of critical acceleration determined for each susceptibility class using the HAZUS 
classification, then displacement occurs at the site, otherwise no permanent 
displacement is considered. If displacement occurs then the displacement (PGD) is 
calculated though a displacement model. Since the HAZUS estimator of PGD is 
deterministic alternative models that better constrain the uncertainty, whilst retaining 
practicality for use with common intensity measures should be used. In this case the 
Saygill and Rathje (2008) empirical model has been used. In Tab. (5.2) all data input 
for the seismic hazard characterization of the case study are summarized. 
5.2.2. Seismic vulnerability assessment  
To estimate earthquake damage, given knowledge of ground shaking (and ground 
failure), earthquake intensity parameters have to be correlated with system component 
damage in terms of fragility functions.  To this aim the typology classification of each 
component, damage scale definition and the intensity measures have to be defined. 
Based on these fragility curves, functionality of each component of the case study can 
be assessed. The case study consists essentially of pipelines and stations (M/R and 
regulator stations). In particular for buried pipelines ALA (2001a) fragility relations, 
in terms of PGV and PGD, have been selected for each pipe typology (steel and 
HDPE). Regulator stations have been not considered vulnerable since no quantitative 
fragility curves are available in literature. Also for the M/R station, no quantitative 
fragility curves are available in literature but since some authors (Chang and Song, 
2007; Song and Ok, 2009) assume the M/R station owns the same fragility property as 
compressor stations, these fragility curves  have been adopted in order to evaluate the 
implications of this assumption in terms of seismic performance. 
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Location of
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IM at surface
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Slope
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(PGD)
PGA>Kc
PGA and KC 
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Figure 5.5 Overview of the process of defining site amplification and landslide hazard 
Damage states considered for the evaluation of seismic vulnerability are strictly 
related to the objective of the analysis and then to the level of functionality that is 
considered. In this case the system is considered functional if demand nodes (regulator 
groups) continue to provide gas and then if they remain accessible from at least one 
supply node (M/R stations). Therefore a connectivity analysis has been performed. To 
this purpose it is assumed that a pipe segment cannot deliver gas when the segment 
has at least one break, while for the supply node it is assumed that it loses its 
connectivity when it is in either “extensive” or “complete” damage states. The details 
about fragility functions and damage states for each component’s typology are 
reported in Section 3.2. As a reminder, the three fragility functions of  M/R station and 
pipelines (steel and HDPE) are summarized in Tab. (5.3). 
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Table 5.2 Data input for the seismic hazard characterization 
Input Primary 
IM 
Secondary  
IM 
Landslide 
 
IM PGA PGV PGD 
GMPE Akkar and Bommer 
(2010) 
Akkar and Bommer 
(2010) 
- 
Spatial correlation 
model 
Esposito and 
Iervolino (2011) 
 
- 
- 
Correlation 
coefficient 
 
- 
 
0.7549 
- 
Site 
amplification 
 
GMPE 
 
GMPE 
- 
Critical acceleration 
map 
 
- 
 
- 
Hazus 
(FEMA,2004) 
Displacement 
model 
 
- 
 
- 
Saygill and Rathje 
(2008) 
 
Table 5.3 Data input for the fragility characterization 
 
Component 
 
Author 
 
Damage 
state 
Fragility relation parameter 
Ground 
shaking 
Ground  
failure 
 
Steel 
pipelines 
(small 
diameter) 
 
ALA 
(2001a) 
 
Leak 
 
 
1 0.6K =  
 
 
2 0.7K =  
 
HDPE 
pipelines 
(small 
diameter) 
 
ALA 
(2001a) 
 
Leak 
 
 
1 0.5K =  
 
 
2 0.8K =  
 
M/R  
station 
(Un-
anchored) 
 
HAZUS 
(FEMA, 
2004) 
 
 
Extensive 
µ(g) β µ(inch) β 
 
0.77 
 
0.65 
 
10 
 
0.5 
                                                 
9 The correlation coefficient has been estimated starting from the dataset used for the Akkar 
and Bommer (2010) GMPE. 
Chapter 5  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Probabilistic seismic risk assessment of L’Aquila gas distribution network 
 
 
115 
5.2.3. System performance evaluation  
The quantitative measure of the functionality of the gas network is given by 
performance indicators to provide a measure of the impact of the earthquake on the 
systemic vulnerability and to quantify the degree to which the system is able to meet 
established specifications and/or customer requirements following an earthquake 
event. For the case study the adaptation and use of the Serviceability Ratio (Adachi 
and Ellingwood, 2008) and Connectivity Loss (Poljanšek et al., 2011) performance 
indicators are proposed. These indicators are summarized in Tab. (5.4). The process of 
estimating seismic vulnerability and performance indicators implemented in the 
software is shown in Fig. (5.6). 
Table 5.4 Perfomance indicators adopted 
Perfomance Indicator Parameters Supply 
node 
Demand 
node 
( )
1
1
n
i i
i
n
i
i
w X
SR
w
=
=
=
∑
∑
 
iw = weight factor related to 
the nominal flow (m3/h) of the 
demand node 
n= number of demand nodes 
M/R station GR 
,
,
1
i
source dam
i
source orig i
N
CL
N
= −  
i
sourceN = number of demand 
nodes connected to the i-th 
supply node 
M/R station GR 
 
Probabilistic risk assessment of the case study has been performed using Monte Carlo 
simulation. The goal of the analysis is to evaluate probability distribution or annual 
exceedance rate of events defined in terms of performance indicators. Multiple 
scenarios are simulated at all sites of interest (following the process described in 
Section 5.2 and shown in figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6) and performance indicators are 
evaluated for each run. This requires the joint distribution of all uncertainties entering 
the seismic analysis  that are due to the randomness in seismic intensity (modeled 
through magnitude-recurrence laws, ground-motion prediction equations, spatial 
correlation models, cross-IM correlation models, site amplification models and 
permanent displacement models) and facility response (modeled through physical 
damageability of the components). Simulation is a robust way to explore the behavior 
of systems of any complexity. It is based on the observation of system response to 
input. Simulation of a set of inputs and evaluation of corresponding outputs allows 
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determining through statistical post-processing the distribution of the output.  In 
particular the exceedance curve, which provides the annual exceedance rate of various 
level of the performance indicator, is the product of the exceedance probability curve 
and the total occurrence rate of earthquakes exceeding the minimum considered 
magnitude on all sources/faults (nf) as expressed by Eq. (5.1) 
( )
1
nf
PI u j
j
P PI uν ν>
=
= ⋅ >∑  (5.1) 
where ( )PI u> is the probability that the performance indicator exceeds a 
predefinited level u. This probability can be computed empirically using the MCS 
approach as follow: 
  ( ) ( )
1
1ˆ
n
j
j
P PI u I pi u
n =
> = ⋅ >∑   (5.2) 
where jpi is the performance indicator level corresponding to the simulation j, and 
( )jI pi u> is an indicator function which equals 1 if jpi u> and 0 otherwise. 
 
IMs
at surface PGD
Fragility
models
Vulnerability of each
component
Connectivity
analysis
Perfomance 
Indicators
Stop iteration j
 
Figure 5.6 Overview of the process of fragility analysis and system performance 
evaluation 
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5.3. Risk assessment results 
In order to study the effects of different components on risk assessment, five 
combinations have been identified and listed in Tab. (5.5) and results are presented for 
the various cases. In the first two cases only the ground shaking effect is considered 
(transient ground deformation, TGD) assuming or not spatial correlation between intra 
event residuals of the intensity measures. The third case, instead, has the attempt to 
verify the severity of damages caused by PGD induced by landslides. Finally the last 
two cases aim to evaluate the implications of assuming the vulnerability of the M/R 
station on the seismic system performance. 
Table 5.5 Case definitions for risk assessment 
Case Definition 
1 TGD and spatial correlations ignored 
2 TGD and spatial correlations considered 
3 TGD and PGD 
4 Case 2 and M/R stations not vulnerable 
5 Case 3 and M/R stations not vulnerable 
 
The simulation, of the plain Monte Carlo type, consists of 3000 runs and it has been 
defined respect to the maximum coefficient of variation (δ ) of the system-level 
performance indicators (CL and SR) that falls below on a target  value of 5%, as 
shown in Fig. (5.7). 
5.3.1. Importance of modeling spatial correlations  
In order to evaluate the influence of accounting spatial correlation between intra event 
residuals of primary IM (PGA) the risk assessment has been performed assuming in 
the first case a correlation coefficient equal to zero, i.e. intra event residual are 
considered independent and in the second case a correlation length equal to 13.5 km 
(Esposito and Iervolino, 2011). Fig. (5.8) and (5.9) show the variation of CL indicator 
and SR indicator respectively with the number of runs in terms of mean (μ ) and 
standard deviation (σ ). It is apparent how the risk in terms of connectivity loss is 
quite underestimated when the spatial correlation is ignored. The expected mean of CL 
results equal to 0.16 in the first case and 0.18 in the second case. On the contrary, the 
second indicator, that measures the serviceability of the gas network, is quite 
overestimated: the expected mean is equal to 0.85 in the first case and 0.81 in the 
second case.  
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Figure 5.7 Maximum coefficient of variation of the estimated performance indicators 
(CL, SR) versus number of runs 
 
The influence of spatial correlation is even more pronounced in Fig. (5.10) where 
exceedance curves are plotted. Note that the annual exceedance rate of various level of 
the performance indicators has been obtained considering as occurrence rate ν = 1/ 
750 (Pace et al., 2006). 
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Figure 5.8 Variation of the average connectivity loss considering uncorrelated residuals 
(up) and correlated residuals (down) 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Variation of the average serviceability ratio considering uncorrelated residuals 
(up) and correlated residuals (down) 
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Figure 5.10 Annual exceedance curve of connectivity loss (up) and serviceability ratio 
(down) considering uncorrelated residuals and correlated residuals  
Although past research have shown that risk may be substantially underestimated 
when spatial correlation is ignored (as also shown in section 2.2.3.4), in this case 
differences between two cases are not so pronounced; this may be due to the limited 
extension of the case study.   
5.3.2. TGD vs PGD effects  
It is recognized that PGD is one of the most pervasive causes of lifeline damage 
during earthquakes (O’ Rourke and Liu, 1999). At the same time, seismic wave, or 
TGD effects, can also have serious consequences on lifeline performance. Although 
not as severe locally as PGD, TGD can disturb an entire network as source of system-
wide effects. In order to evaluate the contribution of PGD on system performance,  
performance indicators have been performed considering the combined effect of TGD 
and PGD due to landlside. Fig. (5.11) shows the variation of performance indicators 
with the number of runs in terms of mean and standard deviation. It is apparent how 
the risk in terms of connectivity loss is substantially underestimated when the PGD 
effect is ignored. In this case the expected mean of CL results equal to 0.59, i.e. it is 
expected that about the 60% of demand nodes are not connected to the source node 
(M/R station) while the expected mean of SR is equal to 0.45, i.e. it is expected that 
only the 45% of demand nodes receive gas after earthquakes accounting for the 
importance level related to the nominal flow of the RGs.    
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Figure 5.11 Variation of the average connectivity loss (up) and serviceability ratio (down) 
considering the combined effect of TGD and PGD 
Fig. (5.12) shows instead the annual exceedance curve of connectivity loss and 
serviceability considering only the TGD effects and the combined effects of TGD and 
PGD. It is important to note that the combined effect of TGD and PGD has an 
important impact on the probability of exceedance of  low values of connectivity loss 
(and hence high values of serviceability ratio) while for high values of CL (low values 
of SR) it seems that the contribute of PGD is not relevant. This may be explained 
considering that high values of connectivity are strongly influenced by the behavior of 
the M/R station (the source) and pipelines connected to the source node. In fact if the 
source node is damaged all reduction groups result not connected; moreover at the 
same time if pipelines that are more close to the source are damaged, a great number 
of RGs cannot receive gas. Therefore considering that the M/R station is not 
vulnerable to PGD because the site where the station is located is not susceptible to 
landlside, and that the most of susceptible sites are in correspondence of pipes from 
which few RGs depend (as shown in Fig. 5.13), it seems clear that high values of 
connectivity loss are mostly controlled by TGD effects. 
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Figure 5.12 Annual exceedance curve of connectivity loss (up) and serviceability ratio 
(down) considering only the TGD effect and the combined effect of TGD and PGD 
Moreover there is another important factor that should be considered to explain these 
results. To evaluate the critical acceleration map, the methodology of HAZUS 
(FEMA, 2004) has been used herein (see Appendix D for more details).  This 
methodology is based on the study by Wilson and Keefer (1985) which categorizes 
landslide susceptibility from lowest to highest. For each susceptibility class, a critical 
acceleration is defined; hence, if PGA exceeds the critical acceleration then a landslide 
is observed. As reported in Section 2.3.2, due to the conservative nature of the Wilson 
and Keefer (1985) correlation, the probability of a landslide occurring should be 
modified by a term to determine the percentage of the map area having a landslide 
susceptible deposit. Based on Wieczoreck et al. (1985), these percentages have been 
estimated for the San Mateo County (California) as a function of the susceptibility 
categories. Since these values have not been validated for L’Aquila region, the 
probability of a landslide occurring has not been modified. Therefore the contribution 
of PGD affects results conditioned by this choice. Further consideration must be given 
to evaluating the probability of slope failure.  
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Figure 5.13 Critical acceleration values (Kc) associated to sites susceptible to landlside 
5.3.3. Importance of considering vulnerability of M/R station 
In addition to PGD and TGD effects, there is another factor that may influence the 
seismic performance of the gas network.  Some authors (Chang and Song, 2007; Song 
and Ok, 2009) assume the M/R station owns the same fragility property as compressor 
stations, therefore fragility curves of compressor stations (FEMA, 2004)  have been 
adopted in order to evaluate the implications of this assumption in terms of seismic 
performance. Fig. (5.14) and (5.15) shows the variation of performance indicators 
when the M/R station is not considered vulnerable. The risk assessment has been 
performed considering TGD effects (Fig. 5.14) and the combined effects of TDG and 
PGD (Fig. 5.15). Results show that the risk in terms of connectivity loss is 
substantially overestimated when the M/R station is considered vulnerable. In the case 
of the M/R is not considered vulnerable and accounting for only the TGD effects, the 
expected mean of CL results equal to 0.05, i.e. it is expected that only the 5% of 
demand nodes are not connected to the M/R station while the expected mean of SR is 
equal to 0.95, i.e. it is expected that the 95% of demand nodes receive gas after 
earthquakes accounting for the importance level related to the nominal flow of the 
RGs.  This means that the seismic behaviour of the M/R station is one of the most 
important factors that influence the seismic performance of the case study. In the 
second case where the M/R is not considered vulnerable and accounting for the 
combined effects of TGD and PGD effects the expected mean of PIs is not 
substantially underestimated (0.52 respect to 0.59 for CL indicator and 0.53 respect to 
0.45 for SR indicator). This may be explained considering that the M/R station is not 
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vulnerable to PGD and then the seismic behaviour of the M/R station influences only 
the estimation of damage induced by TGD.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Variation of the average connectivity loss considering the M/R station not 
vulnerable for the TGD case (up) and for TGD and PGD combination case (down) 
 
Fig. (5.16) shows instead the annual exceedance curves of connectivity loss and 
serviceability ratio considering or not the seismic vulnerability of the M/R station. 
The probability of exceedance of the performance indicators is strongly influenced by 
the seismic behavior of the M/R station when the TGD effects are considered. While 
comparing the trend of the exceedance curves in case of combined effects of TGD and 
PGD the influence of the seismic behavior of the M/R station is stronger for high 
values of CL (low values of SR). This may be explained considering that high values 
of connectivity are strongly influenced by the behavior of the M/R station (the source) 
and pipelines connected to the source node that are not vulnerable to PGD while low 
values of CL (high values of SR) are more influenced by the behavior of pipelines 
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vulnerable to PGD that are less critical in term of connectivity (i.e. pipes from which 
few RGs depend). 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Variation of the average serviceability ratio considering the M/R station not 
vulnerable for the TGD case (up) and for TGD and PGD combination case (down) 
 
Therefore the use of fragility curves of compressor stations as approximation may 
induce significant errors into the risk calculations. Further consideration should be 
given to evaluating the fragility of these components.  
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Figure 5.16 Annual exceedance curve of connectivity loss (up) and serviceability ratio 
(down) considering the influence of the M/R station behavior for the TGD case and for 
TGD and PGD combination case 
  
Chapter 6 – CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Contribution summary 
This study focused on developing a framework for the seismic risk assessment of gas 
distribution systems investigating the different aspects that are involved. The process 
make use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, empirical relations to estimate 
pipeline response, fragility curves for the evaluation of facilities vulnerability, 
performance indicators to characterize the functionality of the gas network. The 
thesis, in fact, has achieved this goal with special emphasis to the medium and low 
pressure network of a real system, namely the L’Aquila gas distribution system 
managed by ENEL Rete Gas s.p.a., for which not only detailed information on the 
network were retreived, but also data related to damages occurred on the network 
followed the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake. The important challenge in the seismic risk 
assessment of a real gas system is to take into account all the aspects of risk. 
Contributions have been made expecially in the hazard and vulnerability areas.  
6.1.1. Wave propagation hazard 
Considering that gas networks are essentially located underground, these systems are 
subjected to both transient ground deformation due to seismic waves, which is felt 
over a wide geographical area, and ground failure due to geotechnical hazards such as 
liquefaction and landslide, which determine localized ground failure. In order to  
characterize the ground shaking hazard of the L’Aquila region, probabilistic scenarios 
earthquakes have been generated using as source the Paganica fault on which 
L’Aquila (central Italy) 2009 earthquake  was originated, computed for a characteristic 
earthquake of moment magnitude Mw 6.3 and occurrence rate of ν = 1/ 750 (Pace et 
al., 2006).  Strong ground motions, have been evaluated though European ground 
motion prediction equation and a spatial correlation model. In particular Chapter 2 of 
this thesis describes how to estimate ground motion including the spatial correlation 
and how to compute regional hazard analysis. Since correlation models available in 
literature have been estimated starting from dense observations of different 
earthquakes outside Europe, in order to characterize spatial correlation fields for the 
case study, spatial correlation models based on the European Strong-motion Database 
and the Italian Accelerometric Archive datasets have been estimated for different 
intensity measures. The correlation decreas with increasing separation between sites 
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and this correlation structure has been modeled though geostatistical tools. It was seen 
that the rate of decay of correlation length (i.e. the range) is higher for for PGV than 
for PGA. In fact, the acceleration time history shows a significant proportion of 
relatively high frequency, while velocity records shows substantially less high-
frequency motion and are likely to yield higher correlations. This seems to be 
consistent with past studies of ground motion coherency. In fact, the coherency 
describes the degree of correlation between amplitudes and phases angles of two time 
histories at each of their component frequencies. Considering that coherency decreases 
with increasing distance between measuring points and with increasing frequency, it 
may be reasonable to expect more coherent ground motion, as velocity that 
corresponds to low frequency exhibits more correlated peak amplitudes. Moreover, 
Appendix A presents some preliminary results on the spatial correlation analysis of 
acceleration spectral ordinates. It was shown that the decay rate of correlation, as a 
function of inter-site distance, tends to increase with structural period. Based on that, a 
simple linear formula, although preliminary, has beeen provided to model spatial 
correlation of Sa as a function of frequency.  
Since the performance of spatially distribute systems may be conditional upon the 
failure of many components within the system each of which is sensitive to different 
intensity measures, the possibility of the existence of a cross-correlation between IMs 
has been taken into account through the use of the conditional hazard. This technique 
starts from the assumption that two IMs considered are jointly distributed according to 
a bivariate Gaussian distribution, and it has the advantage to avoid making 
assumptions about the structure of the cross correlation between the two IMs.  
6.1.2.  Geotechnical hazard 
For consideration of geotechnical hazards, the modeling approach of HAZUS 
described in Chapter 2,  has been  adopted. The principal forms of permanent ground 
deformation are surface faulting, landsliding, seismic settlement and lateral spreading 
due to soil liquefaction. Although many models that have the intent to relate the 
degree of deformation and the probability of occurrence of each geotechnical hazard 
to the strength of ground motion are available in literature, the main limiting factor of 
many models is the requirement of very detailed geotechnical data that could make 
difficult the implementation of these models for the analysis of  lifeline systems. 
Therefore the use of simpler models  as those proposed in HAZUS has been taken into 
account to characterize the geotechnical hazard potential of L’Aquila region. In 
particular for the case study, thanks to a process jointly developed with specialists the 
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landslide potential of L’Aquila region has been performed. Results are shown in 
Appendix D.   
6.1.3. Fragility analysis 
Regarding vulnerability analysis, in Chapter 3 fragility curves available in literature 
for the most of gas network components are described. For buried pipelines, a fragility 
relation is a function that releates pipeline damage rates with different level of seismic 
intensity. These relations are usually based on empirical data collected throughout past 
earthquakes. The usual practice is to define damage rates as the number of pipe repirs 
per unit length of pipeline. Depending on the consistency of the data used for the 
empirical estimation, fragility curves may provides factors that influence the 
vulnerability of pipelines such as  pipe material, pipe diameter or pipe connections. 
Since buried pipelines are very sensitive to permanent ground deformation (resulting 
from various ground failures), in addition to transient ground deformation due to 
seismic wave propagation , fragility curves are proposed for both phenomena. In 
paritular PGD is used as the demand description of ground failure and while to 
correlate the ground motion effects to the damage suffered by buried pipeline, PGV 
has been identified as the one having a more direct physical. Storage and processing 
facilities instead are mostly vulnerable to PGA, sometimes to PGD, if located in 
liquefiable or landslide zones. Therefore, fragility curves for these components are 
defined and associated with either PGA or PGD. Fragility curves from the literature, 
whether they are empirical or analytical, usually propose the same number of damage 
states and very similar definitions. For each damage state, the HAZUS methodology 
proposes fragility curves accounting also for the fragility of the equipment needed for 
the facilities to function properly using the fault tree analysis: the global damage state 
is based on the combination of individual damage state of  its components. 
Unfortunately, there are no exhaustive studies in the literature on seismic behavior of 
all components making difficult a comprehensive characterization of the case study. 
Therefore to this aim, seismic vulnerability of pressure reduction stations 
characterizing the L’Aquila gas network has been investigated through the use of fault 
tree analysis. Moreover fragility relations for pipeline systems available in literature 
have been validated through an analysis of the damages occurred on the gas network 
following the 6th April L’Aquila earthquake by processing technical reports from Enel 
Rete Gas describing the repairs and replacements activities following the seismic 
event as described in Appendix C. 
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6.1.4. Systemic vulnerability and loss 
Depending on the goal of the analysis, the performance of the system may be 
evaluated though the use of performance indicators that represent a quantitative 
measure of the functionality of the gas providing a measure of the impact of the 
earthquake on the systemic vulnerability and to quantify the degree to which the 
system is able to meet established specifications and/or customer requirements 
following an earthquake event. For the case study the system has been considered 
functional if demand nodes continue to provide gas and then if they remain accessible 
from at least one supply node. Therefore a connectivity analysis has been performed  
in order to integrate the damage of facilities and distributing elements into the damage 
of the system and the adaptation and use of two performance indicators (Serviceability 
Ratio and Connectivity Loss) described in Chapter 4, are proposed. 
6.1.5. Risk assessment 
The methodology presented has been tested via the implementation of the case study 
in a specific software . The software, created in relation of the objectives of the Syner-
G project, adheres to the OBJECT-ORIENTED Paradigm (OOP) where the problem is 
described as a set of objects, “software containers” grouping together related 
procedures and data. Data elements are called attributes of an object. Procedures, 
which operate on data specific for an object, are called methods. Objects are instances 
(concrete realizations) of classes (abstract models) that are used to model the system. 
For the purpose of the thesis the programme has been equipped with the GAS class, 
focusing on the components of a gas distribution system, in order to evaluate seismic 
performance of the L’Aquila gas distribution network.  
Probabilistic risk assessment of the case study has been performed using Monte 
Carlo simulation. The goal of the analysis is to evaluate probability the annual 
exceedance rate of events defined in terms of performance indicators. Multiple 
scenarios are simulated at all sites of interest and performance indicators are evaluated 
for each run. 
In order to study the effects of different components on risk assessment, different 
combinations have been identified.In particular the importance of modeling spatial 
correlations of ground motion and geotechnical hazard on risk assessment evaluation 
has been investigated. Results indicate that the system performance estimation may be 
understimated when the spatial correlation and  ground failure effects are ignored.  
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6.2. Emerging research need 
6.2.1. Hazard 
Chapter 2 presented a spatial correlation model for PGA and PGV developed using 
records from datasets characterized by multiple events and regions. One may argue 
that an unique model may be inadeguate to characterize spatial variability of  different 
earthquake events and regions. For example a dependency of correlation length on 
magnitude could be an aspect to investigate. However geostatistical estimation needs a 
relatively large number of data to model the spatial correlation which are not available 
for individual events in the Italian and European datasets. A possible solution coulb be 
the use of simulated time histories. Moreover models proposed have been estimated 
assuming stationarity and isotropy of correlations. Although this hypothesis seems to 
be reasonable starting from literature results, if hazard assessment of critical facility  
close to the rupture is required further investigation should be addressed. 
It is well recognized that PGD is one of the most pervasive causes of buried 
pipeline systems damage during earthquakes. Although results shown in Chapter 5 
indicate that the risk may be substantially underestimated when PGD effects are 
ignored, it is important to consider that the conservative methodology suggested in 
HAZUS has been used herein. This methodology categorizes landslide susceptibility 
from lowest to highest and for each susceptibility class define a critical acceleration. 
Hence, if peak ground acceleration exceeds the critical acceleration then a landslide is 
observed. Due to the conservative nature of the correlation, the probability of a 
landslide occurring should be modified by a term to determine the percentage of the 
map area having a landslide susceptible deposit.  Some researhers estimated these 
percentages for the San Mateo County (California) as a function of the susceptibility 
categories. Since these values have not been validated for L’Aquila region, the 
probability of a landslide occurring has not been modified. Therefore the contribution 
of PGD effects results conditioned by this choice. Further consideration must be given 
to evaluating the probability of slope failure. 
6.2.2. Vulnerability 
In Chapter 3 fragility curves for gas system components have been presented. As 
mentioned before, there are no exhaustive studies in the literature on seismic behavior 
of all components making difficult a comprehensive characterization of the case study. 
Although a fist attempt has been done, performing fault tree analysis for pressure 
reduction stations,  new fragility curves should be developed. In fact, as shown in 
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Chapter 5 the use of fragility curves of compressor stations as approximation may 
induce significant errors into the risk calculations.  
Moreover as stated in Chapter 3, empirical relations for the fragility of pipelines 
are based on the recorded number of repairs during past earthquakes, and do not 
clarify the proportion of leaks and breaks with respect to the expected number of pipe 
repairs. However, HAZUS proposes for the two damage states proportions in function 
of the type of hazard: a damaged pipe because of ground failure is likely to present a 
break (it is assumed 80% breaks and 20% leaks), whereas ground shaking may induce 
more leak related damages (e.g. 20% breaks and 80% leaks).  Although these 
percentages are accepted in literature, current fragility relations should be 
complemented in order to provide better models to describe earthquake effects on 
pipeline.
  
Appendix A– PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF      
SPATIAL CORRELATION 
ANALYSIS FOR ACCELERATION 
SPECTRAL ORDINATES FROM 
ITALIAN DATA 
 
Esposito, S. and Iervoino, I. (2011b). Preliminary results of spatial correlation analysis 
for acceleration spectral ordinates from Italian data. In Proceeding, XIV Convegno 
Nazionale “L’Ingegneria Sismica in Italia”. September, Bari, Italia. 
 
 
Abstract 
Spatial correlation of peak ground motion amplitudes is required in modeling hazard 
for risk assessment of spatially distributed systems. In particular when a portfolio of 
buildings or a transportation/distribution network is of concern, spectral acceleration 
(Sa) correlation models may be considered in order to evaluate the expected loss in 
case of seismic events. The estimation of an appropriate spatial correlation model is 
still a research task in earthquake engineering, because of several issues related to: 
data, statistical approaches and estimation tools, and tests to evaluate the estimated 
models. In the presented paper an analysis of the spatial correlation of Sa is carried out 
using the Italian ACcelerometric Archive (ITACA) dataset. Correlation is estimated on 
the residuals with respect to a ground motion prediction equation (GMPE) calibrated 
on the same data considered. Results show that the decay rate of correlation, as a 
function of inter-site distance, tends to increase with structural period. Based on that, a 
simple linear formula, although preliminary, is provided to model spatial correlation of 
Sa as a function of frequency.  
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A.1.Introduction 
Assessment of intraevent spatial correlation of ground motion intensity measures (IMs) 
has become a relevant topic in seismic risk analysis. The importance of modeling such 
phenomenon is due to the requirement to extend seismic risk analysis, usually related 
to site-specific structures, to spatially distributed systems and lifelines. In particular, on 
the hazard side, probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA; McGuire, 2004) refers to 
ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs) to model ground motion which provide 
probabilistic distribution of the chosen IM conditional on earthquake magnitude, 
source-to-site distance, and other parameters such as local geological conditions. Since 
it was demonstrated that GMPEs’ residuals of IMs (e.g., peak ground acceleration, 
peak ground velocity, spectral acceleration) are spatially correlated (e.g., Boore et al., 
2003; Goda and Hong, 2008; Esposito and Iervolino, 2011a), it is important to have 
correlation models for hazard assessment of a region. Spatial correlation models 
available in literature have been empirically estimated mainly on earthquakes outside 
Europe, such as Northridge (1994) or Chi-Chi (1999). Most of the studies are based on 
dense observations of single events (e.g., Boore et al., 2003; Wang and Takada, 2005; 
Jayaram and Baker 2009a); a few works have, instead, combined data from multiple 
events to obtain a unique estimate of correlation (e.g., Goda and Hong, 2008; Goda and 
Atkinson, 2009; Goda and Atkinson, 2010; Sokolov et al., 2010). Those models 
depend uniquely on inter-site separation distance and provide the distance limit at 
which correlation may technically considered to be lost (i.e., distance beyond which 
IMs may be considered uncorrelated).  Moreover, if spectral acceleration (Sa) is of 
concern, the correlation may depend also on the period Sa refers to.  
In Fig. (A.1), several models for spectral acceleration, considering as period 1 sec 
are shown. The correlation coefficient is expressed by Eq. (A. 1), where a, b, and c are 
the model parameters, T is the period and h is the inter-site separation distance (in km). 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }- h, max 1- + e ,0b Ta Th T c T c Tρ ⋅= ⋅   (A.1)
 
The black dotted line in Fig. (A.1) represents the value of distance at which the 
correlation may technically considered to be lost, i.e. equal to 0.05, or the practical 
range as discussed in the following.  
It is clear from the figure that distances at which the correlation is conventionally 
considered lost is very different for each model considered. In fact, models from 
different authors provide different results even if estimating correlation for the same 
IM. This is supposed to depend on several factors such as the dataset used, the GMPE 
chosen to compute intraevent residuals, and the working assumptions of the estimation. 
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For example, Sokolov et al. (2010), starting from the strong-motion database of 
TSMIP network in Taiwan, investigated the dependency of spatial correlation on site 
classes and geological structures, asserting that a single generalized spatial model may 
not be adequate for all of Taiwan territory. In some cases (e.g., Wang and Takada, 
2005; Jayaram and Baker, 2009a) existing GMPEs are used, while, in others (e.g., 
Goda and Hong, 2008; Goda and Atkinson, 2009; Sokolov et al., 2010), ad-hoc fit on 
the chosen dataset is adopted. Generally, regressions analysis used to develop 
prediction equations does not incorporate the correlation structure of residuals as a 
hypothesis. Hong et al. (2009) and Jayaram and Baker (2010a), evaluated the influence 
of considering the correlation in fitting a GMPE, finding a minor influence on 
regression coefficients and a more significant effect on the variance components. Goda 
and Atkinson (2010), investigated the influence of the estimation approach, 
emphasizing its importance when residuals are strongly correlated.  
In this paper, the evaluation of the spatial correlation of Sa residuals is carried out 
using the Italian ACcelerometric Archive (ITACA). The analysis of correlation was 
performed through geostatistical tools pooling data from multiple events to fit a unique 
model following the same approach of Esposito et al. (2010) and Esposito and 
Iervolino (2011a). The GMPE with respect to which residuals are computed is those of 
Bindi et al. (2011) and only records used to estimate the considered GMPE are 
employed to estimate spatial correlation.  
In the paper, the first part describes the framework adopted to estimate the 
correlation. The second part provides the working assumptions and a description of the 
dataset considered. Then, results of the estimation of correlation lengths for spectral 
acceleration for the eight periods ranging from 0 s to 2 s are given. Finally, an 
approximated preliminary relationship of the correlation range as a function of period 
is provided and compared with previous research on the same topic. 
 
Figure A.1 Some correlation models available in literature for Sa(1s): the black dashed 
line intersects the curves at the distance at which the correlation is conventionally 
considered as almost lost (i.e., the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.05) 
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A.2.  Semi-empirical modeling of spatial correlation 
A.2.1.Geostatistical analysis 
GMPEs model the logs of spectral acceleration for a specific period T, and related 
heterogeneity, at a site p due to earthquake j as in Eq. (A.2). 
( )log ( ) log ( ) , ,pj pj j pjSa T Sa T M R θ η ε= + +   (A.2)
 
 
( )log ( ) , ,pjSa T M R θ  is the mean of the logs conditional on parameters such as 
magnitude (M), source-to-site distance (R), and others ( )θ ; ηj denotes the inter-event 
residual, which is a constant term for all sites in a given earthquake and represents a 
systematic deviation from the mean of the specific seismic event; and εpj is the intra-
event variability of ground motion. εpj and ηj are usually assumed to be independent 
random variables, normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation σintra and 
σinter, respectively. Then, log ( ) pjSa T  is modeled as a normal random variable with 
mean ( )log ( ) , ,pjSa T M R θ  and standard deviation, σT  where σ2T = σ2intra + σ2inter.  
If the hazard assessment at two or more sites is of concern, the joint probability density 
function (PDF) for Sa(T) at all locations is required, and it can be modeled with a 
multivariate normal distribution (Jayaram and Baker, 2008). It is assumed that the logs 
of Sa(T) form a Gaussian random field (GRF), defined as a set of random variables, 
one for each site u in the study area S∈R2. To any set of n sites , 1, ,p n=pu " , 
corresponds to a vector of n random variables that is characterized by the covariance 
matrix, Σ , as in Eq. (A.3) where the first term produces perfectly correlated inter-
event residuals (Malhotra 2008), while the second term (symmetrical) produces 
partially correlated intra-event residuals. 
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  (A.3) 
 
In Eq. (A.3), the correlation is heterogeneous as it depends on the pairs of sites 
considered, and the intra-event variance is homoscedastic as it is constant for all sites 
(this assumed in most of GMPEs, although some studies have found dependence of 
intra-event variability on distance, magnitude and non-linear site effects; Strasser et al.  
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2009). If the spatial correlation for intra-event residuals is a function of the relative 
location of sites, it becomes as in Eq. (A.4), where p and q are two locations at the end 
of hpq (the separation vector between the two sites).  
( )pqρ ρ= pqh   (A.4)
 
Under the hypothesis of second-order stationarity and isotropy of the GRF, correlation 
depends only on the separation distance h = ||h||. Therefore if intra-event residuals may 
be modeled as a stationary and isotropic GRF, all data available from different 
earthquakes and regions, therefore deemed homogeneous, are used to fit a unique 
model (see Esposito and Iervolino 2011a, for more details). 
A common tool to quantify spatial variability of georeferenced data is the 
semivariogram ሺ ሻj hγ  It is used to model the covariance structure of GRF through 
suitable functions. Under the hypothesis of second-order stationarity and isotropy it is 
defined as in Eq. (A.5).  
( ) ( ) ( )1j j jh Var hγ ε ρ⎡ ⎤= ⋅ −⎣ ⎦   (A.5)
 
where j hρ ሺ ሻ denotes the spatial correlation coefficient between intra-event residuals 
separated by the distance h. The estimation of correlation usually develops in three 
steps:  
•computing the empirical semivariogram10;  
•choosing a functional form;  
•estimating the correlation parameters by fitting the empirical data with the 
functional model. 
Empirical semivariograms are computed as a function of site-to-site separation 
distance, with different possible estimators. The classical estimator is the method-of-
moments (Matheron, 1962) which is defined for an isotropic random field in Eq. (A.6), 
where N(h) is the set of pairs of sites separated by the same distance h, and |N(h)| is the 
cardinal of N(h).     
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
h
1ˆ h h
2 h NN
γ ε ε⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + −⎣ ⎦⋅ ∑ u u   (A.6) 
                                                 
10 Assuming a common semivariogram for different events, that is, invariant through 
earthquakes, allows to neglect the subscript j in the following equations. 
Appendix A 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
138 
Since this estimator can be badly affected by atypical observations (Cressie, 1993), 
Cressie and Hawkins (1980) proposed a more robust estimator (less sensitive to 
outliers). Both estimators will be used in the evaluation of intra-event spatial 
correlation of Sa(T). To compute the semivariogram it may be useful, when dealing 
with earthquake records, to define tolerance bins around each possible h value. The 
selection of distance bins has important effects: if its size is too large, correlation at 
short distances may be masked; conversely if it is too small, empty bins, or bins with 
samples small in size, may impair the estimate. A rule of thumb is to choose the 
maximum bin size as a half of the maximum distance between sites in the dataset, and 
to set the number of bins so that there are at least thirty pairs per bin (Journel and 
Huijbregts, 1978). The interpretation of experimental semivariograms consists in the 
identification of a model among the family of functions able to capture and emulate its 
trend. The three basic stationary and isotropic models are: exponential, spherical, and 
Gaussian. In particular, the exponential model which is the most common one, is 
described in Eq. (A.7):  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
h
1ˆ h h
2 h NN
γ ε ε⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + −⎣ ⎦⋅ ∑ u u   (A.7) 
where c0 is defined nugget, i.e. the limit value of the semivariogram when h is zero, ce 
is the sill, or the population variance of the random field (Barnes, 1991) and b is the 
practical range defined as the inter-site distance at which hγ ሺ ሻ  equals 95% of the sill. 
Note that the parameter b defined in Eq. (A.7), which will be used in the following, 
does not correspond to the parameter defined in Eq. (A.1). Several goodness-of-fit 
criteria for finding the best parametric model have been proposed in geostatistical 
literature. Studies dealing with earthquake data sometimes use visual or trial and error 
approaches in order to appropriately model the semivariogram structure at short site-to-
site distances (Jayaram and Baker, 2009a), where it is significant. 
In this work experimental semivariograms are fitted visually, although using the 
least squares estimation as a starting point. 
A.2.2. Estimating correlation on multievent data 
Empirical semivariograms are computed starting from normalized intra-event residuals 
obtained for a single earthquake j and a generic site p as εpj∗=εpj/σp where σp is the 
standard deviation of the intra-event residual at the site p (in the study the intra-event 
standard deviation is common for all sites consistent with GMPEs used to compute 
residuals, to follow). The standardization enables to not estimate the sill, as it should be 
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equal to one; therefore Eq. (A.5) becomes Eq. (A.8), where the superscript represents 
an empirical estimate. 
( ) ( )1h hγ ρ= −ˆ ˆ   (A.8)
 
With earthquake data, standardization can be carried out with the standard deviation 
provided by the GMPE11. Another option is to use the sample variance as an estimate 
of the true variance (e.g., Jayaram and Baker, 2010a). Moreover Goda and Atkinson 
(2010) used the intra-event standard deviation inferred from the large-separation- v 
distance plateau of the semivariogram, assuming that at those distances residuals are 
not correlated. In this work, the variance provided by the GMPEs was preferred. In 
fact, evaluation of possible alternatives for standardization leads to results which seem 
to be not significantly affected by a choice with respect to another (e.g., in Esposito 
and Iervolino, 2011a). Normalized intra-event residuals from multiple events (and 
regions) are then pooled to fit a unique correlation model. This because geostatistical 
estimation needs a relatively large number of data to model the semivariogram (i.e., 
many records to have more than thirty pairs in each h bin), which are not available for 
individual events in the chosen dataset. Assuming the same isotropic semivariogram 
with the same parameters for all earthquakes the experimental semivariogram becomes 
that of Eq. (A.9) where nj is the number of records for the jth event and ( )N h  is the 
number of pairs in the specific h bin. Eq. (A.10) shows how individual events are kept 
separated in computing the empirical semivariogram. In fact, the differences of 
residuals of Eq. (A.9)  are computed only between pairs of residuals (standardized with 
the common standard deviation from the GMPE) from the same earthquake, then 
differences from different earthquakes are pooled. This process is visually sketched in 
Fig. (A.3) from which it is possible to note that the empirical semivariogram point at h1 
is not the average of experimental semivariograms from different earthquakes, as N(h) 
is the number of pairs in the specific h bin from all earthquakes. 
( ) ( ) ( )
21
2 pj qjN h
h
N h
γ ε ε⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦⋅ ∑ * *ˆ   (A.9) 
( ) ( )* * * *, , : ;
, 1, ; 1,
pj qj pj qj
j
j h
N h
p q n j k
ε ε ε ε⎧ ⎫− =⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬= =⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭… …
  (A.10)
 
                                                 
11 It is usual to use the sample variance as an estimator of the sill for the experimental semivariogram, but 
this may be improper in some circumstances; see Barnes (1991) for a discussion. 
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A.3. Dataset 
The number of considered recordings from ITACA corresponds exactly to data used to 
fit Bindi et al. (2011) GMPE (except that only earthquakes for which more than one 
record was available where considered) and it is equal to 763 ground motions from 97 
events over the 4-6.9 magnitude range (moment magnitude, Mw). Source-to-site 
distance is the closest horizontal distance to the vertical projection of the rupture (i.e., 
Joyner-Boore distance, Rjb) and is up to 196 km in the data. Characteristics of the 
datasets, with respect to explanatory variables of the considered prediction equation 
(magnitude, distance and local site conditions) are shown in Fig. (A.2). 
 
Figure A.2 ITACA strong-motion subsets with respect Mw, Rjb and local site conditions 
according to Eurocode 8 ( 2004) 
 
Figure A.3 Pooling standardized intra-event residuals of multiple events (j=1,2,..k) to 
compute experimental semivariogram 
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A.4. Spatial correlations of spectral ordinates from ITACA 
In order to have a reasonable number of data pairs in the bins (at least 30) and a stable 
trend of correlation, the experimental semivariograms were obtained using a width of 2 
km at seven periods ranging between 0.1 seconds and 2 seconds. In Fig. (A.4) the 
distribution of data pairs as a function of separation distance bins (2 km) is shown. 
Because the GMPE used to obtain intraevent residuals refers to geometric mean of 
horizontal components, the correlation was estimated for this IM. Both estimators 
(classical and robust) were used; no significant difference was found in the shape of the 
fitted semivariogram. Of the three basic models (Gaussian, spherical and exponential), 
the exponential model has been chosen to fit empirical points since this model is 
widely adopted in the literature. Moreover, the choice of using the same model for all 
periods allows to compare results and to investigate possible dependency of the 
model’s parameters on the fundamental period. Assuming that there is no nugget effect 
(as this study does not investigate variations at a smaller scale with respect to that of 
the tolerance); the only parameter to estimate is the range, b. Least square method 
(LSM) was used as a reference to manually fit the model in the empirical 
semivariogram in order to give more importance to the small separation distances. In 
particular, correlation lengths evaluated for spectral acceleration for the seven periods, 
0.1 s, 0.2 s, 0.3 s, 0.5 s, 1 s, 1.5 s, 2 s, resulted equal to 11.4 km, 9 km, 13.2 km, 11.9 
km, 17.8 km, 25.7 km, and 33.7 km, respectively. In Fig. (A.5) to Fig. (A.11) all 
estimated exponential models are shown together with data points referring to both 
classical and robust estimators. 
 
Figure A.4 Histograms of the number of data pairs as a function of site-to-site separation 
distance 
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Figure A.5 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for Sa(0.1 s)  
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Figure A.6 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for Sa(0.2 s) 
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Figure A.7 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for Sa(0.3 s) 
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Figure A.8 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for Sa(0.5 s) 
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Figure A.9 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for Sa(1 s) 
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Figure A.10 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for Sa(1.5 s) 
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Figure A.11 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for Sa(2 s) 
Results indicate that correlation range tends to increase with period reaching the value 
of about 40 km for T = 2 s.  
It should be noted that in Esposito and Iervolino (2011a) the proposed 
methodology was used to estimate the horizontal peak ground acceleration (PGA) 
intra-event residuals’ correlation starting from a less recent GMPE, the Bindi et al. 
(2010), and a larger dataset that includes the one used herein. For completeness, their 
spatial correlation model has been also estimated for horizontal PGA. The resulting 
range was similar to that of the mentioned study (Fig. A.12); i.e., 10.8 km with respect 
to 11.5 km, as expected. The slight difference may also be related to the bin width used 
in the estimation of empirical semivariograms (1 km instead of 2 km considered 
herein).  
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Figure A.12 Empirical semivariogram and fitted exponential model for horizontal PGA 
compared with Esposito and Iervolino (2011a) 
Appendix A 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
145 
A.5. Discussion 
Empirical results demonstrate that correlation length tends to increase with period. 
Except for high frequencies at which there is no a significant increment. This seems to 
be consistent with past studies of ground motion coherency (Zerva and Zervas, 2002). 
In fact, the coherency describes the degree of correlation between amplitudes and 
phases angles of two time histories at each of their component frequencies. 
Considering that coherency decreases with increasing distance between measuring 
points and with increasing frequency, it may be reasonable to expect more coherent 
ground motion, as spectral acceleration evaluated at high periods exhibits more 
correlated peak amplitudes. This same issue aspect was also discussed in Jayaram and 
Baker (2009a) where in all earthquakes analyzed, the estimated ranges increased with 
period except for some cases. 
In Fig. (A.13) estimated ranges have been compared with some correlation lengths 
available in literature; those models have been chosen considering: Californian dataset 
from Goda and Hong (2008), “all earthquakes” model from Hong et al. (2009), and the 
“predictive model” based on all earthquakes from Jayaram and Baker (2009a). The 
range b has been obtained evaluating the distance at which correlation is equal to 0.05.  
Results provided by this study seem to be comparable with ranges estimated in 
literature in terms of both trend as a function of T, and the estimated value of 
correlation lengths. This holds generally, except with respect to Goda and Atkinson 
(2009, 2010) models, in which ranges are larger (never below about 60 km) and the 
dependence of the correlation on period is not significant. A simple linear predictive 
model (red dashed line in Fig. A.13) has been estimated using LSM method in order to 
obtain ranges based on the period of interest. The resulting linear model is expressed 
by Eq. (A.11). 
( ) 8.6 11.6b T T= + ⋅   (A.11)
 Based on this model, the correlation between normalized intraevent residuals separated 
by h is obtained as follows: 
( )3( , )
h
b Th T eρ
⎛ ⎞− ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=   (A.12)
 derived from Eq. (A.7) and Eq. (A.8) where model parameters c0  and ce, the nugget 
and the sill respectively, are equal to one. Starting from this predictive model it is 
possible to get the joint probability density function for Sa(T) at all locations, for 
which it is required characterizing the covariance matrix, Σ , expressed in the Eq. 
(A.3). 
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Figure A.13 Estimated ranges in this study compared with some correlation lengths 
available in literature 
A.6. Conclusions 
The study presented focused on the assessment of intraevent spatial correlation of 
spectral acceleration at eight periods ranging between 0 s and 2 s. A subset of the 
Italian Accelerometric Archive has been used to compute residuals starting from a 
GMPE calibrated on the same dataset. Consistent with the available literature on the 
topic, hypotheses of the stationarity and isotropy of the random fields were retained to 
compute experimental semivariograms of standardized intraevent residuals (with 
respect to the standard deviation estimated by the GMPE). Moreover, because a 
relatively small number of records for each earthquake was available, records from 
multiple events and regions within Italy were pooled to develop a unique model fitted 
with a large number of observations. Exponential correlation models were calibrated 
by finding that practical ranges tend to increase with the period. The choice of using 
the same model (exponential) for all periods allows to compare results and to 
investigate possible dependency of the parameters on the period the spectral ordinate 
refers to. Results have been also compared with previous researches finding, generally, 
a similar trend. Finally a simple linear predictive model has been estimated in order to 
provide the correlation coefficient between spectral accelerations as a function of 
structural period. 
  
Appendix B – HAZUS GEOTECHNICAL 
CLASSIFICATION 
B.1. Liquefaction 
Table B.1 HAZUS Classification for Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Type of 
Deposit 
General 
Distribution 
of 
Cohesionless 
Sediments 
Likelihood that Cohesionless Sediments when 
Saturated would be Susceptible to Liquefaction 
(by Age or Deposit) 
< 500 year 
(Modern) 
Holocene 
(< 11 ka) 
Pleistoce
ne 
11 – 2 
Ma 
Pre-
Pleistocen
e 
> 2 Ma 
(a)Continental Deposits 
River Channel Locally 
Variable Very High High Low Very Low 
Flood Plain Locally 
Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Alluvial fan 
and plain Widespread Moderate Low Low Very Low 
Marine 
terraces and 
planes 
Widespread --- Low Very Low Very Low 
Delta and fan 
delta Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Lacustrine and 
playa Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Colluvium Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Talus Widespread Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Dunes Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Loess Variable High High High Unknown 
Glacial Till Variable Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Tuff Rare Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Tephra Widespread High High ? ? 
Residual soils Rare Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Sebka Locally 
Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
(b)Coastal Zone 
Delta Widespread Very High High Low Very Low 
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Esturine Locally 
Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Beach      
High Wave 
Energy Widespread Moderate Low 
Very 
Low Very Low 
Low Wave 
Energy Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Lagoonal Locally 
Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Fore shore Locally 
Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
(c)Artificial 
Uncompacted 
Fill Variable Very High --- --- --- 
Compacted 
Fill Variable Low --- --- --- 
 
Table B.2 Probability of Liquefaction for Each Susceptibility Category 
Susceptibility Category P [Liquefaction | PGA = a] 
Very High 0 ≤ 9.09a - 0.82 ≤ 1 
High 0 ≤ 7.67a - 0.92 ≤ 1 
Moderate 0 ≤ 6.67a – 1.0 ≤ 1 
Low 0 ≤ 5.57a – 1.18 ≤ 1 
Very Low 0 ≤ 4.16a – 1.08 ≤ 1 
None 0 
 
Table B.3 Proportion of Map Unit for Liquefaction Susceptibility Class 
Mapped Relative Susceptibility Proportion of Map Unit (Pml) 
Very High 0.25 
High 0.2 
Moderate 0.1 
Low 0.05 
Very Low 0.02 
None 0 
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Table B.4 Liquefaction Settlement for each Susceptibility Category 
Relative Susceptibility Settlement (inches) 
Very High 12 
High 6 
Moderate 2 
Low 1 
Very Low 0 
None 0 
 
B.2. Landslide 
Table B.5 Landsliding Susceptibility Classification 
Geologic Group Slope Angle (Degrees) 
0 – 10 10 – 15 15 – 20 20 - 30 30 – 40 > 40 
DRY (groundwater below level of sliding) 
A Strongly Cemented 
Rocks (Crystalline 
rocks and well-
cemented sandstone 
None None I II IV VI 
B Weakly Cemented 
Rocks and Soils (sandy 
soils and poorly 
cemented sandstone) 
None III IV V VI VII 
C Argillaceous Rocks 
(shales, clayey soil, 
existing landslides, 
poorly compacted fill) 
V VI VII IX IX IX 
WET (groundwater above level of sliding) 
A Strongly Cemented 
Rocks (Crystalline 
rocks and well-
cemented sandstone 
None III VI VII VIII VIII 
B Weakly Cemented 
Rocks and Soils (sandy 
soils and poorly 
cemented sandstone) 
V VIII IX IX IX IX 
C Argillaceous Rocks 
(shales, clayey soil, 
existing landslides, 
poorly compacted fill) 
VII IX X X X X 
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Table B.6 Critical accelerations and map area proportions for each landsliding 
susceptibility category 
Susceptibility 
Category 
None I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Critical 
Acceleration 
(g) 
None 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 
Map Area 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
 
 
  
Appendix C – ADDRESSING GROUND-
SHAKING-INDUCED DAMAGE OF 
THE GAS DISTRIBUTION 
NETWORK IN THE 2009 L`AQUILA 
EARTHQUAKE 
Esposito, S., Elefante, L., Giovinazzi, S., and Iervoino, I. (2011b) Addressing ground-
shaking induced damage of the gas distribution network in the 2009 L’Aquila 
earthquake. In Proceeding, XIV Convegno Nazionale “L’Ingegneria Sismica in 
Italia”. September, Bari, Italia. 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes the assessment of the damage of the local gas network in the 
2009 L’Aquila earthquake (Mw 6.3). The analysis focuses on the main components of 
the low and medium distribution networks, namely pipes, valves, and demand nodes. 
The processing of the technical reports from Enel Rete GAS (the unique gas network 
operator in the affected region), describing the repairs and replacements activities 
following L’Aquila earthquake is presented, and the resulting damage scenario is 
discussed. In particular, the density of repairs activities have been overlaid to the 
ground motion in the affected area, described in terms of peak ground velocity. 
Finally, the repair ratios (number of repairs per km) for the pipelines were compared 
with repair ratio fragility functions available in literature.  
C.1. Introduction  
Recent disastrous seismic events have widely documented the role of lifeline networks 
in supporting the emergency management and in facilitating the response and recovery 
phases (resilience) following an earthquake, thus rising the interest of both the 
scientific community and the stakeholders in identifying proper risk management 
strategies for this kind of systems (Pitilakis et al, 2006). Building on the results from 
past international research projects and existing tools for the vulnerability assessment 
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and seismic risk analysis of lifelines systems the SYNER-G “Systemic Seismic 
Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for Buildings, Lifeline Networks and Infrastructures 
Safety Gain”, has been funded by the European Commission (2009-2012) with the 
aim to address criticalities.  
This paper, developed as part of the SYNER-G project, analyses the impact of the 
6th April 2009 L`Aquila earthquake, in Italy, on the gas network with particular focus 
on the damage induced by the transient ground deformation on the pipeline 
distribution network. In fact, in the event of an earthquake, buried pipeline can be 
subjected to both transient ground deformation caused by the passage of seismic 
waves (ground shaking) which is felt over a wide geographical area, and permanent 
ground deformation (PGD) caused by surface faulting, liquefaction, landslides which 
determine localized ground failure. Exception made for surface faulting phenomena, 
limited PGD were, in fact, observed following the L`Aquila earthquake. Therefore, the 
damage to the pipelines, has been correlated with the experienced ground shaking. The 
first part of the paper presents relevant information on the 6th April 2009 L`Aquila 
earthquake and the assessment of the peak ground velocity (PGV), virtually 
experienced by the gas network. The second part provides a description of the gas 
networks in the affected region and of the operations undertaken for securing of the 
system following the earthquake and for its restarting during the recovery phase. 
Finally, data processing and analysis for assessing the physical impact of the 
earthquake on the pipelines of the distribution network is presented comparing the 
results with existing predictive relationships of repair ratios per km. 
C.2. The L’Aquila earthquake 
On April 6th 2009, 03:32:40 UTC, a moment magnitude (Mw) 6.3 earthquake struck 
the Abruzzo region, in central Italy. The earthquake occurred at about 10 km depth 
along a NW-SW normal fault with SW dip, located below the city of L’Aquila (INGV 
2009). Considerable damage to structures and infrastructures was detected over a 
broad area of approximately 600 square kilometres, including the city of L’Aquila and 
several villages in the Aterno River valley. After the main shock, 3 aftershocks with 
moment magnitude Mw > 5 were recorded (6th April, Mw 5.8; 7th April, Mw 5.3; 9th 
April, Mw 5.1), and 31 with a range of moment magnitude from Mw 3.5 and Mw 5. 
The main shock and its aftershocks were recorded by several digital stations of the 
Italian strong-motion network (Rete Accelerometrica Nazionale, RAN; Zambonelli et 
al.,2010), owned and maintained by the Italian Department of Civil Protection. 
Horizontal peak ground accelerations (PGA) recorded in the near-source region 
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ranged from 0.33g to 0.65g, the latter representing one of the highest values measured 
in Italy (Chioccarelli et al.,2009). Regarding geological effects induced by the 
earthquake, evidence of coesismic surface faulting was found in correspondence of the 
Paganica fault (Blumetti et al., 2009). A set of well aligned ground ruptures was found 
(traced for a length of about 2.6 km), reaching in some sites vertical offsets of 7-8 cm. 
Moreover, numerous rock falls occurred especially near the village of Fossa and 
within the Gran Sasso mountain. Evidence of liquefaction were found in a quarry near 
Bazzano (industrial area) and in Vittorino (near Sulmona), relatively far from the 
epicentre. 
C.2.1.Peak ground velocity map from L`Aquila earthquake ground motion 
records 
A continuous map of the ground motion, for all the extension of the analysed gas 
network, has been derived from the available records, using ShakeMap(TM) (Wald et 
al., 2006). The ShakeMap processing system has provided PGV values as a grid of 
points with associated intensity values of the shaking parameter. Fig. (C.1) shows the 
resulting PGV values, contoured for the maximum horizontal velocity (cm/sec) at each 
station, with contour intervals of 2 cm/sec. Those values have been obtained 
interpolating recorded values and estimated amplitudes obtained considering available 
information about local geology. 
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Figure C.1 Map of PGV (cm/s) contours relative to L’Aquila earthquake (from 
http://shakemap.rm.ingv.it) overlapped to the L’Aquila gas network 
C.3. The gas network in L`Aquila and its management during 
the post-event phase 
Principal components of a nationwide gas supply system include: (1) high-pressure 
transmission lines; (2) Metering/Pressure reduction stations (M/R stations); (3) 
medium-pressure distribution networks; (4) Reduction Groups; (5) low-pressure 
distribution networks; (6) demand nodes; (7) gas meters.  
In Italy the high-pressure transmission lines (operated at a national level by SNAM, 
http://www.snamretegas.it ) are made of welded–steel pipes, with an internal diameter 
of 103.9 mm and a thickness of 5 mm. The connection of the L’Aquila distribution 
medium-pressure network (MP = 64bar) to the national high-pressure transmission 
lines is operated via three Metering/Pressure Reduction Stations, M/R Stations 
(Re.Mi. “Regolazione e Misura” stations, in Italian). The three M/R stations (Re.Mi. 
stations) of the L`Aquila distribution system are cased in one-story reinforced concrete 
structures with steel roofs (Fig. C.2) hosting internal regulators and mechanical 
equipment (heat exchangers, boilers and bowls) where the gas undergoes the 
following processes: (1) gas preheating; (2) gas-pressure reduction and regulation; (3) 
gas odorizing; (5) gas-pressure measurement.  
In L’Aquila region the gas is distributed via a 621 km pipeline network (Fig. 
C.2): 234 km of which operating at medium pressure (2.5 – 3 bar), and the remaining 
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387 km with gas flowing at low pressure (0.025 – 0.035 bar). The pipelines of the 
medium and low pressure distribution networks are either made of steel or HDPE 
(High Density Polyethylene). HDPE pipes have nominal diameters ranging from 32 to 
400 mm, whereas diameter of steel pipes is usually between 25 and 300 mm. Different 
types of in-line valves are found along the pipeline network (mainly gate valves, 
butterfly valves, check valves, ball valves). The transformation of the medium 
distribution pressure into the low distribution pressure (LP) is operated via 300 
Reduction Groups (RGs). Generally along the low pressure network (in some cases 
also along medium distribution pressure network), there are several demand nodes 
(IDU, “Impianto di Derivazione Utenza” in Italian) consisting of buried and not buried 
pipes and accessory elements to supply natural gas to utilities. Moreover, depending 
on the type of final client of the network and whether there is an IDU system, there are 
three types of RG: (a) GRM, Reduction Groups and Measure along medium 
distribution pressure (MP) network and direct connected to large users (e.g., industrial 
facilities); (b) GRU, Reduction Groups smaller than GRM for medium pressure Users 
connected to a medium pressure IDU system; (c) GRF, Final Reduction Group 
connected to low pressure network. It is worth noting that all the components 
contained in both the L’Aquila M/R stations and Reduction Groups are unrestrained, 
and therefore especially seismically vulnerable.  
 
Figure C.2 M/R Metering/Pressure reduction station in Onna (L`Aquila, Italy) 
The 300 Reduction Groups, that in the L`Aquila gas distribution allow for the 
transformation of the medium distribution pressure into the low distribution pressure 
are either buried, sheltered in a metallic kiosk  or housed within/close to a building 
(Fig. C.3).  
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Figure C.3 RG housed in a masonry kiosk closed to building and damaged following the 
6th April 2009 earthquake 
C.3.1.Emergency management of the gas network following the L’Aquila 
earthquake 
The first priority identified for the management of the gas network, in the first phase 
of the emergency immediately after the L`Aquila earthquake, was the timely securing 
of the network in order to avoid explosions, gas leaks and fires and to allow 
emergency vehicles and Search and Rescue USAR teams to act in the safest possible 
way. To ensure this priority, the entire network managed by ENEL Rete Gas S.p.A. 
(http://www.enel.it/it-IT/reti/enel_rete_gas/) in the affected area was shut off via the 
closure of the three operating M/R stations (Dolce et al., 2010). Thanks to this 
decision, it was possible to timely and significantly reduce the gas pressure and to 
avoid the occurrence of secondary effects of the earthquake. The subsequent closure of 
the 300 GR Reduction Groups ensured the full securing of the network in less than 
two hours after the earthquake. In the days following the event, all the gas valves 
external to each residential building were closed as well. 
 The process to recovery the gas network started few days after the earthquake.  
To more effectively manage and prioritise the repair activities, during the recovery 
phase, four different areas, in the region served by the gas network, were identified, 
namely: Central Area (Z1); West Area (Z2), East Area (Z3), Sud-East Area (Z4). The 
Central Area, Z1, included the historical centre of the city and the surrounding where a 
large number of the collapsed and severely damaged buildings was concentrated. The 
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West Area, Z2, includes the west suburbs and the municipalities of Lucoli and 
Tornimparte, where a moderate/slight impact on the built environment was observed. 
The East Area, Z3, corresponds to the east suburbs, including Onna e Paganica, where 
a large percentage of the buildings resulted collapsed or severely damaged. The Sud-
East Area, Z4, includes municipalities less affected by the earthquake (i.e. Ocre, 
Rocca di Cambio and Rocca di Mezzo). The areas Z2 and Z3 were the first ones to be 
targeted for the recovery activities. In these areas, six days after the earthquake event, 
the network was restored to allow for 50% of the end-users to be potentially 
reconnected. The reactivation of the shut-off gas network required:  the check of the 
gas flow in the medium and low-pressure networks; the check of each external valve 
pertinent to each residential building previously closed; the substitution of each gas-
meter. The check and reactivation of low and medium pressure networks was managed 
in the following four steps: (1) seal verification; (2) nitrogen check; (3) repair of 
damaged pipes and/or valves; (4) reopening. In the seal verification phase, the 
detection of broken pipes and/or the possible joint slip-off was made, acting in the first 
instance, from node to node, and further segmenting the network when necessary 
(Dolce et al., 2010). The material and equipment needed for the repair was 
immediately available from the integrated logistics system used by Enel Rete Gas. The 
adopted strategy ensured the remediation and testing of more than 90% of the gas 
network in three months time after the earthquake and the provision of the gas supply 
for all the end-users with a safe home. Fig. (C.4) (red line) shows the percentage of the 
customers that could have been potentially reconnected to the network for all the four 
zones. In fact, a relative minor percentage of the end-users was reactivated to the 
service, (Fig. C.4, blue line), since the reactivation required a safe building for the 
supply; i.e., green tagging by the civil protection.  It is worth highlighting that data on 
potential reconnection and end-user activation were recorded and reported in Fig. 
(C.4) starting only from 6th of May. Because data were not available for the month 
after the earthquake, dashed lines in Fig. (C.4)  represent an hypothetical trend of 
serviceability of the network considering that immediately after the earthquake the 
entire network in the affected area was shut off by the operator.  
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Figure C.4 Percentage of the customers potentially reconnected (red line) and 
reconnected (blue line) to the networks for all the four zones in the months following the 
earthquake referring time period when data were available 
C.4. Physical damage assessment for the gas system  
In order to assess the physical damage that occurred to the gas network components 
(described in Section C.3), the technical reports from Enel Rete GAS (the only gas 
network operator in the affected region), describing the repair and replacement 
activities following L’Aquila earthquake, have been processed. In particular, Enel 
Rete GAS was involved in two types of technical activities: (1) activities to recovery 
the system efficiency to its state before the earthquake (referred to as “Rei.activities”, 
recover system efficiency as a result of exceptional events); (2) reconstruction 
activities to improve the gas network efficiency beyond its original condition (referred 
to as “E1E.activities”, reconstruction of facilities for investments as a result of 
exceptional operations). More than 500 technical reports from Enel Rete GAS related 
to “Rei.activities” maintenance/repair activities following the earthquake were 
analyzed and processed, over a period of five months (from April 2009 to August 
2009). Starting from those reports different maintenance operations have been 
identified and geocoded. (For April 2009, in a situation of full emergency, the 
technical reports describing the repair activities were not compiled; and only costs of 
the operations are available for that period. However, assistance and emergency 
support interventions were the main operations undertaken during the month of April, 
with a limited activity of repair/restoration of the gas network.) For each component, 
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operations where gathered in macro categories that are not exactly associated with a 
particular damage level, since the extent and description of the damage sustained by 
the network components were insufficiently reported in the technical reports, which 
scope was more related to price the repair activity rather than to report the damage. 
However, from processing of technical and economic reports, it has been possible to 
get an aggregate quantification of: (1) the damage to the network system’ components; 
(2) the aggregate cost associated with different types of repair operations; (3) the time 
required for different types of repair operations. A more detailed description of the 
maintenance operations was illustrated in a previous paper of the authors (Esposito et 
al., 2011a). Reports related to “E1E.activities” were furthermore analyzed and 
processed until November 2009 but more than two years after the earthquake, the 
“E1E.activities” activities are still on-going. Further reports will be processed, 
extending the observation period, to get a clearer overview on these activities and on 
how they have impacted in the recovery process following the earthquake. 
C.4.1. Processing of technical reports and results 
The processing of damage reports allowed for a classification of maintenance 
operations. In particular the list below illustrates the typology of maintenance 
operations for “Rei.activities”: 
• testing operations (disconnecting and reconnecting the network); 
• gas leak detection and repair; 
• valve replacement; 
• demand node repair 
As mentioned, the reports were compiled by field crews with the main objective 
to restore the gas system to service as rapidly as possible and price the repair; 
documenting damage was of secondary importance. As a results repair records have 
some inaccuracies, including omitted address indication, vague damage description 
and multiple repairs at a single site combined into one record. For these reasons, 
processing 513 technical reports and excluding incomplete ones, a dataset consisting 
of 431 records has been obtained. In order to get a clear idea of the damage undertaken 
by the gas network system, maintenance intervention types have been summarized 
identifying eight macro categories: three for pipelines (including operation for pipeline 
inspection or screening, P_scr, pipeline repair, P_rep, pipeline reconnection, P_rec), 
three for the valves (excavation for valve inspection, V_exc, valve insertion, V_ins, 
valve removal, V_rem); and two for the demand nodes, IDU (realization of buried, 
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I_rea_b, and unburied demand node, I_rea_nb). Fig. (C.5) illustrates the number of 
interventions included in each of the considered macro categories.    
 
Figure C.5 Number of maintenance operations 
The aim of this work is to obtain pipelines damage curves, expressed in number of 
repairs per km, overlaying density of repairs activities to the ground motion observed 
in the affected area in terms of peak ground velocity. Therefore, the database obtained 
was further purified of all records related to screening operations (P_scr), valve 
excavation (V_exc), realization of unburied nodes (I_rea_nb) and the interventions 
indicated as “other” that refer to transport operations or closure of excavations 
previously made. At the end of this process a reduced dataset consisting of 176 
maintenance records was obtained. Fig. (C.6) illustrates the composition of the 
reduced database used for damage analysis. Damage reports of maintenance 
operations involved pipes operating at medium (MP) and low (LP) pressure. Moreover 
the pipelines of the medium and low pressure distribution networks are either made of 
steel or HDPE. Fig. (C.7) illustrates this operations included in the dataset 
distinguished in relation to pressure level and pipe material. 
C.4.2.  Density of repairs activities versus ShakeMap PGV values  
Earthquake damage to buried pipelines can be attributed to transient ground 
deformation (caused by ground shaking) or to permanent ground deformation, PGD 
(including surface faulting, liquefaction, landslides, and differential settlement from 
consolidation of cohesionless soil) or both (Toprak and Taskin, 2006).  
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Figure C.6 Reduced database of maintenance operations 
 
Figure C.7 Dataset distinguished in relation to pressure level and pipe material 
The earthquake impact on the pipeline is commonly measured in term of the Repair 
Rate, RR, which is the number of pipeline repairs in an area divided by the length of 
the pipelines in the same area. Empirical data on pipeline failures from past 
earthquakes have been processed to define Repair Rate empirical correlations, able to 
predict the number of repairs per unit length of pipe required as a function of a 
parameter representative of ground shaking (e.g., peak ground velocity or acceleration, 
PGV and PGA, respectively) or ground failure (i.e., PGD) (ALA 2001a). A concise 
summary of “Repair Rate” fragility curves for buried pipes due to ground shaking can 
be found in Tromans (2004) including the dataset used and the range of applicability 
for each relation. This study aims to derive Repair Rate values for the gas network 
following the L`Aquila earthquake as a function of the PGV. Exception made for 
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surface faulting phenomena, limited PGD were, in fact, observed following the 
L`Aquila earthquake (as reported in Section C.2). Therefore, the damage to the 
pipelines, deduced from the analyzed repair activities, has been correlated with the 
experienced ground shaking. Moreover, among the various seismic parameters used to 
correlate the ground motion effects to the damage suffered by buried pipeline, the 
peak ground velocity, PGV, has been identified as the one having a more direct 
physical interpretation (O’Rourke et al. 1998). Actually, PGV is correlated with the 
ground strain that can be transferred to the pipeline, depending on the slippage 
developed between the pipe and the surrounding soil. Therefore a good correlation 
between PGV and pipeline damage is expected.  
In order to evaluate RR data points based on L’Aquila earthquake, both the 
network and the damage data have been mapped using a Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS). For the evaluation of pipeline RR-PGV points, the PGV values from 
the ShakeMap of Fig. (C.1) were used. It is worth noticing that, although the repairs 
activities dataset covers four distinct areas, as explained in Section C.3.1, only the data 
belonging to the Zone 1 have been considered and processed for deriving the RR-PGV 
points. Actually, in the emergency management phase, following the earthquake, 
several repairs activities were carried out without completing the reporting 
documentation. Zone 1 was the only one where the repair data were completely 
reported, for the observation period considered in this analysis. Therefore, in order to 
avoid an underestimation of the repair ratio, data from the other Zones have been 
eliminated. Moreover since the network belonging to the historical center has been 
completely replaced, repairs data belonging to this zone (referred to as the “Red 
Zone”) have been, equally eliminated, from the dataset. The resulting study area is 
shown in Fig. (C.8), together with the L’Aquila gas distribution system and the repairs 
occurring in the analysed zone. The repairs dataset used for repair ratio evaluation is 
composed of 85 data repairs distinguished in six macro categories, as illustrated in 
Fig. (C.9). This dataset includes 8 repair operations on pipes operating at medium 
pressure and 77 on pipes operating at low pressure. As concern to material, only 11 
repair operations included in the dataset were on HDPE pipes and the remaining 74 
were on steel pipes. 
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Figure C.8 Selected area for the evaluation of Repair Ratio 
 
Figure C.9 Dataset for repair ratio evaluation distinguished in relation to pipe material 
Using the GIS software, repair rate of the selected area have been calculated for each 
PGV zone combining repairs location, pipeline network and PGV contours. For each 
PGV zone, number of repairs and pipeline length has been calculated. The resulting 
points (Fig. C.10)  are compared with pipeline fragility relations suitable for the 
L’Aquila gas network reported in Tab. (C.1)12. Note that data obtained from the 
analysis consider PGV as the maximum horizontal velocity (cm/sec); even if some 
fragility curves consider the geometrical mean horizontal component for PGV, no 
                                                 
12 Fragility relations reported in Table 1 were converted by Tromans (2004): RR was converted 
from 1/feet*103 to  1/km and PGV from inch/s to cm/s. 
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conversion has been applied ; see Beyer and Bommer (2006) for a discussion. Results 
shows that the trend is somehow comparable with existing pipeline-fragility curves; 
although the fragility curves seems to be conservative on respect to the observed 
damage, it must be highlighted that the scatter associated with the empirical fragility 
relations is quite high since those fragility curves have been obtained combining data 
from different kinds of pipes (e.g. ALA, 2001a).  
Table C.1RR - PGV pipelines fragility relations suitable for L’Aquila gas network 
Author Fragility relation Notes 
ALA (2001a) 
1 0.002416R ALAR K PGV= ⋅ ⋅  “backbone13” curve (K1=1) 
HAZUS (FEMA, 
1999) 
2.250.00003RR PGV= ⋅  “ductile pipes” curve 
Eidinger (1998) 1.98
1 0.0001658RR K PGV= ⋅ ⋅  “best-fit” curve (K1=1) 
 
It is important to note that L’Aquila gas pipelines are made of steel and HDPE. HDPE 
is not well studied in current literature as no empirical fragility curves have been 
developed specifically for this material. However, the RR resulting seems to be 
comparable with the fragility curve derived by Eidinger (1998).  
When looking at Fig. (C.10) it is to recall that, as in some of the case studies 
reported in the literature, the repair rate following the L’Aquila earthquake incorporate 
the damage from both the ground shaking and the ground deformations, including 
PGD effects and surface rupture (ALA 2001b). Unfortunately data available from 
L’Aquila earthquake does not make possible to derive an empirical curve because of 
the limited PGV range [22-34 cm/s]; anyway it could be useful to include repair data 
obtained in this work in a pipe damage database to develop new fragility curves. 
 
C.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents the preliminary results of the data processing activities that are on-
going on the L`Aquila case study to understand the impact of the earthquake on the 
                                                 
13 Backbone fragility functions represent the average performance of all kinds of pipes in 
earthquakes. These functions can be used when there is no knowledge of the pipe materials, 
joint type, diameter, etc. 
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gas distribution system. In particular the ground shaking induced damage to the gas 
distribution network following the April 6th 2009 earthquake was analyzed.  
 
Figure C.10 RR-PGV points compared with some fragility curves suitable for the L’Aquila 
gas network 
To this aim the technical reports from the repair activities following the earthquakes 
were processed to obtain the repair rate (number of repairs per km) as a function of the 
level of ground shaking experienced, expressed in terms of PGV. In fact, while it is 
expected pipelines suffer damage (mostly) from ground displacements, insufficient 
PGD data were available for the region at the time of the study and therefore damage 
was correlated to PGV only (as in some of the literature studies at the basis of the 
existing fragility functions for networks’ components). 
The selected period refers to May 2009 - August 2009 since repair activities 
related to the month of April were not reported technically. However, assistance and 
emergency support interventions were the main operations undertaken during the 
month of April, with a limited activity of repair/restoration of the gas network. Many 
repair reports from the network operator were discarded because of incomplete or 
unsuitable information. Moreover, although the repair dataset covers four distinct 
areas, only the data belonging to the Zone 1 have been considered and processed since 
this area was the only one where the repair data were completely reported, for the 
observation period considered in this analysis. 
This whole set of issues resulted in a limited data available. Nevertheless, the 
resulting repair rates were finally compared with those ones available from the 
literature to assess whether these functions can be applied in the assessment of gas 
distribution networks of similar types. 
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Appendix D – LANDSLIDE POTENTIAL 
CHARACTERIZATION OF 
L’AQUILA REGION 
The methodology presented in HAZUS (FEMA, 2004) has been used to characterize 
landslide susceptibility of L’Aquila region, based on the geologic group, slope angle, 
and ground-water condition thanks to a process jointly developed by Department of 
Hydraulic Engineering, Geotechnical and Environmental and Department of Structural 
Engineering of University of Naples, “Federico II. Study by Wilson and Keefer (1985) 
was the foundation of this methodology, which categorizes landslide susceptibility 
from lowest to highest. Geology has been derived from 1:50,000 scale ISPRA geologic 
maps (http://www.isprambiente.gov.it). Each rock type was classified into three 
geologic groups using the HAZUS method (Fig. D.1). Slope angle was generated from 
topographic data, and was grouped into six slope classes: 3-10, 10-15, 15-20, 20-30, 
30-40, >40 degrees (Fig. D.2). Ground-water conditions have been considered as wet 
for geologic groups B and C. A spatial overlay of these data layers (geologic group and 
slope angle) was performed using Arc/GIS software. The resulting polygons were then 
attributed with the corresponding susceptibility category (I to X). Moreover starting 
from the susceptibility categories, the critical acceleration map has been obtained 
according to the HAZUS methodology (Fig. D.3). 
A map showing earthquake-induced landslide susceptibility and critical 
accelerations for the L’Aquila area is essential for good decision making at local and 
regional levels of government to accurately estimate losses from potential earthquakes. 
For the purpose of this thesis, these maps have been used as input for the geotechnical 
analysis in order to estimate the seismic demand due to landslide and to obtain the 
failure probability of each facility and distributing elements of the case study. 
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Figure D.1 Classification of geological groups for L’Aquila region according to HAZUS 
(FEMA, 2004) methodology  
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Figure D.2 Slope angles categories fro l’Aquila region  
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Figure D.3 Critical acceleration map for L’Aquila region according to HAZUS (FEMA, 
2004) methodology 
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